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2-1060 Illinois v. Lidster
Ruling Below: (Ill., 202 Ill. 2d 1, 779 N.E.2d 855, 72 Crim. L. Rep. 79)
Roadblock at which vehicles were stopped, without suspicion, for purpose of finding leads about
crime that had occurred in same area approximately one week earlier violated Fourth
Amendment as interpreted in Indianapolis, Ind v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 69 U.S.L.W. 4009
(2000); evidence of drunk driving discovered in stop at roadblock must be suppressed.
Question Presented: Does Indianapolis, Ind v. Edmond prohibit police officers from
conducting checkpoint organized to investigate prior offense, at which checkpoint law
enforcement officers briefly stopped all oncoming motorists to hand out flyers about - and look
for witnesses to - offense, under circumstances in which checkpoint was conducted exactly one
week after - and at approximately same time of day as - offense, and checkpoint otherwise met
reasonableness standard articulated in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)?
PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
V.
Robert S. LIDSTER, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Illinois
Decided October 18, 2002.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the
court:
Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Du
Page County convicted defendant of driving
under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-
501(a)(2) (West 1996)). The appellate court
found that the roadblock where the police
arrested defendant did not comply with the
constitutional standards set forth in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct.
447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). Accordingly, the
appellate court reversed defendant's conviction.
319 Ill.App.3d 825, 254 Ill.Dec. 379, 747
N.E.2d 419. We granted the State's petition for
leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), and
allowed the Illinois Association of Chiefs of
Police to file an amicus curiae brief in support
of the State. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
On August 30, 1997, the Lombard police
department set up a roadblock on North Avenue
in Lombard, Illinois. A police officer stopped
defendant at the roadblock and directed him to a
side street where another police officer had
defendant perform several field-sobriety tests.
Defendant failed a number of the tests and was
taken into custody.
Defendant was subsequently charged with the
offense of driving under the influence of
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alcohol. He filed a motion to quash his arrest
and suppress evidence. At the hearing on the
motion, Detective Ray Vasil testified that
Lieutenant Glennon, third in command at the
Lombard police department, authorized the
roadblock. The purpose of the roadblock was
to obtain information from motorists regarding a
hit-and-run accident that took place one week
earlier, at the same location, and at the same
time of day. In particular, the police wanted
information regarding a Ford Bronco or full-
sized pickup truck implicated in the accident.
The Lombard police department has a general
order regarding the use of roadblocks. The
order, however, does not contain guidelines
regarding the use of roadblocks to obtain
information from crime witnesses. The
roadblock at issue was not videotaped. Further,
the police did not publicize the roadblock.
Between 6 and 12 police vehicles participated in
the roadblock. Detective Vasil wore an orange
reflective vest with the word "Police" on it, and
stood between the eastbound lanes of North
Avenue, 15 feet from the roadblock. A line of
cars formed at the roadblock. As each vehicle
pulled up to Detective Vasil, he handed a flyer
to the driver of the vehicle requesting
information regarding the accident. Because
defendant's Mazda minivan almost hit him,
Detective Vasil requested defendant's driver's
license and insurance card. Detective Vasil
smelled alcohol on defendant's breath and
noticed that defendant's speech was slurred.
Detective Vasil directed defendant to a side
street where Detective Roy Newton had
defendant perform several sobriety tests.
The trial court denied defendant's motion.
At defendant's subsequent bench trial, Detective
Newton testified that he was assigned to the
corner of North Avenue and Craig. His duties
were to ensure that drivers did not skirt the
roadblock and to provide help to the officers in
the event they experienced any problems with
the vehicles or drivers stopped at the roadblock.
The officers at the roadblock directed several
cars, including defendant's vehicle, to Detective
Newton's location. At Detective Newton's
request, defendant produced a driver's license
and insurance information. Detective Newton
then had defendant perform several sobriety
tests and placed defendant under arrest.
The court found defendant guilty of driving
under the influence of alcohol. The court
sentenced defendant to one year of conditional
discharge and required that defendant
participate in counseling, complete 14 days in
the "Sheriffs Work Alternative Program," and
pay a fine of $200.
ANALYSIS
As noted above, the appellate court relied on
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148
L.Ed.2d 333, in finding the roadblock at issue
invalid. In Edmond, the United States Supreme
Court invalidated checkpoints set up by the
police on Indianapolis roads in an effort to
interdict unlawful drugs. Initially, the Court
observed:
"The Fourth Amendment requires that searches
and seizures be reasonable. A search or seizure
is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. While
such suspicion is not an 'irreducible' component
of reasonableness [citation], we have recognized
only limited circumstances in which the usual
rule does not apply....
We have also upheld brief, suspicionless
seizures of motorists at a fixed Border Patrol
checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens,
Martinez- Fuerte, [428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074,
49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) ], and at a sobriety
checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers
from the road, Michigan Dept. of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444[, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110
L.Ed.2d 412] (1990)." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37,
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121 S.Ct. at 451-52, 148 L.Ed.2d at 340- 41.
The Edmond Court concluded that the
Indianapolis checkpoints were invalid, stating:
"The primary purpose of the Indianapolis
narcotics checkpoints is in the end to advance
'the general interest in crime control,' [citation].
We decline to suspend the usual requirement of
individualized suspicion where the police seek
to employ a checkpoint primarily for the
ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We
cannot sanction stops justified only by the
generalized and ever-present possibility that
interrogation and inspection may reveal that any
given motorist has committed some crime."
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 121 S.Ct. at 455, 148
L.Ed.2d at 345.
In the present case, the appellate court held the
roadblock at issue invalid under Edmond The
appellate court noted "that the roadblock's
ostensible purpose was to seek evidence of
'ordinary criminal wrongdoing.' "319 Ill.App.3d
at 828, 254 Ill.Dec. 379, 747 N.E.2d 419. The
court concluded "[t]his is the type of routine
investigative work that the police must do every
day and does not justify the extraordinary means
chosen to further the investigation." 319
Ill.App.3d at 828, 254 Ill.Dec. 379, 747 N.E.2d
419.
The State asserts that Edmond is distinguishable
because the roadblock at issue had a specific
purpose of assisting the authorities in solving a
crime that had already been committed and was
known to the police. Thus, police efforts were
not directed at general crime control. Unlike in
Edmond, the Lombard police department did not
seek to interrogate and inspect motorists to
ferret out evidence that the motorists themselves
had committed crime that was as yet unknown
to police. Defendant was only subjected to
further investigation because he narrowly
missed hitting an officer in the area where
vehicles were stopped.
The State's interpretation of Edmond is
incorrect. First, as the Court reaffirmed in
Edmond, the general rule is that "a search or
seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence
of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing."
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 121 S.Ct. at 451, 148
L.Ed.2d at 340.. Certainly the Lombard
roadblock does not fall within the scope of the
limited exceptions heretofore approved by the
Supreme Court.
Second, the Court in Edmond was keenly aware
that an exception for roadblocks "designed
primarily to serve the general interest in crime
control" would abrogate the general rule
requiring individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. See 4 W. LaFave, Search &
Seizure § 9.6 (3d ed. Supp.2002). Accordingly,
the Court drew a bright line that when the
primary purpose of a roadblock is general crime
control, the roadblock is unconstitutional. The
Court explained:
"Without drawing the line at roadblocks
designed primarily to serve the general interest
in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would
do little to prevent such intrusions from
becoming a routine part of American life."
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 121 S.Ct. at 454, 148
L.Ed.2d at 344.
In the case at bar, the State ignores the concerns
expressed by the Court in Edmond In spite of
the clear admonishment in Edmond against the
use of roadblocks to advance "the general
interest in crime control," the State requests that
we allow a roadblock for precisely that purpose.
Third, the State finds a distinction between
173
gathering information leading to the arrest and
prosecution of a motorist as the perpetrator of a
crime, and gathering information from a
motorist leading to the identification of another
motorist as the perpetrator of a crime.
According to the State, gathering information
leading to the arrest and prosecution of a
motorist as the perpetrator of a crime is a part of
general crime control. However, the State
maintains that gathering information from a
motorist leading to the identification of another
motorist as the perpetrator of a crime is not
considered a part of general crime control.
Taking the State's reasoning a step further, a
police investigation tool such as canvassing a
neighborhood to find identification witnesses to
a crime is not considered to be a part of general
crime control. In the State's view, crime control
involves arresting the perpetrator directly; it
does not involve gathering information leading
to the arrest of the perpetrator. We must reject
this contention. In investigating and solving any
crime, police efforts are directed at general
crime control. This holds true whether the
police happen upon the perpetrator of the crime
at the roadblock or obtain information from a
roadblock detainee identifying the perpetrator of
the crime.
Lastly, an exception for informational
roadblocks has the potential to make roadblocks
"a routine part of American life." Edmond, 531
U.S. at 42, 121 S.Ct. at 454, 148 L.Ed.2d at 344.
In 2000, 870 murders, 49,652 assaults, 25,168
robberies, 77,947 burglaries, 306,805 thefts,
55,222 motor vehicle thefts, and 2,899 arsons
were known by police to have been committed
in Illinois. J. Fitch, 2001 Illinois Statistical
Abstract 764 (16th ed.2001). [...] Should the
police have been allowed to set up roadblocks to
obtain information from potential witnesses for
each murder? What of a robbery, an aggravated
criminal sexual assault, an arson or any other
serious crime? According to the State, for a
period of at least a week after each crime, police
could set up roadblocks with the specific
purpose of making inquiries of persons who
were possibly witnesses to a crime. The
troubling specter then arises that the streets of
Cook County, or at least the streets of Chicago,
would be adorned with roadblocks, an outcome
clearly unacceptable under Edmond
Amicus suggests that exigent circumstances
justified the use of the roadblock. Amicus
asserts that police needed to act quickly to
contact possible witnesses or else risk losing
vital information. The Court in Edmond left
open the possibility that an emergency may
justify a law enforcement roadblock. The Court
explained:
"Of course, there are circumstances that may
justify a law enforcement checkpoint where the
primary purpose would otherwise, but for some
emergency, relate to ordinary crime control.[...]
The State and amicus fail in their attempts to
distinguish Edmond Edmond clarifies that
"[w]hen law enforcement authorities pursue
primarily general crime control purposes at
checkpoints such as here, * * * stops can only
be justified by some quantum of individualized
suspicion." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47, 121 S.Ct.
at 457, 148 L.Ed.2d at 347.
CONCLUSION
The laws of this state require that a motorist
remain at the scene of an accident. In the
present case, the motorist left the scene of the
accident. The police set up a roadblock to obtain
information regarding the identity of the
motorist. The goals of the police in doing so are
laudable.
This court is sympathetic to the efforts of the
police in identifying the motorist involved in the
accident. Sympathy, however, does not justify
the roadblock at issue. As the Supreme Court
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observed in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596
(1973):
"The needs of law enforcement stand in constant
tension with the Constitution's protections of the
individual against certain exercises of official
power. It is precisely the predictability of these
pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to
constitutional safeguards.[... ]
The right of an individual to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures is an
indispensable freedom, not a mere luxury. It
cannot give way in the face of a temporary need
for the police to obtain information regarding
the identity of the motorist at issue. As the
protector of the constitutional rights of all
citizens of this state, this court is commanded to
draw a "line at roadblocks designed primarily to
serve the general interest in crime control."
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42, 121 S.Ct. at 454, 148
L.Ed.2d at 344. Without such a line, the fourth
amendment will do little to prevent intrusive
searches and seizures from becoming a routine
part of American life. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42,
121 S.Ct. at 454, 148 L.Ed.2d at 344.
The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
constitutionally impermissible. Consequently,
the majority abrogates the balancing test of
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61
L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), which is normally applied
in roadblock cases. For all of these reasons and
as more fully explained below, I respectfully
dissent.
1. Edmond Is Distinguishable and Is Not
Determinative
In Edmond, the Court considered the
constitutionality of an Indianapolis checkpoint
program that had as its primary purpose the
interdiction of illegal drugs. In contrast to the
10 to 15 second stops in the present case, which
were conducted for the sole purpose of handing
out an informational flyer, the total duration of
the stops in Edmond lasted between two and
five minutes. Moreover, unlike the roadblock
here, drivers in Edmond were asked to produce
a license and registration while an officer
looked for signs of impairment. The officer also
conducted an open-view examination of the
vehicle from the outside. Meanwhile, a
narcotics-detection dog was walked around the
outside of the stopped vehicle. Thus, the nature,
purpose, and scope of the roadblocks were
completely different in the two cases.
Affirmed.
Justice THOMAS, dissenting:
The majority has misconstrued City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct.
447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000), by reading it to
prohibit the type of roadblock at issue here.
Edmond is factually distinguishable, and its
language does not condemn the strictly
informational roadblock instituted by the
Lombard police department in this case.
Additionally, I believe that the majority
erroneously creates a per se rule that roadblocks
involving police canvassing for information
about a specific, known crime are
In concluding that a checkpoint designed
primarily to catch drug offenders and interdict
illegal narcotics violates the fourth amendment,
the Edmond Court stated the following:
"We decline to suspend the usual requirement of
individualized suspicion where the police seek
to employ a checkpoint primarily for the
ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We
cannot sanction stops justified only by the
generalized and ever-present possibility that
interrogation and inspection may reveal that
any given motorist has committed some crime."
(Emphasis added.) Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44,
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121 S.Ct. at 455, 148 L.Ed.2d at 345.
... I believe that the majority improperly relies
on the first sentence in the above-quoted
passage from Edmond and disregards the second
sentence, which, modifying the first, plainly
proscribes checkpoints for the purpose of
exposing unknown crimes to the police. . . .
Instead, I would find that absent either exigent
circumstances or a sufficient relationship to
highway safety or border concerns, Edmond
categorically prohibits only checkpoints whose
primary purpose lies in discovering that the
subjects of the seizure have committed some
crime (Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43-44, 121 S.Ct. at
455, 148 L.Ed.2d at 345)....
Here, the roadblock at issue had a specific
purpose of assisting the authorities in solving a
crime that had already been committed and was
known to the police. Thus, police efforts were
not directed at general crime control within the
meaning of Edmond Unlike in Edmond, the
Lombard police department did not seek to
interrogate and inspect motorists to ferret out
evidence that the motorists themselves had
committed a crime that was as yet unknown to
police. The present defendant was subjected to
investigation only because his erratic driving
nearly resulted in his collision with an officer in
the area where vehicles were stopped for
purposes of handing out flyers. Once the
officers witnessed defendant's erratic driving,
they clearly had reasonable suspicion to detain
defendant for further inquiry. See People v.
Sorenson, 196 Il.2d 425, 433, 256 Ill.Dec. 836,
752 N.E.2d 1078 (2001); People v. Brodack,
296 Ill.App.3d 71, 74, 230 Ill.Dec. 540, 693
N.E.2d 1291 (1998). As the Court in Edmond
recognized, its holding was not meant to "impair
the ability of police officers to act appropriately
upon information that they properly learn during
a checkpoint stop justified by a lawful primary
purpose, even where such action may result in
the arrest of a motorist for an offense unrelated
to that purpose." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48, 121
The conclusion that Edmond does not compel
the result reached by the majority here is
supported by the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Virginia in Burns v. Commonwealth,
261 Va. 307, 541 S.E.2d 872 (2001), which is
the only other reported case decided in the
aftermath of Edmond to assess the validity of a
roadblock established with the hope of
discovering witnesses to a specific, known
crime, as opposed to a roadblock established to
discover evidence of crime in general. There,
police set up a roadblock . . . in the hopes of
discovering witnesses to a brutal murder that
occurred in a nearby house between the same
hours on September 20-21, 1998.
In holding that the roadblock did not violate the
fourth amendment, the Supreme Court of
Virginia first considered and weighed the
factors enunciated in Brown. Burns, 261 Va. at
322, 541 S.E.2d at 883.
Similarly, I would find that the roadblock in the
present case did not violate fourth amendment
principles. At the time police set up the
roadblock, the offender remained at large with
his identity unknown. Thus, he continued to
pose a safety risk to others on the road.
Moreover, even if the perpetrator was not an
immediate threat, the same exigent
circumstances found to exist in Burns were
present here because police had to move
relatively quickly to canvass the area at the
appropriate time or risk losing information
about the crime.
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S.Ct. at 457, 148 L.Ed.2d at 347.
II. Application of the Brown Balancing Test
Given my conclusion that Edmond does not
categorically prohibit the type of roadblock at
issue in the present case, I believe that it is
incumbent upon this court to assess the validity
of the roadblock in relation to the factors noted
in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637,
61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). It is well settled that a
vehicle stop at a roadblock or highway
checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. Edmond,
531 U.S. at 40, 121 S.Ct. at 453, 148 L.Ed.2d at
342; People v. Bartley, 109 Ill.2d 273, 280, 93
Ill.Dec. 347, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985). However,
a roadblock where individuals are stopped
without probable cause or individualized
suspicion is not a per se violation of the fourth
amendment; the question of whether a
roadblock violates the fourth amendment is one
of reasonableness, requiring the weighing of the
gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of
the interference with individual liberty. Brown,
443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. at 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d
at 361-62; Bartley, 109 Ill.2d at 280, 93 Ill.Dec.
347, 486 N.E.2d 880.
The factors set forth in Brown require a court to
balance the State's asserted interest for the
roadblock against the "objective" and
"subjective" intrusion on the motorist. Prouse,
440 U.S. at 656, 99 S.Ct. at 1397, 59 L.Ed.2d at
669; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 96 S.Ct.
at 3083, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1128. The objective
intrusion is measured by such factors as the
length of the stop, the nature of the questioning,
and whether a search is conducted; the
subjective intrusion relates to the concern,
fright, or annoyance on the part of the motorist.
Bartley, 109 1ll.2d at 282, 93 Ill.Dec. 347, 486
N.E.2d 880.
Application of the Brown factors to the instant
case leads to the conclusion that the roadblock
established by the Lombard police department
passed constitutional standards. The department
made the decision to set up the roadblock
because of a fatal hit-and-run accident that had
been committed in the precise area of the
roadblock, and officials did not know the
identity of the offender responsible for the
crime. That the perpetrator was still at large
was indeed a matter of grave public concern,
and the roadblock advanced that concern by
aiding in the investigation of the cnme.
Moreover, the timing of the roadblock, exactly
one week after the crime at approximately the
same time of day, was purposely designed to
stop motorists who might routinely travel that
route at the end of their work shift and thus was
narrowly tailored for maximum effectiveness.
Thus, I would find that the State's interest in the
roadblock was sufficient to outweigh a minimal
intrusion on the motorist.
Likewise, the subjective nature of the intrusion
was minimal. The record indicates that a high-
ranking lieutenant in the police department
called the meeting to inform the officers that
they were to participate in the roadblock.
Vehicles were stopped in a systematic and
preestablished manner - all eastbound traffic
was stopped and this was not a roving patrol.
Although an officer participating in the
roadblock admitted that there were no written
guidelines for "informational roadblocks"
contained in the department's written guidelines,
the department did have guidelines for
roadblocks generally, and there is no indication
that the officers in the field did not follow the
preestablished procedure for this particular
roadblock. Although the roadblock itself may
not have been publicized in advance, it is clear
that the basis for the roadblock had been well-
publicized, which would have likely minimized
any apprehension motorists may have otherwise
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experienced upon encountering it. Finally, any
anxiety motorists may have felt was dissipated
by the official nature of the operation - there
was a large number of emergency vehicles
present with flashing lights and officers clad in
orange police vests.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the
judgment of the appellate court and reinstate
defendant's conviction. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.
Justices FITZGERALD and GARMAN join in
this dissent.
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Justices Weight Police Roadblocks in Crime Probes; Fairness of Unrelated Arrests at Issue before
Supreme Court
Chicago Sun-Times
May 6, 2003
Dan Rozak
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to hear
a case out of Lombard that tests the
constitutionality of police roadblocks as part of
an investigation.
Police in the west suburb put up a roadblock in
1997 and briefly stopped every car that passed,
passing out leaflets seeking information about a
fatal hit-and-run.
Robert Lidster, who police say nearly hit an
officer as he drove up to the checkpoint, was
charged with drunken driving and convicted.
But the Illinois Supreme Court later threw out
Lidster's conviction, ruling that the roadblock
amounted to an unconstitutional search of
drivers and that police could not stop drivers at
random every time they needed tips about a
crime. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear
an appeal of that decision filed by the Illinois
attorney general's office on behalf of the
Lombard police.
"When the police are conducting an
investigation into a crime, they should not be
barred from taking action when another crime is
committed in front of them," Melissa Merz, a
spokeswoman for Attorney General Lisa
Madigan, said Monday.
At issue in the Lombard case is whether police
can set up checkpoints to seek information
about a recent crime - then arrest people for
drunken driving or other wrongdoing.
Lidster's attorney, G. Joseph Weller, told
justices that, if the police wanted to seek
information, they could have used other ways,
such as radio and television stations.
Lombard Police Chief Ray Byrne said Monday
that police checkpoints are useful in solving
crimes and he wants the court to uphold a
conviction he sees as the result "of just good
police work."
"It was a crime-solving technique that was
very unobtrusive," said Byrne, who was not
with the Lombard department at the time of
Lidster's arrest.
The police set up the roadblock that caught
Lidster at the same spot and time of day that the
hit-and-run took place. They hoped to find
someone who used the route and had seen the
collision. Police stopped each car for 10 to 15
seconds--long enough to mention the crash and
hand out a flier asking for help.
The nation's high court already has said police
officers can set up sobriety checkpoints to
randomly detect drunken drivers and border
roadblocks to intercept undocumented
immigrants. But the justices ruled in 2000 that
random roadblocks intended for drug searches
are an unreasonable invasion of privacy under
the constitution.
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Lombard Case Could Affect Police Roadblocks
Chicago Daily Herald
October 19, 2002
Robert Sanchez Daily Herald Staff Writer
Law enforcement authorities said they're
troubled by an Illinois Supreme Court ruling
Friday that puts strict limits on when they may
use roadblocks to stop drivers.
In a 4-3 decision, the court threw out the DUI
conviction of Robert Lidster, who was arrested
in 1997 at a roadblock Lombard police set up to
seek information about an earlier hit-and-run.
The court upheld a lower court ruling that the
roadblock amounted to an unconstitutional
search of drivers.
Police cannot randomly stop drivers every time
they need tips about a crime, the court held.
"The right of an individual to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures is an
indispensable freedom, not a mere luxury,"
Justice Charles Freeman wrote. "It cannot give
way in the face of a
temporary need for the police to obtain
information."
DuPage County state's attorney's office
officials who prosecuted Lidster said they were
troubled by the ruling.
First Assistant State's Attorney John Kinsella
said police were not randomly searching cars or
questioning drivers.
"They were literally handing out fliers asking
motorists if they had any information relative to
this crime," Kinsella said. "To suggest that
police can't do that is very troublesome. That's
going to be a concern to all police."
Jim Sotos, an attorney for the Illinois
Association of Chiefs of Police, also said the
ruling "eliminates a useful police tool that
enlists the support of the citizenry in solving
crimes."
"It appears the court gave short shrift to the
public's interest in solving crimes," Itasca
attorney Sotos said.
Police have a tough enough time solving
crimes without further restrictions, he said.
"When you take away a tool which allows
them to enlist the support of everyday drivers,
that just makes their job that much more
difficult," he said.
Carol Stream attorney Elaine Sofferman, who
argued the case in the Supreme Court on
Lidster's behalf, disagreed.
"I don't think it's going to make much
difference," she said. "Police still have so many
other methods to investigate crimes."
Sofferman said roadblocks are legitimate if
used in emergencies or specific circumstances
like checking for drunken drivers or searching
for a fleeing suspect. She said Lombard's
roadblock didn't meet those standards.
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"You can't set up a roadblock every time there
is a crime," she said. "There are other, more
effective ways to catch criminals."
Kinsella said he agrees it's improper to set up
roadblocks as random dragnets.
"Here we had a specific crime that occurred at
a specific location," he said. "The informational
roadblock was set up at a time and location to
investigate that crime.
"This was not a general investigation of
criminal activity where we are trying to sort out
if any of the motorists were committing a
crime."
DuPage prosecutors are still considering an
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Lidster, at the time a Bartlett resident, nearly
hit a detective with his minivan in 1997 after
police handed him a flier requesting information
about a hit-and-run accident that killed a 70-
year-old
bicyclist on North Avenue.
Suspecting he'd been drinking, police stopped
Lidster, who failed field sobriety tests.
But those tests - the only evidence against
Lidster - were thrown out last year by the 2nd
District Appellate Court.
Daily Herald news services contributed to
this report.
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RULING DRAWS LINE ON POLICE USE OF ROADBLOCKS
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October 30, 2002
Patrick J. Cotter
In this post 9/11 America, filled as it is with
terrorists, clouds of war and even snipers, the
tension between our constitutionally guaranteed
civil liberties and the government's efforts to
provide security are as great, or greater, than
they have ever been in the history of our nation.
Nowhere is that tension greater than at the
interface of our Fourth Amendment rights to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure and
law enforcement efforts to address the public's
demands for the prevention and the solving of
crimes.
One type of police-citizen encounter that can
definitely be expected to become far more
common is the roadblock. In the days and weeks
after the Sept. 11 attacks, the use of blockades
in and around New York and Washington was
well publicized. Many emergency plans to deal
with terrorist threats call for their use, as the
recent incident with the three Islamic medical
students terrorists in Florida made clear.
In just the last few weeks, the nation watched
as the police set up dozens of roadblocks to try
and capture the Washington-area sniper.
On Oct. 18, a divided Illinois Supreme Court
rendered an important decision in a case dealing
with one type of roadblock that led to a
confrontation between individual rights and law
enforcement efforts;
Today's column, the first of two on this case,
looks at the majority ruling in People v. Robert
Lidster, No. 91522 (Oct. 18). The second
installment on Friday will examine the dissent.
The Lidster majority held that a police
roadblock set up to attempt to find witnesses to
a hit-and-run accident had violated the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizures. In doing so, the court not
only provided an extremely thorough and
thoughtful discussion of the U.S. Supreme
Court's landmark decision in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148
L.Ed.2d 333, 121 S.Ct. 447 (2000), which also
dealt with roadblocks, but also made an
important statement about where this court may
strike the balance between the Fourth
Amendment's guarantees of individual liberty
and law enforcement's needs.
In August 1997, Lombard police set up a
roadblock on a busy street in the western
suburb. The roadblock was intended to find
potential witnesses to a fatal hit-and-run
accident that had occurred one week earlier at
the location. At the roadblock, instituted at the
same time of day as the accident, all motorists
were stopped by a number of police and
funneled past other officers standing in the road.
The motorists were handed a flier that solicited
information regarding the accident.
When one passing motorist, defendant Lidster,
was stopped by the police, a officer requested to
see his driver's license and insurance card. The
officer later claimed that the defendant had
almost struck him with his car as he pulled up to
the roadblock. Additionally, after he approached
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the defendant, the officer said he detected both
the smell of alcohol and slurred speech.
The police officer directed the defendant to
proceed to a nearby side street, where other
police officers were stationed. On the side
street, the police ordered him to perform several
field sobriety tests. The defendant apparently
failed and was charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol.
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress
the police seizure of his person and the
subsequent fruits of that seizure as having been
obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.
The trial court denied the motion, and the
defendant was found guilty after a bench trial.
He was sentenced to one year of conditional
discharge, a fine and 14 days of community
service.
On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the
denial of Lidster's motion to suppress. The court
relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Edmund and found that the
roadblock the Lombard police employed was
unconstitutional. (That Appellate Court opinion
was discussed in this column last year.)
The state petitioned for leave to appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court, which accepted the case
and allowed the Illinois Association of Chiefs of
Police to file an amicus curiae brief in support
of the state.
The majority affirmed the Appellate Court's
finding that the roadblock was unconstitutional.
The majority began its analysis with a thorough
discussion of Edmund. The Edmund court found
that check points set up by the police on roads in
and around Indianapolis in an effort to interdict
unlawful drugs violated the Fourth Amendment.
Specifically, the Edmund court rooted its
analysis on the Fourth Amendment's
requirement that searches and seizures be
reasonable and that a search or seizure is
ordinarily considered unreasonable in the
absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing.
The Edmund court recognized that in a few
very narrowly limited circumstances the
government is allowed to conduct searches or
seizures of citizens without individualized
suspicion.
For example, the Edmund court noted, brief
seizures of motorists at fixed border checkpoints
designed to intercept illegal aliens had been
approved as an exception to the general rule. In
addition, Edmund acknowledged that sobriety
checkpoints aimed at removing drunken drivers
from the road have also been upheld. These
narrow exceptions were allowed because the
roadblocks in each instance were designed to
meet important and "special needs beyond the
normal need for law enforcement" -- and thus
did not significantly undermine the liberty
interest the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect.
Turning to the Indianapolis police roadblocks
designed to find illegal drugs, Edmund ruled
that such a roadblock was not designed to serve
any "special need" beyond the normal
investigative purposes of law enforcement.
Indeed, the Edmund court made it clear that the
Supreme Court had "never approved any
checkpoint program whose primary purpose was
to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing," such as those employed by the
Indianapolis police. The Edmund court
concluded its analysis by stating that the Fourth
Amendment drew a line at "roadblocks designed
primarily to serve the general interest in crime
control."
A failure to draw a line prohibiting such
roadblocks, the high court said, would have the
potential to permit such governmental intrusions
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on the liberty of the citizens to "become a
routine part of American life," a result that the
Fourth Amendment could not allow.
Applying the lessons of Edmond to the
Lombard roadblock, the Illinois Supreme Court
majority agreed with the Appellate Court and
found that "the roadblock's ostensible purpose
was to seek evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing." As such, the court held that the
seizure and search of the defendant by the
Lombard police violated the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against searches not based on
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. The
Lombard roadblock did not fall within the
recognized limited exceptions to that rule, the
majority said.
The majority proceeded to spend considerable
time addressing the arguments raised by the
state and the amicus curiae brief.
First, the state asserted that because the
Lombard roadblock was designed to find
evidence of a specific crime that had already
occurred -- the hit-and- run -- as opposed to
seeking evidence of possible crimes that might
be occurring, and because the roadblock was not
designed to seek evidence against the stopped
motorists themselves, it did not fall within the
roadblock type condemned in Edmund.
The majority rejected this attempted distinction,
finding that contrary to the state's assertion,
there was no constitutional distinction to be
drawn between police seizure and interrogation
of citizens seeking evidence against the person
seized for unknown possible crimes and police
seizure and interrogation of citizens seeking
evidence against a third party for a specific
crime. The infringement of the seized citizen's
right to be free from seizure by the police absent
individualized suspicion is the same.
The majority added that the state's attempt to fit
the Lombard roadblock into the limited
exceptions to the requirement of individualized
suspicion misinterpreted Edmund and "ignores
the concerns expressed by the court in
Edmond." Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court
majority noted that the Edmund court was
"keenly aware" that an exception for roadblocks
designed primarily to serve the general interest
of crime control would abrogate the general rule
requiring individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing -- and seriously undermine the
Fourth Amendment protections.
Such a broad interpretation of the government's
right to seize and search citizens would soon
have the consequence of turning roadblocks into
a "routine part of American life."
In a very striking section of its opinion, the
majority provided specific statistics as to the
number of crimes of various types, including
murders, assaults, robberies, burglaries, thefts,
motor vehicle thefts and arsons, that have
occurred in the state, Cook County and Chicago
during one year, 2000. The opinion is worth
reading by every citizen of the State of Illinois if
only for the chance to see the truly stunning
numbers of crimes being committed around us,
on us and by us. The Illinois Supreme Court's
purpose, however, in citing the statistics was not
to reassure all criminal law practitioners that
there is little chance that we will soon see a
decline in business but, rather, was to raise what
can be fairly termed the "nightmare scenario"
that could occur if the state's arguments were
accepted. The majority asked the question,
Why, if the Lombard roadblock to find the
driver in a fatal hit-and-run accident was to be
found constitutional, law enforcement agencies
around the state could not set up roadblocks to
investigate any of the literally thousands upon
thousands of crimes that occur every year.
Specifically, the majority noted that according
to the state's arguments, "for a period of at least
a week after each crime" police could set up
roadblocks with a specific purpose of making
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inquiries of persons who were possible
witnesses to a crime.
The troubling specter then arises that the streets
of Chicago "would be adorned with roadblocks,
an outcome clearly unacceptable under
Edmund." Indeed, in Chicago alone for the year
2000 there were 627 murders and 26,660
assaults. Even if the police limited their use of
investigatory roadblocks to the most serious of
crimes it is conceivable that there could be a
hundred roadblocks a year set up at various
places and at various times.
Indeed, it seems that this is the "routine part of
American life" that the Edmund court so
vigorously stated roadblocks should never
become.
The majority also addressed an argument made
by the amicus brief. Specifically, the majority
rejected the argument that "exigent
circumstances" justified the use of the Lombard
roadblock. Amicus counsel correctly pointed out
that the Edmund court had left open the
possibility that emergencies might arise that
would allow law enforcement to employ
roadblocks even in the absence of individualized
suspicion, for instance, to stop an imminent
terrorist threat or to prevent a serious criminal
from escaping the scene of a crime.
The majority, however, rejected the amicus
argument, finding that exigent circumstances
simply did not exist in the Lombard situation.
The majority noted that there was "no
indication" that the motorists being sought from
the hit- and-run posed any imminent threat of
danger to any local resident or was even still in
the vicinity where the roadblock was set up.
Additionally, there was no indication that the
motorist from the hit-and-run had necessarily
been driving recklessly or had been under the
influence of alcohol. Thus, the majority found
that there were no exigent circumstances present
that could justify the Lombard roadblock.
Nonetheless, it is perhaps quite significant that
even the majority in Lidster acknowledged that
exigent circumstances of a kind that we have all
seen much more of post-9/11 may well require
this court, like this nation, to further loosen the
constraints of the Fourth Amendment on police
action. -- Friday: The Dissent
Criminal Law By Patrick J. Cotter Cotter is a
partner in the law firm of Arnstein & Lehr,
where he concentrates in criminal defense.
Cotter and Arnstein partners Patrick A. Tuite
and Ronald D. Menaker rotate authorship of this
column.
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There's a great tension these days between
our Fourth Amendment rights to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure and
law enforcement efforts to fight crime.
On Oct. 18, a divided Illinois Supreme
Court rendered an important decision in a
case dealing with one crime-fighting
measure -- a roadblock Lombard police
erected in August 1997 to track down the
motorist responsible for a fatal hit- and-run
accident in the western suburb.
But the roadblock netted someone else.
Robert Lidster was arrested on a drunken
driving charge after police shunted him off
to the side to check his license and
insurance, apparently because he nearly hit
one of the officers running the roadblock.
Lidster unsuccessfully moved to suppress
the seizure, was found guilty, but won on
appeal to the 2d District Appellate Court.
The state then took the case to the Supreme
Court.
Today's column, the second of two on this
case, looks at the dissent in People v.
Robert Lidster, No. 91522 (Oct. 18). The
first installment on Wednesday examined
the majority ruling that the roadblock
violated the Fourth Amendment.
In doing so, the majority not only provided
an extremely thorough discussion of the
U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.
32, 148 L.Ed.2d 333, 121 S.Ct. 447 (2000),
but also made an important statement about
where this court may strike the balance
between the Fourth Amendment's
guarantees of individual liberty and law
enforcement's needs.
In the dissent, however, three judges of the
Supreme Court took issue with the
majority's interpretation of Edmund, as well
as the analytical approach taken to the entire
issue of roadblocks.
The dissent agreed with the state that
Edmund was distinguishable from the case
at bar in that the nature, purpose and scope
of the roadblocks in the two cases were
"completely different." The dissent noted
that the evidence in the record suggested
that the Lombard roadblock stops were far
shorter in duration than the stops in Edmund
and that the roadblock in Edmund was
designed to identify possible criminal
activity of which the police had no prior
knowledge, unlike the specifically targeted
roadblock in Lombard.
The dissent took the position that these
distinctions placed the Lombard roadblock
closer to the category of roadblocks the U.S.
Supreme Court has found to be
constitutional, such as border stops and DUI
roadblocks.
It is worth noting perhaps that the Lidster
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dissenters focused much, if not all, of their
analysis on the nature of the police actions
involved. While this is, of course, an
appropriate inquiry in Fourth Amendment
cases, the majority, and the Edmund court,
seemed to weigh more heavily the effect of
the police actions on the individual citizen.
As to the individual citizen stopped by the
roadblock in Lombard, the effect of the
police seizure is the same whether the police
are seeking information about crime in
general or about a specific crime and a
specific criminal. Perhaps it is this
difference in emphasis -- police motivation
versus impact on citizen liberty -- that
explains the difference in analyses of the
majority and dissent.
The dissent raised several additional
arguments, apparently not raised by the
state, including that the Lombard roadblock
could be seen as a roadblock in the interest
of "highway safety" and therefore akin to
DUI roadblocks. The dissent noted that
language in Edmund seems to contemplate
the constitutionality of roadblocks to check
for driver licenses. The dissent argued that if
a roadblock to check for licenses would be
considered constitutional then a roadblock
seeking information regarding a "deadly hit-
and-run crime" should also be constitutional.
This point by the dissent, however, may be
mixing apples and oranges.
The highway safety exception for DUI
roadblocks and, possibly for drivers' license
checks, are premised on the notion that such
roadblocks would not be used to seek
evidence of "ordinary criminal wrongdoing"
but, rather, as the only practical method of
regulating and ensuring legal and safe use of
public roads. The far broader, and therefore
far more invasive, use of roadblocks as an
additional tool for the investigation of
ordinary criminal activities is what the
Edmund court said the Fourth Amendment
forbids.
Seeking evidence of a fatal hit-and-run
would seem to be, by any reasonable
definition, well within the concept of
ordinary criminal investigation. That
roadblocks for both DUI and hit-and-run
evidence would be set up on a road and
relate to activities on a road does not in and
of itself seem logically to bring them under
the same category of highway safety nor to
render them equally constitutional.
The dissent also discussed a case from the
Virginia Supreme Court: Burns v.
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 541 S.E.2d
872 (2001). A post-Edmund case, the Burns
court upheld a police roadblock and
distinguished Edmund, noting that the
roadblock in the Virginia case was not to
investigate "ordinary criminal wrongdoing"
but was "specifically designed to investigate
a particular murder that had recently
occurred in the area where the roadblock
was placed."
The dissent certainly seems to be correct
that the Virginia Supreme Court accepted
the distinction between investigation of
"ordinary criminal wrongdoing" and
investigation of a particular crime, which the
majority of the Illinois high court rejected in
Lidster.
The real question, however, is whether the
U.S. Supreme Court in Edmund would
accept this distinction. The Virginia
Supreme Court, as explained by the dissent,
seems to have also relied, at least in part, on
a notion that the roadblock in the Illinois
case was somehow necessitated by an
"emergency," a claim similar to one that the
Lidster majority specifically rejected.
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After having explained why the majority
had misunderstood Edmund, the dissent
went on to suggest that the proper analysis
was to be found in Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 61 L.Ed.2d 357, 99 S.Ct. 2637
(1979). Essentially, the Brown case requires
courts reviewing roadblocks to engage in a
balancing analysis that places the state's
asserted interest in balance against the
intrusion on the motorist. Without going
through the entire Brown analysis, suffice it
to say that the dissent found that had a
Brown balancing analysis been conducted in
this case, it would have found that the state's
interest in the roadblock was sufficient to
outweigh what the dissent considered to be
the minimal intrusion on citizens.
The dissent did not discuss what, if any, the
effect of the Edmund case from 2000 has
had on the approach suggested by the Brown
case in 1979, nor did it explain why the
Supreme Court in Edmund did not rely on
Brown.
Finally, the dissent attempted to assuage the
majority's concern about a "proliferation of
roadblocks" should the Lombard roadblock
be found to be constitutional. The dissent
suggested that the Lombard roadblock could
be upheld on the basis that it was related to a
highway crime: the fatal hit-and- run
accident; and therefore, such a holding
would stand only for the proposition that
roadblocks would be allowable in searching
for evidence of crimes occurring on the
highway. This argument, of course, depends
on whether one is persuaded by the dissent's
attempt to place the Lombard roadblock into
the same category with the sobriety
checkpoints.
The dissent also suggested that the
majority's "nightmare scenario" of hundreds
of roadblocks around the city and state is
highly unlikely because "the amount of
roadblocks would be limited by the scarce
public resources available to the police."
Thus, the dissent appears to be making the
arguments that even if a ruling upholding
the Lombard roadblock might make it
constitutional for the police to erect
roadblocks in relation to hundreds, if not
thousands, of cases, as long as the police do
not have enough money and manpower to
do so there should be no serious concern on
the part of the citizenry.
This rather novel argument, linking as it
does the extent of the citizens' freedom from
government seizure to the particular level of
government resources at any given time, is
certainly creative, though unsupported by
citation.
The majority in Lidster concluded its
opinion by explicitly noting the "constant
tension" between the Constitution's
protections of the individual versus the
exercise of official power. The court was
also explicitly sympathetic to law
enforcement's need to protect citizens from
many threats. However, the Illinois Supreme
Court majority made clear that, in its role as
the "protector of the constitutional rights of
all citizens of this state," it is compelled to
draw the line where governmental action
violates the Fourth Amendment protections
of the individual citizen.
The majority declared that the right of an
individual to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures is "an indispensable
freedom, not a mere luxury."
There can be little doubt that in the months
and years to come this proposition will be
put to severe test in numerous cases yet to
arise. As those cases come before the Illinois
Supreme Court and other courts around this
country, the opinion in Lidster will, I
believe, loom ever larger. It is therefore
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incumbent on every practitioner and judge in
this state to not only read Lidster but to
seriously consider the issues raised by the
case.
Criminal Law By Patrick J. Cotter Cotter is
a partner in the law firm of Arnstein & Lehr,
where he concentrates in criminal defense.
Cotter and Arnstein partners Patrick A.
Tuite and Ronald D. Menaker rotate
authorship of this column.
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A BETTER INTERPRETATION OF "SPECIAL NEEDS" DOCTRINE AFTER
EDMOND AND FERGUSON
Yale Law Journal
June, 2003
Jonathan Kravis
[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
Part I of this Comment summarizes the
special needs doctrine as interpreted in
Edmond and Ferguson; Part II offers an
alternative approach to the doctrine...
I
In discussing the DNA Act searches, both
the Miles and Reynard courts relied on City
of Indianapolis v. Edmond and Ferguson v.
City of Charleston.13 In Edmond, the Court
struck down Indianapolis's highway
checkpoint program, under which randomly
stopped cars were visually inspected by
officers and sniffed by narcotics-detecting
dogs. Unlike highway checkpoints with
virtually identical effects upheld in earlier
cases,' Indianapolis's program was created
for the "primary purpose [of detecting]
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."
Thus, the Border Patrol could stop cars near
the border, and the police could stop
motorists for sobriety checks, because in
13 Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1135-38; Reynard, 220 F.
Supp. 2d at 1165-68.
15 Compare id. at 35-36, with Mich. Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1990), and
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-
47 (1976).
both cases the searches were justified by a
primary purpose distinct from "general
crime control ends," namely, safeguarding
the border and removing drunk drivers from
the roads. But because Indianapolis had
conceded that its program "unquestionably
[had] the primary purpose of interdicting
illegal narcotics," the program could not be
similarly justified.
In Ferguson, Charleston proved that it had
learned from Indianapolis's unwise
concession in Edmond. Charleston argued
that a public hospital's policy of testing
pregnant women for cocaine use had the
primary non-law-enforcement purpose of
protecting the health of mother and child,
and therefore fell within the special needs
exception. The Court nevertheless struck
down the program, concluding that while the
"ultimate goal of the program" may have
been to get the women into treatment, the
"immediate object of the searches was to
generate evidence for law enforcement
purposes in order to reach that goal."
How did the Court distinguish the
"immediate object of the searches" at issue
in Ferguson from the warrantless drug-
testing programs upheld in earlier cases?
Here again, the Court defined the special
needs category by considering the primary
purpose to which the government intended
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to put the results of the search. Each of the
earlier programs upheld by the Court was
justified by a purpose that did not involve
arrest and prosecution: protecting the
integriti of the front lines in the war on
drugs, gathering reliable data on train
accidents caused by substance abuse,2 3 or
ensuring the safety of high school students. 24
The Charleston policy, by contrast, focused
on "the arrest and prosecution" of the drug-
abusing mothers.
Taken together, Edmond and Ferguson
articulate a kind of evidentiary approach to
special needs analysis. In determining
whether a warrantless search falls under the
special needs exception, the court asks,
"What is the primary purpose to which the
government intends to put the results of the
search?" If the answer is simply, "to
generate evidence for law enforcement
purposes," then the exception does not
apply. If, however, the government can
plausibly argue that it needs the search
results primarily for something other than
criminal prosecution, then the special needs
exception applies.
The Miles and Reynard courts faithfully
applied this test in their analyses of the
constitutionality of the DNA Act searches.
In both cases, the government argued that
the primary purpose of the searches was to
create a more accurate DNA database,
which would assist law enforcement in
solving past and future crimes and thereby
ensure a more accurate criminal justice
system. The Miles court concluded that this
purpose was "indistinguishable from the
22 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 670 (1989).
23 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 620-23 (1989).
24 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
government's basic interest in enforcing the
law," since the evidence was being used to
solve and prosecute crimes. The Reynard
court, on the other hand, found that "the
creation of a more accurate criminal justice
system" was a purpose that went beyond
"the normal need for law enforcement."
Thus, the debate between the Miles and
Reynard courts over the constitutionality of
the DNA Act searches amounted to a
semantic disagreement over the meaning of
"law enforcement purposes." By focusing
their attention on whether the creation of a
more accurate criminal justice system is a
"law enforcement purpose," both courts
ignored many of the central issues pertaining
to the reasonableness of the DNA Act
searches.
This definitional quandary, moreover, is
inevitable under the special needs test as
articulated in Edmond and Ferguson. Those
cases frame the special needs inquiry in
terms of whether the government's primary
purpose in obtaining the results of the search
is law-enforcement-related. In applying this
test, lower courts faced with special needs
arguments will have to determine (1)
whether a given purpose is non-law-
enforcement-related, and (2) if so, whether
that is the primary purpose of the search.
But there are several reasons why these
questions are not helpful in determining
whether warrantless searches are reasonable,
which is, after all, the point of the special
needs exception. First, there is no reason to
believe that searches conducted primarily
for non-law-enforcement purposes are
categorically more likely to be reasonable
than law enforcement searches. The Court
has noted, "It is surely anomalous to say that
the individual and his private property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment
only when the individual is suspected of
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Fourth Amendment."
Second, the distinction between law
enforcement and non-law- enforcement
purposes is not entirely clear. Most of the
warrantless searches upheld under special
needs analysis had a law enforcement
purpose in the sense that they ultimately led
to an arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Conversely, nearly any law enforcement
search could also be said to have a non- law-
enforcement purpose, since "law
enforcement involvement always serves
some broader social purpose or objective."
Thus, most warrantless searches will have
both law enforcement and non-law-
enforcement purposes. Edmond and
Ferguson suggest that a special needs search
is one in which the non-law- enforcement
purpose is "primary," but offer little
guidance about how to distinguish primary
from secondary purposes.
Third, the special needs test suggests that
subjective intent is relevant to the
reasonableness of the search: "[O]ur special
needs . . . cases demonstrate that purpose is
often relevant when suspicionless intrusions
pursuant to a general scheme are at issue."
But this approach is inconsistent with the
Court's holding in Whren v. United States
that an actor's motive does not "invalidate[]
objectively justifiable behavior under the
31 Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967)
(applying the warrant requirement to municipal
housing inspections); see also Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 504 (1978) ("The decisions of this Court
firmly establish that the Fourth Amendment extends
beyond the paradigmatic entry into a private dwelling
by a law enforcement officer in search of the fruits or
instrumentalities of crime."); William J. Stuntz,
Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1017 (1995)
("[M]uch of what the modem state does outside of
ordinary criminal investigation intrudes on privacy
just as much as the kinds of police conduct that
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law forbid.").
II
The special needs doctrine as articulated in
Edmond and Ferguson and applied in Miles
and Reynard asks an evidentiary question:
Does the government have a special (i.e.,
non-law-enforcement-related) need for the
fruits of the search? I propose that the
special needs doctrine should instead ask an
administrative question: Does the context of
the search at issue create a special need for
warrantless searches? When the government
conducts business-as-usual crime fighting,
the Fourth Amendment requires that
searches and seizures be based on
individualized suspicion.3 7  But when the
context of the search differs from everyday
police work, the government may be able to
articulate a special need for warrantless
searches, even if its primary purpose in
obtaining that evidence is prosecutorial.
Thus, school searches fall within the
special needs exception because the warrant
requirement is unsuited to the school
environment. Requiring teachers, who are
not familiar with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, to obtain a warrant before
searching a student "would unduly interfere
with the maintenance of the swift and
informal disciplinary procedures needed in
the schools." 38 Similarly, warrantless stops
near the border are permissible on the
ground that a warrant requirement "would
be impractical because the flow of traffic
tends to be too heavy to allow the
3 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)
("[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made
more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of
the Fourth Amendment.").
38 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
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criminal behavior." 0
particularized study of a given car."39
Likewise, suspicionless drug testing of
railroad employees immediately after an
accident is necessary because the delay
required to obtain a warrant would destroy
much of the toxicological evidence the
government needs to determine whether the
accident was drug- or alcohol-related--again,
an administrative consideration. 40 And so
on.
The administrative interpretation of the
special needs doctrine suggests that the
Edmond highway checkpoint program was
unconstitutional because, with the narrow
exception of border searches, highway
checkpoints cannot be justified by an
administrative special need. Drug couriers
are the targets of everyday law enforcement.
Their illegal activities are supposed to make
them susceptible to apprehension through
ordinary law enforcement methods. The
suspicionless searches at the highway
checkpoints were simply a shortcut around
these methods.
The key fact in Ferguson was that law
enforcement and city prosecutors were
involved in the hospital's drug-testing
program from its inception--deciding who
would be tested, how and when the tests
would be conducted, and even establishing a
chain of custody for the evidence. Unlike the
drug tests of railroad employees (upheld in
Skinner) or high school students (upheld in
Earls), the drug tests in Ferguson were not
administered by officials unfamiliar with
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Nor was
there any danger, as in Skinner, that
evidence would be lost because of the delay
'9 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
557 (1976).
40 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 623 (1989).
necessary to obtain a warrant, since the
women were in the hospital for an extended
period to give birth. The involvement of
police and prosecutors in the administration
of the program has constitutional
significance, not because it reveals a
primary law enforcement purpose, but rather
because it suggests that, as in Edmond, the
warrantless search program was nothing
more than a police shortcut.
This brief account of the Court's recent
cases suggests that, under the administrative
interpretation, the special needs doctrine
would likely apply when (1) the search is
administered by non-law-enforcement
officials; (2) the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant would result in the loss of evidence
or otherwise frustrate the purpose of the
search; or (3) the context in which the search
is conducted necessarily requires
randomness, for example because of the
sheer number of searches involved.
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Ruling Below: (8th Cir., 285 F.3d 721)
Police visit to indicted defendant's residence, at which time they informed defendant that they
were there pursuant to indictment and that they wanted to discuss defendant's involvement in use
and distribution of drugs and his associations with certain persons, but did not warn him of rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), did not constitute police interrogation within
meaning of Sixth Amendment rule that guarantees assistance of counsel at post-indictment
interviews, and thus inculpatory statements defendant made at his home did not taint subsequent
inculpatory statements that he voluntarily and knowingly made at jail after being given Miranda
warnings, signing Miranda waiver, and agreeing to speak with officers.
Question Presented: (1) Did court of appeals err when it concluded that defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), was not
violated because defendant was not "interrogated" by government agents, when proper standard
under Supreme Court precedent is whether government agents "deliberately elicited" information
from defendant? (2) Should second statements--preceded by Miranda warnings--have been
suppressed as fruit of illegal post-indictment interview without presence of counsel, under this
court's decisions in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975)?
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
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John J. FELLERS, Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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Filed: April 8, 2002.
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[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
WOLLMAN, Chief Judge. violation of 21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1) and 846.
We affirm.
John Fellers appeals from the judgment of
conviction entered and the sentence imposed by
the district court' for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute methamphetamine in On February 24, 2000, two policemen went to
Fellers' Lincoln, Nebraska, home to arrest him
The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.
Judge for the District of Nebraska.
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After Fellers's admitted the police to the house,
they told him that they were there pursuant to an
indictment and that they wanted to discuss his
involvement in the use and distribution of
methamphetamine and his associations with
certain persons. Fellers responded by stating
that he had associated with the named persons
and that he had used methamphetamine. At no
time during this conversation did the police
advise Fellers of his Miranda rights.
The officers then escorted Fellers to jail, where
they advised him of his Miranda rights. Fellers
signed a written Miranda waiver form and
agreed to speak with the officers. During this
conversation, Fellers reiterated the inculpatory
statements made at his home and admitted his
association with several more co-conspirators.
Fellers moved to suppress both the inculpatory
statements made at his home and those made at
the jail. A magistrate judge found that both sets
of statements should be suppressed because
Fellers was in custody at the time he made the
statements at his home, the officers used
deceptive stratagems to prompt those
statements, and the subsequent statements at the
jail would not have been made but for the prior
ill-gotten statements. The district court agreed
that the statements made at Fellers's home
should be suppressed, but admitted the
statements made at the jail after finding that
Fellers had knowingly and voluntarily waived
his Miranda rights before making those
statements.
The jury found that Fellers had conspired to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute
between 50 and 500 grams of
methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district
court held Fellers responsible for more than 500
grams of methamphetamine and denied Fellers's
request for a mitigating role adjustment, as well
as his motion for a downward departure. After
finding that category II did not adequately
reflect the seriousness of Fellers's past criminal
conduct, the district court raised Fellers's
criminal history category to III and sentenced
him to 151 months' imprisonment.
II.
Fellers argues that the district court should have
suppressed his inculpatory statements made at
the jail because the primary taint of the
improperly elicited statements made at his home
was not removed by the recitation of his
Miranda rights at the jail.
The voluntariness of a confession is a legal
inquiry subject to plenary appellate review.
United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 320, 322 (8th
Cir.1994). To determine if Fellers's inculpatory
statements at the jail were voluntary, we must
determine if, "in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the pressures exerted by the
authorities overwhelmed the defendant's will.
Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate
to finding that a confession is not voluntary in
the constitutional sense." Id (citing Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93
L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)) (internal citation omitted).
Contrary to Fellers's contention otherwise, we
conclude that Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), renders
admissible the statements made by Fellers at the
jail. In that case, two officers went to Elstad's
residence with a warrant to arrest him for the
burglary of a neighbor's home. One of the
officers told Elstad that he believed that Elstad
had been involved in the burglary, whereupon
Elstad responded "Yes, I was there." The
officers then transported Elstad to the sheriffs
office, where, approximately one hour later,
they advised Elstad of his Miranda rights.
Elstad indicated that he understood his rights
and that he wished to waive them. Elstad then
signed a written statement explaining his role in
the burglary. The trial court suppressed Elstad's
initial oral statement, but admitted his written
confession. Id. at 300-302, 105 S.Ct. 1285. In
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holding that the statement given at the sheriffs
office was admissible, the Court stated:
It [would be] an unwarranted extension of
Miranda to hold that simple failure to
administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any
actual coercion or other circumstances
calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to
exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory
process that a subsequent voluntary and
informed waiver is ineffective for some
indeterminate period. Though Miranda
requires that the unwarned admission must be
suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent
statement should turn in these circumstances
solely on whether it is knowingly and
voluntarily made.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285.
Citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 108
S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988), Fellers
argues that the officers' failure to administer the
Miranda warnings at his home violated his sixth
amendment right to counsel inasmuch as the
encounter constituted a post-indictment
interview. Patterson is not applicable here,
however, for the officers did not interrogate
Fellers at his home.
Finally, we conclude that the record amply
supports the district court's finding that Fellers's
jailhouse statements were knowingly and
voluntarily made following the administration
of the Miranda warning. See Elstad, 470 U.S.
at 314-15, 105 S.Ct. 1285; Robinson, 20 F.3d at
322. Accordingly, the district court did not err
in denying the motion to suppress the statements
made at the jail.
III.
Fellers argues that the district court should not
have admitted methamphetamine seized from a
co-conspirator. We review under an abuse of
discretion standard a district court's rulings on
the admissibility of evidence. We find no abuse
of discretion here, for the evidence established
that the seized drugs were part of the on-going
conspiracy for which Fellers was prosecuted.
United States v. Maynie, 257 F.3d 908, 915 (8th
Cir.2001).
Fellers next argues that the district court erred in
limiting his cross examination of a witness.
"Absent a clear abuse of discretion and a
showing of prejudice, we will not reverse a
district court's ruling limiting cross-
examination of a prosecution witness on the
basis that it impermissibly infringed [the
defendant's] right of confrontation." United
States v. Stewart, 122 F.3d 625, 627 (8th
Cir.1997). The record reveals that Fellers was
allowed to cross-examine the witness about the
issues with which he was concerned, and thus
we find no abuse of discretion in the district
court's ruling.
Fellers contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict. "When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict and give the government the benefit
of all reasonable inferences. We will reverse
'only if a reasonable jury must have had a
reasonable doubt that the elements of the crime
were established.' " United States v. Santana,
150 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting
United States v. Carlisle, 118 F.3d 1271, 1273
(8th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Fellers's argument rests almost
entirely on his assertion that the testimony of his
co- conspirators was not credible and should
have been disregarded. "Assessing the
credibility of witnesses is a matter properly left
to the jury." Santana, 150 F.3d at 864 (citing
United States v. Anderson, 78 F.3d 420, 422-23
(8th Cir. 1996)). The jury heard testimony from
multiple witnesses that they bought from and
sold to Fellers methamphetamine, including
testimony that the quantities sold to Fellers were
sufficient for redistribution to others. This
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testimony was sufficient to support Fellers's
conviction.
Fellers contends that the court erred in denying
his motion for a new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence.
We review under an abuse of discretion
standard the denial of a motion for a new trial.
A defendant is entitled to a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence only if he can show
(1) that the evidence was not discovered until
after the trial; (2) that due diligence would not
have revealed the evidence; (3) that the
evidence is not merely cumulative or
impeaching; (4) that the evidence is material;
and (5) that the evidence is such as to be likely
to lead to acquittal.
United States v. Zuazo, 243 F.3d 428, 431 (8th
Cir.2001) (citing Lindhorst v. United States,
658 F.2d 598, 602 (8th Cir.1981)). Because the
new evidence Fellers points to is merely
impeachment evidence, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
IV.
Fellers's remaining arguments concern alleged
errors committed in calculating his sentence
under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Fellers argues that the district court erred in
calculating the amount of drugs for which he
was responsible. "We review a district court's
drug quantity calculations for clear error, and
we will reverse only if our examination of the
entire record 'definitely and firmly convinces us
that a mistake has been made."' Santana, 150
F.3d at 864 (quoting United States v. Moss, 138
F.3d 742, 745 (8th Cir.1998)). The jury found
that Fellers was responsible for at least 50 but
less than 500 grams of methamphetamine. The
district court determined that the quantity of
methamphetamine that was reasonably
foreseeable to Fellers during the course of the
conspiracy was more than 500 grams but less
than 1.5 kilograms, a finding that we conclude is
not clearly erroneous. Fellers argues that even
though his sentence does not exceed the
statutory maximum allowable under the jury's
verdict, the sentence should be reversed because
it is based upon a finding of drug quantity that
exceeds that found by the jury. Fellers
acknowledges that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435
(2000), does not require such a result, and we
decline to extend Apprendi to encompass
Fellers's situation. As we held in United States
v. Hollingsworth, 257 F.3d 871, 878 (8th
Cir.200 1), it is "proper for the sentencing judge
to then make more exact calculations for
purposes of computing the offense level under
the guidelines and determining where the
sentence will actually fall within the statutory
range determined by the jury's verdict."
Fellers contends that the district court erred in
finding that his criminal history category did not
adequately reflect the seriousness of his past
criminal conduct. We review the district court's
departure from the Sentencing Guidelines for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Payne, 940
F.2d 286, 293 (8th Cir.1991). The court may
depart upward if "reliable information indicates
that the criminal history category does not
adequately reflect the seriousness of the
defendant's past criminal conduct or the
likelihood that the defendant will commit other
crimes." U.S.S.G. § 4Al.3. Without recounting
the details of Fellers's past criminal conduct, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that an upward
departure was warranted.
Fellers challenges district court's denial of his
motion for downward departure. So long as a
district court is aware of its authority to depart
downward, as it clearly was in this case, its
refusal to exercise its discretion to depart from
the applicable guideline range is unreviewable,
United States v. Evidente, 894 F.2d 1000, 1004-
05 (8th Cir.1990), and thus Fellers's challenge
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fails.
Finally, Fellers argues that the district court
erred in denying him a two-level reduction as a
minor participant. "[W]hether a defendant
qualifies for a minor participant reduction is a
question of fact, the determination of which we
review for clear error." United States v. Alverez,
235 F.3d 1086, 1090 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting
United States v. Hale, I F.3d 691, 694 (8th
Cir.1993)). Fellers argues that he was less
culpable than other participants because the
majority of the evidence showed him as
receiving the drugs, not distributing them.
There was sufficient evidence indicating that
Fellers had a larger role in the conspiracy than
being a mere user, however, and thus the district
court did not err in finding that Fellers was not a
minor participant in the conspiracy.
The judgment is affirmed.
RILEY, Circuit Judge, concurring.
In all respects but one, I concur in the Court's
well-reasoned opinion. My disagreement, which
does not affect the ultimate resolution of this
case, concerns whether the arresting officers
violated Fellers's right to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment.
Because Fellers was under indictment at the
time of his arrest, he had a constitutional right to
the presence of counsel during police
interrogation. Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 205-06, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d
246 (1964). For purposes of this right, an
interrogation takes place when agents of law
enforcement deliberately attempt to elicit
incriminating information from the indicted
defendant. See id at 206, 84 S.Ct. 1199.
Although the officers in this case did not ask
Fellers any questions, they deliberately elicited
incriminating information by telling Fellers they
wanted to discuss his involvement in the use and
distribution of methamphetamine. This post-
indictment conduct outside the presence of
counsel violated Fellers's right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment. See United States v.
Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270-71, 100 S.Ct. 2183,
65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 399-401, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d
424 (1977); cf Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 300-02 & 300 n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64
L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).
Nevertheless, I do not believe this constitutional
violation takes Fellers's case outside the
rationale of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105
S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). The
Supreme Court "has never held that the
psychological impact of voluntary disclosure of
a guilty secret ... compromises the voluntariness
of a subsequent informed waiver." Id. at 312,
105 S.Ct. 1285. Fellers knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment rights
at the jail, and his subsequent statements were
thus admissible at his criminal trial.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the
Court.
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High Court to Revisit Miranda
The Tucson Citizen
March 11, 2003
A.J. Flick
The extent to which police officers may
question a suspect without first reciting the
now-familiar "Miranda rights" is at issue as the
U.S. Supreme Court considers a Nebraska drug
case that challenges the 37-year-old ruling.
The original ruling came in an Arizona case.
"I've been a police officer since 1958, before we
had Miranda," said Pima County Sheriff
Clarence Dupnik, "and for those out there
interrogating, there's been a feeling that
eventually, interrogation is going to be a lost art.
And in my judgment, it has (become one)."
For defense attorneys, the announcement
yesterday that the justices will consider an
appeal by a man who claims he was tricked into
confessing to authorities is good news.
"Normally, they don't accept appeals from
defendants," said Tucson attorney Michael L.
Piccarreta. "The Supreme Court has
traditionally been pro-government. The fact that
they've accepted this case bodes well for
defendants. They may wish to decide the issue
for the whole country as to whether a second
Mirandized confession covers the first un-
Mirandized confession."
The case the Supreme Court will consider
involves John J. Fellers of Lincoln, Neb., who
claims he was chatting with officers at his home
and because of his ease with one officer, freely
admitted being involved with illegal drugs after
having some personal problems.
Fellers had been under indictment, but says he
was not told by officers that they were there to
arrest him and he was not given his Miranda
rights, which state that suspects "have the right
to remain silent" when questioned by police.
University of Texas law professor Susan Klein
said the situation is played out around the
country as officers try to elicit a confession from
a suspect, catching him off guard, without
giving a Miranda warning.
If Fellers wins, Klein said, "Police officers can
no longer intentionally circumvent Miranda by
questioning first, getting a statement, then
saying, 'Oh, by the way, now that you've spilled
the beans, here's your rights.' "
If Fellers loses, officers will have more freedom
to question suspects without bringing up
Miranda, she said.
Fellers maintains that his constitutional rights
were violated during the home interview and
again when he talked to police at the jail after
being advised of his rights. He said the first
questioning tainted the later jailhouse
interrogation, during which he confessed.
"What this (Miranda) decision and others like it
do is make billions of dollars for the legal
profession, the legal community," Dupnik said.
"Why should we do things to make guilty
people not tell the truth? What Miranda has
done is taken a bill of rights and turned it into a
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bill of duties and created an incredibly
expensive system."
Piccarreta said Miranda is not a burden to
authorities.
"Miranda has worked well for everybody for the
last 30 years," Piccarreta said. "It hasn't been a
burden to police. They know what they have to
do.
"One would think it's only common sense that if
you have an un-Mirandized statement, that
taints any other statement. You don't have to be
a lawyer to figure that out. This could be a
chance for the court to restate the obvious: That
you have to Mirandize the statement of an
individual that you are arresting or intend to
arrest. That's not too much to ask of cops.
They'll do it."
The Miranda warning takes its name from the
Supreme Court's ruling in a 1966 case involving
the use of a confession in Maricopa County in
the prosecution of Ernesto Miranda, who was
accused of rape.
Three years ago the Supreme Court reaffirmed
in a 7-2 decision that police must warn the
people they arrest of their right to remain silent
when questioned. Suspects must be told that
anything they say may be used against them,
they can remain silent or have a lawyer's help
while answering, and that a lawyer will be
appointed to help them if they cannot afford to
hire one.
A decision is expected soon from the Supreme
Court in another police interrogation case, this
one involving the questioning of a wounded
farmworker who was shot repeatedly by police
and then subjected to a lengthy interrogation as
he awaited medical treatment.
The worker was never told of his Miranda right
to remain silent, and he said a sergeant kept
questioning him even after he said that he did
not want to answer.
The question before the court in this case is
whether the worker may sue the officer for
damages on grounds that his constitutional right
against self-incrimination was violated.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
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Inmate Takes Case to High Court Without Lawyer
Omaha World-Herald
March 11, 2003
Robynn Tysver
Without the help of a lawyer, a former
Nebraska man has persuaded the U.S. Supreme
Court to review his drug conviction.
John J. Fellers, originally from Lexington,
Neb., is serving a 12-year sentence for
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.
Acting as his own attorney, Fellers argued in
briefs filed with the nation's high court that
Lincoln police improperly obtained statements
from him prior to his arrest and without
informing him of his constitutional rights.
This is not the first time an inmate has taken a
case to the high court through a "pauper" appeal
and without a lawyer, but it is rare for the court
to agree to hear such appeals.
Perhaps the best known example is Clarence
Gideon, a Florida inmate who filed a
handwritten appeal in 1963. That case, Gideon
vs. Wainwright, established that all Americans
accused in criminal cases have the right to legal
counsel.
Fellers, 40, is currently in a Minnesota
penitentiary. He was convicted in U.S. District
Court in Omaha.
"It is clear that once a defendant is indicted,
the government may not deliberately elicit
information from him without the presence of
counsel," Fellers wrote in his appeal. His
mother, Beverley Fellers of Lexington, said her
son always had good writing skills. She said he
has a high school diploma but has never gone to
college.
"He has always written, so I'm not surprised at
this," she said.
At issue in the Fellers case is when police must
notify the accused of their "Miranda rights" - the
rights to remain silent and to have an attorney
present during police interrogations.
Those rights were established in a landmark
1966 ruling involving the use of a confession in
the prosecution of Ernesto Miranda on rape
charges.
Fellers said that in February 2000, police went
to his home in Lincoln to arrest him for
allegedly dealing in drugs. He let the police into
his home.
They told him about his indictment on the drug
charge, he argued, but they did not tell him they
planned to arrest him. Fellers said police told
him they wanted to discuss his involvement in a
meth ring.
Fellers told police that he had associated with
some people in the ring and that he had used
meth. He said that at no time during this
conversation was he informed of his Miranda
rights.
At the police station, Fellers signed a Miranda
waiver form and agreed to talk to police. He
repeated the statement he made at his home.
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Later, in court, Fellers tried to have both
statements suppressed.
A magistrate judge initially agreed, saying the
police officers used deceptive tactics to prompt
the first statement.
However, U.S. District Judge Lyle Strom
suppressed Fellers' first statement but allowed
the second - the one made at the police station -
to be used at his trial.
Fellers was convicted of conspiring to
distribute and possess between 50 and 500
grams of methamphetamine.
A three-judge panel of the 8th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected Fellers' appeal and
affirmed his conviction last year.
"The record amply supports the district court's
finding that Fellers' jailhouse statements were
knowingly and voluntarily made following the
administration of the Miranda warning," wrote
Chief Judge Roger Wollman.
Fellers then filed his appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court. It is unknown when oral
arguments in the case will be scheduled, and it
is likely that the high court will appoint a lawyer
for Fellers.
In 1988, a Douglas County district judge
sentenced Fellers to two to five years in prison
for manslaughter in the accidental shooting of a
friend during a game with a gun.
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Opinion
The Gazette
March 20, 2003
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear
a rather unusual case regarding the famous
Miranda statement of rights police are
supposed to recite to suspects, named after a
1966 case that introduced the requirement.
It's the "you have the right to remain silent,
anything you say can and will be used
against you ..." phrase that is now echoed so
often in movie and TV scripts featuring
police.
John J. Fellers didn't use an attorney to file
his appeal from prison. He even filed as a
''pauper" so he wouldn't have to pay court
costs. Against the odds, the Supreme Court
will hear his case (though it will probably
appoint an attorney to argue it for him). It's
an interesting case.
Some officers visited him in his home in
Lincoln, Neb., and he knew one of them
from working together as hospital
volunteers. When they asked him,
apparently casually and informally, about
getting into trouble with drugs after his
marriage broke up and his business went
south, he talked openly. What Fellers didn't
know, and what the officers didn't tell him,
was that they already had an indictment in
hand charging him with methamphetamine
distribution.
After they had elicited incriminating
information from him, they arrested him and
then read him his rights, after which he told
them again what he had told them before.
Once in prison, Fellers decided his second
confession, which was admitted into
evidence at the trial, shouldn't have been,
because he never would have made it if he
had been informed of his rights and that he
was a suspect in the first place. The 8th
Circuit Court disagreed, arguing that his
second confession was given after the police
had followed proper procedures. The
Supreme Court could decide otherwise.
"Because he had already been indicted, he
not only had the right to remain silent, he
had a right to have an attorney present when
the police first talked to him," says
University of Southern California law
professor Erwin Chemerinsky. "I realize it's
a close call on the post-Miranda confession,
but my fear is that if this conviction is not
overturned the police will have strong
incentives to find clever ways to circumvent
the Miranda requirements."
We're inclined to agree, though our opinion
could be modified if new information
emerges. But if this practice of questioning
first and reading rights later is widespread,
as University of Texas law professor Susan
Klein contends, it should be curbed.
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Dickerson v. United States: Miranda is deemed a Constitutional Rule, but does it Really
Matter?
Arkansas Law Review
2002
Conor G. Bateman
[Excerpt; footnotes omitted]
While Brown v. Illinois addressed an issue "at
the crossroads of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments," the issue of the "fruits" doctrine
and a voluntary confession under the Fifth
Amendment was squarely presented to the
Supreme Court in the 1985 case of Oregon v.
Elstad.263 In Elstad, an eighteen-year-old male
was suspected of burglary, and police detectives
went to his house with a warrant for his arrest.
When the officers arrived at the defendant's
home, one officer took the defendant's mother
into the kitchen, while the other officer
questioned him in the living room. When the
detective asked the defendant if he knew
anything about the burglaries, he stated: "Yes, I
was there." The defendant was then taken to the
police station, where he was read his Miranda
rights for the first time and made a full and
voluntary statement to the detectives, which he
read and signed.
Elstad moved to suppress both of his
statements to the police-the statement he made
in his living room before he was read his
Miranda rights and the full statement made at
the police station after he was read his Miranda
rights. Elstad asserted that the second statement
was "fruit" of the "poisonous tree" that resulted
from the detectives failing to deliver the
Miranda warnings before his response to the
detectives' questions in his living room. The
trial judge excluded the first confession because
of the detectives' failure to administer the
Miranda warnings, but allowed the second
confession into evidence. The trial judge based
this ruling on the fact that once Elstad was read
his Miranda warnings, he was fully apprised of
his rights, and the taint was sufficiently purged.
Thus, suppression of the first statement was a
sufficient remedy to protect Elstad's
constitutional rights. The Oregon Court of
Appeals reversed Elstad's conviction. It
concluded that the "cat was sufficiently out of
the bag" after the first confession and that there
was an inherently coercive atmosphere during
the second confession, which indicated that it,
too, should be suppressed.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the ruling
of the Oregon Court of Appeals, finding that the
court had misconstrued the protective nature of
the Miranda decision . The Court noted that
Fourth Amendment violations require a
different application of the exclusionary rule
than do Miranda violations, by stating: "[T]he
exclusionary rule, . . . when utilized to
effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves
interests and policies that are distinct from those
it serves under the Fifth." The Court found that
where a Fourth Amendment violation "taints the
confession," "a finding of voluntariness for the
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263 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a
threshold requirement in determining whether
the confession may be admitted into evidence."
Subsequent to this threshold determination, the
prosecution would also have to show there was
a "sufficient break" in the causal chain to defeat
the presumption "that the confession was caused
by the Fourth Amendment violation."
The Court differentiated the Miranda
exclusionary rule by stating that it "serves the
Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly
than the Fifth Amendment itself." The Fifth
Amendment prohibits the prosecution from
using compelled testimony in its case; the
failure to administer Miranda warnings "creates
a presumption of compulsion." Ultimately, the
Court concluded that the simple failure to
administer the Miranda warnings did not per se
"taint" the entire investigatory process and
render any subsequent, voluntary statements
inadmissible. This conclusion was largely
based on the fact that the Miranda rules were
judicially created and were only "prophylactic
standards" intended to safeguard the suspect's
Fifth Amendment privilege, and were not a
constitutionally mandated standard. The Elstad
Court held that while Miranda did require that
the first statement be suppressed, the analysis of
whether to suppress subsequent statements
should turn on whether they were knowingly
and voluntarily made. The Court further found
that absent deliberate, coercive, or improper
tactics used to obtain the first statement, the
mere fact that a suspect made an unwamed
admission did not warrant a presumption of
compulsion.
The following question thus remained after
Elstad: Were other types of derivative evidence,
such as witness testimony and physical
evidence, admissible if there had been a
technical violation of the Miranda rules during a
suspect's voluntary statements to police?
The Supreme Court has not yet decided this
issue. However, numerous lower federal courts,
and most commentators, believe that evidence
discovered as a result of a tainted confession is
admissible, and therefore, the "fruits" of the
confession may still be admitted into evidence.
The Dickerson case presented a factual issue
along these lines. While the Supreme Court's
opinion was devoted to the constitutionality of §
3501, the Court may have taken one step closer
to making a clear decision on the issue of the
voluntary confession as a "poisonous tree."
Legal commentators and scholars had been
questioning for some time what Miranda's
proper place was in modem American
jurisprudence. The answer to this question was
provided when the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Dickerson v. United States.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Oregon v. Elstad, the Supreme Court held
that a failure to administer the Miranda
warnings to the defendant required suppression
of his first confession.328 However, the
defendant's second confession was not
suppressed because it came after the Miranda
warnings had been properly administered. As it
did in Quarles and Tucker, the Court noted that
a Fourth Amendment violation requires a
"broad application of the 'fruits' doctrine,"
whereas a Miranda violation is treated
differently from a Fourth Amendment violation.
The Court held that Miranda created a
"presumption of compulsion," and thus,
otherwise voluntary statements required
exclusion in light of a failure to give the
warnings.
Clearly then, Elstad's first statement to the
police required suppression. However, while
the Court held that the Miranda presumption
was irrebuttable for the prosecution's case in
chief, it certainly did "not require that the
32 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
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statements and their fruits be discarded as
inherently tainted." The Court found that the
two rationales for the purpose of the
exclusionary rule-trustworthiness and
deterrence-would not be served by broadening
the scope of the rule when the evidence sought
to be excluded was the "fruit" of a Miranda
violation. Once the suspect had been given the
required Miranda warnings, if he then made
voluntary statements to the police, there would
be no basis to exclude those statements. When
the warnings were administered they 'would
"cure the condition that rendered the unwarned
statement inadmissible," and any statements
made by the defendant after that would
"ordinarily be viewed as an 'act of free will."'
The Elstad majority directed courts not to
establish a rigid rule in determining the
voluntariness of confessions. Instead, when
there has been a technical violation of Miranda,
the Court found that there is no basis to presume
that the statement given was the product of
coercion, if it was made voluntarily. The Court
felt that the purposes of the Miranda decision
and the Fifth Amendment were satisfied when
the statement obtained in technical violation of
Miranda was barred from use against the
defendant. However, the Court stated that "[n]o
further purpose" would be served by "imputing
'taint' to subsequent statements obtained
pursuant to a voluntary and knowing waiver."
Thus, Elstad clearly stands for the proposition
that if a voluntary statement was obtained in
violation of Miranda then it must be suppressed.
However, once the warnings are administered,
this seems to be sufficient to purge any taint that
may have occurred by the failure to deliver the
warnings. Therefore, while the voluntary
statements required suppression, it is clear that
unless there was some actual coercion present
during the interrogation, then the derivative
"fruits" could still be admitted into evidence if
the taint had been sufficiently purged. The
following passage from the Elstad opinion is of
primary importance:
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to
hold that a simple failure to administer the
warnings, unaccompanied by any actual
coercion or other circumstances calculated to
undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his
free will, so taints the investigatory process that
a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is
ineffective for some indeterminate period.
Though Miranda requires that the unwarned
admission must be suppressed, the admissibility
of any subsequent statement should turn in these
circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly
and voluntarily made.
Prior to Dickerson, this proposition was
seemingly based on the fact that Miranda was
merely a "prophylactic rule," and that there had
been no concrete statement from the Court that
Miranda was a constitutional mandate.
However, in Dickerson the Court held that
Miranda did in fact announce a constitutional
rule. Now that the Supreme Court has declared
Miranda to be a constitutional rule, it would
seem that the failure to adequately deliver the
warnings to a suspect in custody would be a
"primary illegality." Therefore, failure to
deliver the warnings would require suppression
of the defendant's statements and all subsequent
evidence obtained thereafter. However, upon
closer inspection, this may not be the case
because of the Supreme Court's differential
treatment of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
violations.
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some footnotes and citations
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
The Government appeals from the district
court's order suppressing the physical
evidence against Samuel Francis Patane on
charges of gun possession by a felon. The
district court based its suppression order on
its conclusion that the evidence was
insufficient to establish probable cause to
arrest Patane. We conclude, contrary to the
district court, that probable cause existed to
arrest Patane. However, we affirm the
district court's order on the alternative
ground that the evidence must be suppressed
as the physical fruit of a Miranda violation.
I. BACKGROUND
Patane was indicted for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court
held a suppression hearing at which the
police investigation leading to discovery of
the gun was detailed. Ruling from the bench
a week later, the court granted defendant's
motion to suppress. Patane's arrest resulted
from the intersection of two essentially
independent investigations - one by
Colorado Springs Detective Josh Benner
regarding Patane's gun possession, and
another by Colorado Springs Officer Tracy
Fox regarding Patane's violation of a
domestic violence restraining order.
[Officer Tracy responded to a complaint by
Linda O'Donnell, Patane's ex-girlfriend,
that he violated his temporary restraining
order by calling her. Detective Benner had
been contacted by an ATF agent who had
learned Patane possessed a gun.]
Detective Benner and Officer Fox then
spoke by phone. Officer Fox said she
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planned to arrest Patane for violating the
restraining order by calling O'Donnell, and
the two arranged to go to Patane's house.
Officer Fox knocked on the door while
Detective Benner went out back in case
Patane attempted to flee. The woman who
answered the door summoned Patane.
Officer Fox asked Patane to step outside,
which he did. She asked him about the hang-
up call, and Patane denied having made the
call or having contacted O'Donnell in any
way. Officer Fox told Patane that he was
under arrest and handcuffed him shortly
afterward.
With Patane arrested and handcuffed,
Detective Benner emerged from the back of
the house and approached Patane. Detective
Benner began advising Patane of his
Miranda rights, but only got as far as the
right to silence when Patane said that he
knew his rights. No further Miranda
warnings were given, a fact which the
Government concedes on appeal resulted in
a Miranda violation. Detective Benner told
Patane he was interested in what guns
Patane owned. Patane replied, "That .357 is
already in police custody." Detective Benner
said, "I am more interested in the Glock."
Patane said he was not sure he should tell
Detective Benner about the Glock pistol
because he did not want it taken away.
Detective Benner said he needed to know
about it, and Patane said, "The Glock is in
my bedroom on a shelf, on the wooden
shelf." Detective Benner asked for
permission to get the gun, which Patane
granted, and Detective Benner went inside,
found the gun where Patane described, and
seized it. Detective Benner then told Patane,
as the detective later testified, that "I wasn't
going to arrest him for the gun at this time
because I wanted to do some more
investigations." Officer Fox took Patane to
the police station and booked him for
violating the restraining order.
The next day, Detective Benner met with
Patane's probation officer and verified that
Patane had a prior felony conviction for
drug possession as well as a misdemeanor
third degree assault conviction.
II. PROBABLE CAUSE
On appeal, the Government argues that the
district court erred in concluding that the
police lacked probable cause to arrest Patane
for violating the domestic violence
restraining order. We agree with the
Government.
* * * We have articulated the substantive
probable cause standard as follows:
An officer has probable cause to arrest if,
under the totality of the circumstances, he
learned of facts and circumstances through
reasonably trustworthy information that
would lead a reasonable person to believe
that an offense has been or is being
committed by the person arrested.
Probable cause does not require facts
sufficient for a finding of guilt; however, it
does require more than mere suspicion.
United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080,
1088 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
The district court's ruling that no probable
cause existed to arrest Patane for violating
the domestic violence restraining order was
based on its view that domestic disputes
often involve "claims and counterclaims ...
thrown between people who have separated
some sort of an intimate relationship," and
therefore that uncorroborated allegations
arising from such disputes are "just
inadequate" to establish probable cause.
[The district court listed "unexplored
avenues of corroboration" to support its
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claim that the police did not have probable
cause to arrest Patane.]
We reject any suggestion that victims of
domestic violence are unreliable witnesses
whose testimony cannot establish probable
cause absent independent corroboration. We
have stated, "when examining informant
evidence used to support a claim of probable
cause for a ... warrantless arrest, the
skepticism and careful scrutiny usually
found in cases involving informants,
sometimes anonymous, from the criminal
milieu, is appropriately relaxed if the
informant is an identified victim or ordinary
citizen witness." Easton v. City of Boulder,
776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir.1985); see
also Guzell v. Hiller, 223 F.3d 518, 519-20
(7th Cir.2000).
We find no basis for the suggestion that
domestic violence victims are undeserving
of the presumption of veracity accorded
other victim-witnesses. Indeed, our decision
in Easton forecloses such a position. In
Easton, probable cause to arrest for child
molestation was based on the accusations of
two child witnesses, one five years old and
the other three years old. We rejected as "an
entirely unacceptable point of view" the
argument that the children's testimony was
suspect, stating:
In a great many child molestation cases,
the only available evidence that a crime
has been committed is the testimony of
children. To discount such testimony from
the outset would only serve to discourage
children and parents from reporting
molestation incidents and to unjustly
insulate the perpetrator of such crimes
from prosecution.
Easton, 776
corroboration
violence cases
F.2d at 1449. A strict
requirement in domestic
would create precisely the
same proof problems we found dispositive
in Easton.
[The court notes that "neither the district
court nor Patane point to any evidence in the
record suggesting that O'Donnell lied about
the purported hang-up call."]
In any event, we note that the officers here
did corroborate O'Donnell's veracity in two
respects. First, the district court found as
fact that, prior to the arrest, Detective
Benner had learned from a probation officer
that Patane possessed a gun. Second, Officer
Fox verified that a restraining order had
been issued against Patane. The mere fact
that further corroboration was possible is not
dispositive of whether the information
available would lead a reasonable person to
believe that an offense had been committed.
[The court dismisses Patane's argument that
"as a matter of law, a single hang-up phone
call could not constitute a violation of the
restraining order." It concludes that
"probable cause does not require certainty of
guilt or even a preponderance of evidence of
guilt, but rather only reasonably trustworthy
information that would lead a reasonable
person to believe an offense was committed.
Morris, 247 F.3d at 1088. The possibility
that the hang-up call here was accidental
does not defeat probable cause."]
Accordingly, we conclude that Patane's
arrest was supported by probable cause to
believe that Patane had violated the
domestic violence restraining order.I
In light of our conclusion that the officers had
probable cause to arrest for violation of the
restraining order, it is unnecessary to reach the
Government's alternative argument that the arrest was
justified by probable cause to believe that Patane was
a felon in possession of a gun. The district court
declined to decide whether the officers had probable
cause to arrest on the basis of Patane's gun violation.
*** On appeal, the Government argued that this
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III. SUPPRESSION OF THE PHYSICAL
FRUITS OF A MIRANDA VIOLATION
Our conclusion that the district court
erroneously based suppression of the gun on
the absence of probable cause to arrest does
not end our inquiry. Patane argues that
suppression of the gun should be affirmed
because, even if the arrest was proper, the
ensuing Miranda violation independently
requires suppression of the physical
evidence,
The district held, and the Government
concedes on appeal, that a Miranda
violation occurred when the police
questioned Patane about his possession of a
gun without administering the complete
Miranda warnings. As explained above, this
questioning led Patane to admit that he
possessed a gun in his bedroom, which
admission in turn led immediately to seizure
of the gun. The Government correctly
concedes that Patane's admissions in
response to questioning were inadmissible
under Miranda, but argues that the physical
fruit of the Miranda violation - the gun - is
admissible.
The district court determined that it was
unnecessary to decide whether the physical
fruits of a Miranda violation must be
suppressed because it had concluded that the
underlying arrest that led to the confession
was unconstitutional. Because we have
reversed the conclusion that the arrest was
reasoning is foreclosed by United States v. Santana-
Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1192-93 (10th Cir.2001)
(officer's subjective belief as to non- existence of
probable cause not dispositive); see also Treto-Haro,
287 F.3d at 1006 (same). Patane correctly conceded
that the district court's reasoning was erroneous in
light of our precedent, and on appeal he argued only
that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that
he was a felon in possession of a gun. The district
court did not reach this issue, and we decline to do so
in the first instance on appeal.
unconstitutional, we are now squarely
presented with the issue whether the gun
should be suppressed in any event because it
was obtained as the fruits of an
unconstitutionally obtained confession. ***
Below, we conclude that the physical
evidence that was the fruit of the Miranda
violation in this case must be suppressed.
A. Supreme Court precedent
The Government relies primarily on two
Supreme Court cases for its argument that
the fruits doctrine does not apply to Miranda
violations: Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 445-46, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182
(1974), and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
306, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).
Both cases, it is true, declined to apply the
fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine of Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83
S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), to suppress
evidence obtained from an un-Mirandized
confession. However, both cases were
predicated upon the premise that the
Miranda rule was a prophylactic rule, rather
than a constitutional rule. Elstad, 470 U.S. at
305, 105 S.Ct. 1285 ("'The prophylactic
Miranda warnings are not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution ...."' (quoting
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654,
104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); id at
308, 105 S.Ct. 1285 ("Since there was no
actual infringement of the suspect's
constitutional rights, [Tucker] was not
controlled by the doctrine expressed in
Wong Sun that fruits of a constitutional
violation must be suppressed." (emphasis
added)); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445-46, 94
S.Ct. 2357 (distinguishing Wong Sun
because "the police conduct at issue here did
not abridge respondent's constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, but departed only from the
prophylactic standards later laid down by
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this Court in Miranda to safeguard that
privilege"). Because Wong Sun requires
suppression only of the fruits of
unconstitutional conduct, the violation of a
prophylactic rule did not require the same
remedy.
However, the premise upon which Tucker
and Elstad relied was fundamentally altered
in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,
120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). In
Dickerson, the Supreme Court declared that
Miranda articulated a constitutional rule
rather than merely a prophylactic one. Id at
444, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ("Miranda announced a
constitutional rule that Congress may not
supersede legislatively."); see id at 432,
438, 440, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Thus, Dickerson
undermined the logic underlying Tucker and
Elstad.
Additionally, a close reading of Tucker and
Elstad reveals other distinctions that lead us
to conclude that those cases should not be
given the sweeping reading the Government
is asserting. ***
Tucker involved an un-Mirandized custodial
interrogation that occurred prior to the
issuance of the Miranda decision. During
the course of the interrogation, the defendant
identified a relevant witness of whom the
police previously had been ignorant. The
defendant argued before the Court that the
testimony of the witness so identified by the
defendant should have been barred as the
fruit of the Miranda violation. The Court's
rejection of this argument rested largely on
its conclusion that excluding the fruits of
this confession would have minimal
prophylactic effect because the officers were
acting in complete good faith under
prevailing pre-Miranda law that barred only
coerced confessions. * * *
The other Supreme Court case offered by
the Government to support its argument is
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285. In
Elstad, the defendant made incriminating
statements while in custodial interrogation
prior to the issuance of Miranda warnings.
The police then administered Miranda
warnings, and thereafter the defendant made
further incriminating statements. The issue
in Elstad was whether the defendants post-
Mirandized statements must be suppressed
as the fruit of the earlier Miranda violation.
Id. at 303, 105 S.Ct. 1285. The Supreme
Court held that suppression was not
required, rejecting the view that the post-
warning statements were the
unconstitutional product of "a subtle form of
lingering compulsion, the psychological
impact of the suspect's conviction that he
has let the cat out of the bag." Id. at 311, 105
S.Ct. 1285. After repeating the now-suspect
reasoning that a Miranda violation was not
necessarily a constitutional violation and
thus not controlled by the fruits doctrine of
Wong Sun, the Court stated:
[T]he Miranda presumption, though
irrebuttable for purposes of the
prosecution's case in chief, does not
require that the statements and their fruits
be discarded as inherently tainted.....
.... In deciding how sweeping the
judicially imposed consequences of a
failure to administer Miranda warnings
should be, the Tucker Court noted that
neither the general goal of deterring
improper police conduct nor the Fifth
Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy
evidence would be served by suppression
of the witness' testimony. The unwarned
confession must, of course, be suppressed,
but the Court ruled that introduction of the
third-party witness' testimony did not
violate Tucker's Fifth Amendment rights.
We believe that this reasoning applies with
equal force when the alleged "fruit" of a
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noncoercive Miranda violation is neither a
witness nor an article of evidence but the
accused's own voluntary testimony. As in
Tucker, the absence of any coercion or
improper tactics undercuts the twin
rationales - trustworthiness and deterrence
- for a broader rule. Once warned, the
suspect is free to exercise his own volition
in deciding whether or not to make a
statement to the authorities. The Court has
often noted: A living witness is not to be
mechanically equated with the proffer of
inanimate evidentiary objects illegally
seized The living witness is an individual
human personality whose attributes of
will, perception, memory and volition
interact to determine what testimony he
will give.
Id. at 307-09, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (first emphasis
added, alterations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Elstad thus drew a
distinction between fruits consisting of a
subsequent confession by the defendant after
having been fully Mirandized and fruits
consisting of subsequently obtained
"inanimate evidentiary objects." Id at 309,
105 S.Ct. 1285. A subsequent, Mirandized
confession need not be excluded because it
is the product of "volition, " willingly offered
up by a defendant who already had been
made aware of his Miranda rights. Id. By
implication, "inanimate evidentiary objects"
would be excludable, because physical
evidence derived from the defendant's un-
Mirandized statement is not the product of
volition after a defendant has been
Mirandized properly.2 See id. at 347 n. 29,
2 See also Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct.
1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969). In Orozco, the officers
interrogated a suspect in custody without giving
Miranda warnings, learning that the suspect owned a
gun and where it was located. Id at 325, 89 S.Ct.
1095. Ballistics tests of the gun indicated that it had
been used to commit a murder. Id In a terse holding,
the Court held that "the use of these admissions
obtained in the absence of the required warnings was
105 S.Ct. 1285 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[T]oday's opinion surely ought not be read
as also foreclosing application of the
traditional derivative-evidence presumption
to physical evidence obtained as a proximate
result of a Miranda violation. The Court
relies heavily on individual 'volition' as an
insulating factor in successive-confession
cases.... [This] factor is altogether missing in
the context of inanimate evidence." (citation
omitted)) 
.3
a flat violation of the Self Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment as construed in Miranda." Id. at
326, 89 S.Ct. 1095 (emphasis added). The Court did
not expressly consider whether the gun and the
ballistics evidence would be admissible on remand.
However, one plausible reading of Orozco is that the
reference to the unconstitutional "use" of the
statements includes their use by police officers in
obtaining the gun, as well as their introduction of the
admission at trial.
This reading of Orozco is reinforced by the Court's
subsequent opinion in Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).
Kastigar noted that the privilege against self-
incrimination "protects against any disclosures which
the witness reasonably believes could be used in a
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence
that might be so used," id. at 445, 92 S.Ct. 1653, and
that "immunity from use and derivative use is
coextensive with the scope of the privilege," id at
453, 92 S.Ct. 1653.
Indeed, in Miranda itself the Court stated that "unless
and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated
by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used against him." 384
U.S. 436, 454, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)
(emphasis added).
There is a substantial argument that Elstad ought
not even be treated as a case involving application of
the Wong Sun fruits doctrine in the first place, for
precisely the reasons emphasized by Elstad in its
volition discussion. In rejecting the argument that the
second confession was the result of some "subtle
form of lingering compulsion," id at 311, Elstad in
effect concluded that the second confession was not
evidence "obtained ... as a direct result" of the
Miranda violation. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485, 83
S.Ct. 407. In other words, the post-Mirandized
confession in Elstad was admitted because it was not
(rather than despite the fact that it was ) the fruit of
the poisonous tree.
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[The court rejects the argument that dicta in
Elstad supports the holding that the physical
fruits of a Miranda violation are not subject
to the Wong Sun fruits doctrine.]
In any event, we do not suggest that the
holding in Elstad relying on volition
definitively establishes that the physical
fruits of a Miranda violation must be
suppressed. Rather, the essential point for
our analysis is only that Elstad does not
definitively establish the contrary rule. [The
court quotes Justice White, who says that
Elstad left the question of "admissibility of
physical evidence yielded from a Miranda
violation" open. Patterson v. United States,
485 U.S. 922, 922-23, 108 S.Ct. 1093, 99
L.Ed.2d 255 (1988) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).]
It is true that, prior to Dickerson, the Tenth
Circuit applied Tucker and Elstad to the
physical fruits of a Miranda violation and
concluded that suppression was not required
***. However, once again Dickerson has
undercut the premise upon which that
application of Elstad and Tucker was based
because Dickerson now concludes that an
un-Mirandized statement, even if voluntary,
is a Fifth Amendment violation. Dickerson,
530 U.S. at 444, 120 S.Ct. 2326.
Accordingly, we reject the Government's
position that Tucker and Elstad foreclose
suppression of the physical fruits of a
Miranda violation.
B. Lower court approaches
Courts applying Dickerson have split on the
proper application of Wong Sun to the
physical fruits of a Miranda violation. The
Third and Fourth Circuits have ruled that the
physical fruits of a Miranda violation never
are subject to Wong Sun suppression. The
First Circuit, by contrast, has ruled that the
physical fruits of a Miranda violation must
be suppressed in certain circumstances,
depending on the need for deterrence of
police misconduct in light of the
circumstances of each case. Below, we
analyze the merits of each of these
approaches. We conclude that the First
Circuit is correct that the physical fruits of a
Miranda violation must be suppressed
where necessary to serve Miranda 's
deterrent purpose. However, we part
company with the First Circuit in the
application of that standard, because we
conclude that Miranda 's deterrent purpose
requires suppression of the physical fruits of
a negligent Miranda violation. We therefore
conclude that suppression of the gun in the
present case was appropriate.
1. Sterling & DeSumma
The Third and Fourth Circuits have
concluded that the fruits doctrine simply
does not apply to Miranda violations even
after Dickerson. United States v. Sterling,
283 F.3d 216, 218-19 (4th Cir.2002), cert.
denied, 122 S.Ct. 2606, 153 L.Ed.2d 792
(2002); United States v. DeSumma, 272
F.3d 176, 180-81 (3d Cir.2001), cert.
denied, 122 S.Ct. 1631, 152 L.Ed.2d 641
(2002). Both of these cases held that the
physical fruits of a Miranda violation were
admissible. Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219
(shotgun found in vehicle as a result of
Miranda violation); DeSumma, 272 F.3d at
180-81 (gun found in vehicle as a direct
result of Miranda violation). Both Sterling
and DeSumma relied on substantially the
same reasoning, focusing primarily on an
isolated passage in Dickerson. Dickerson
noted at the outset of the opinion that
"Miranda and its progeny in this Court
govern the admissibility of statements made
during custodial interrogation in both state
and federal courts." 530 U.S. at 432, 120
S.Ct. 2326. Later in the opinion, in the
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course of rejecting various arguments
supporting the erroneous view that Miranda
was not a constitutional decision, the Court
stated:
The Court of Appeals also noted that in
Oregon v. Elstad we stated that "[t]he
Miranda exclusionary rule ... serves the
Fifth Amendment and sweeps more
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself."
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441, 120 S.Ct. 2326
(*, citations and internal quotations
omitted).
Both Sterling and DeSumma viewed this
language as amounting to an endorsement of
the rule that the Wong Sun exclusionary rule
does not apply to the physical fruits of a
Miranda violation. Sterling, 283 F.3d at
219; DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180. Sterling
explained:
Although Dickerson held Miranda to be
with Constitutional significance, Miranda
only held that certain warnings must be
given before a suspect's statements made
during custodial interrogation can be
admitted into evidence. In addition, we are
of opinion that the Court's reference to and
reaffirmation of Miranda's progeny
indicates that the established exceptions,
like those in Tucker and Elstad, survive.
Thus, the distinction between statements
and derivative evidence survives
Dickerson. In fact, Dickerson reiterated
the distinction made in Elstad by stating
that: "Our decision in that case - refusing
to apply the traditional 'fruits' doctrine
developed in Fourth Amendment cases -
does not prove that Miranda is a
nonconstitutional decision, but simply
recognizes the fact that unreasonable
searches under the Fourth Amendment are
different from unwarned interrogation
under the Fifth Amendment."
283 F.3d at 219 (emphasis in original,
citation omitted).
There are at least two serious problems with
the reasoning in DeSumma and Sterling.
First, we respectfully disagree with their
conclusion that Dickerson 's reference to the
controlling force of "Miranda and its
progeny in this Court" forecloses the
argument that the physical fruits of a
Miranda violation may be suppressed.
Although we agree that, based on this
language, the holdings of Elstad and Tucker
survive Dickerson, neither Elstad nor Tucker
involved the physical fruits of a Miranda
violation; as explained above, Elstad
expressly contrasted the subsequent
confession it found admissible from physical
fruits, while Tucker expressly limited its
holding to pre-Miranda interrogations. See
Patterson, 485 U.S. at 922-24, 108 S.Ct.
1093 (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). By wholly undermining the
doctrinal foundation upon which those
holdings were built, Dickerson effectively
left Elstad and Tucker standing but
prevented lower courts from extending their
holdings. Of course, prior to Dickerson
many lower courts (including this one)
already had expanded the holdings of Elstad
and Tucker by concluding that Miranda
violations do not require suppression of
physical fruits, but Dickerson explicitly
limited its saving language to Miranda 's
"progeny in this Court." 530 U.S. at 432,
120 S.Ct. 2326 (emphasis added). Far from
endorsing pre-Dickerson lower court case
law, then, Dickerson instead signaled the
contrary view.
The second fundamental problem with the
reasoning in DeSumma and Sterling is that
the language that they rely on for the
proposition that Dickerson endorsed the
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extension of Elstad to physical fruits in fact
said only that Elstad "recognizes ... that
unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment are different from unwarned
interrogation under the Fifth Amendment."
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441, 120 S.Ct. 2326
(emphasis added). The critical question, of
course, is how the two are different. At oral
argument in the present case, the
Government argued only that the way that
Fourth Amendment violations differ from
Fifth Amendment violations is that the
Wong Sun fruits doctrine applies to the
former and not the latter. This argument
already has been rejected by the Supreme
Court. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 &
n.3, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)
(noting that the Court has applied the fruits
doctrine to violations of the Fifth
Amendment, citing Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12
L.Ed.2d 678 (1964)); Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-61, 92 S.Ct. 1653,
32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Although Dickerson
itself does not explain how searches under
the Fourth Amendment are "different,"
Elstad does just that: "a procedural Miranda
violation differs in significant respects from
violations of the Fourth Amendment, which
have traditionally mandated a broad
application of the 'fruits' doctrine." 470 U.S.
at 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (emphasis added).
This language indicates that Miranda
violations are "different" because a
narrowed application of the fruits doctrine
applies to Miranda violations, not because
the fruits doctrine does not apply at all. Cf
id at 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (referring to "[t]he
Miranda exclusionary rule").
Of course, Elstad 's explanation of how
application of the fruits doctrine is
"different" in Miranda cases begs the
question of what a "broad" application
means. We conclude that the broad
application of the fruits doctrine is that
defined in Nix: "the prosecution is not to be
put in a better position than it would have
been in if no illegality had transpired." 467
U.S. at 443, 104 S.Ct. 2501. Application of
the fruits doctrine in the Miranda context is
not "broad" because a number of exceptions
to this pure rule have been recognized,
circumstances where the prosecution is
permitted to benefit from the Miranda
violation. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, 105
S.Ct. 1285; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447-48, 94
S.Ct. 2357; New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550
(1984); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
225-26 & n. 2, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d I
(1971).
One could argue that further narrowing of
the pure fruits doctrine in the Miranda
context-narrowing beyond that already
effectuated by the holdings of Elstad and
Tucker4 also is appropriate. However, we are
unpersuaded that the additional narrowing
articulated in DeSumma and Sterling
(refusing to apply the fruits exclusion to
physical evidence obtained as a result of the
illegally obtained confession) reflects a
correct understanding of the way in which
Miranda violations are, in Dickerson's
words, "different" from Fourth Amendment
violations.
A blanket rule barring application of the
fruits doctrine to the physical fruits of a
Miranda violation would mark a dramatic
departure from Supreme Court precedent.
The Court consistently has recognized that
deterrence of police misconduct, whether
deliberate or negligent, is the fundamental
Tucker's narrowing would seem no longer
applicable because it appeared to establish an
exception only for questioning that pre-dated
Miranda itself. Elstad 's narrowing would still have
applicability today because it declined to apply the
fruits exclusion to a subsequent voluntary confession
rendered after the Miranda warnings are given.
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justification for the fruits doctrine. Nix, 467
U.S. at 442-43, 104 S.Ct. 2501; see also
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308, 105 S.Ct. 1285;
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447, 94 S.Ct. 2357
(noting "the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule"). The Court also has been
consistent in narrowing the scope of the
fruits doctrine in the Miranda context only
where deterrence is not meaningfully
implicated. See Elstad 470 U.S. at 308-09,
105 S.Ct. 1285; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447-48,
94 S.Ct. 2357.
In sharp contrast with Elstad and Tucker,
however, the rule argued for by the
Government here risks the evisceration of
the deterrence provided by the fruits
doctrine, as this case well illustrates. As a
practical matter, the inability to offer
Patane's statements in this case affords no
deterrence, because the ability to offer the
physical evidence (the gun) renders the
statements superfluous to conviction. See
generally United States v. Kruger, 151
F.Supp.2d 86, 101-02 (D.Me.2001) ("The
exclusion of the cocaine, the substance -
indeed essence - of the suppressed
statements, is necessary to deter law
enforcement officers from foregoing the
administration of Miranda warnings ...."),
overruled by Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 92-
94; Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of
Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions,
and Compelled Testimony, 93 Mich. L.Rev.
929, 933 (1995) ("Unless the courts bar the
use of the often-valuable evidence derived
from an inadmissible confession, as well as
the confession itself, there will remain a
strong incentive to resort to forbidden
interrogation methods."); David A. Wollin,
Policing the Police: Should Miranda
Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 Ohio St. L.J 805,
843-48 (1992) ("Police officers seeking
physical evidence are not likely to view the
loss of an unwarned confession as
particularly great when weighed against the
opportunity to recover highly probative
nontestimonial evidence, such as a murder
weapon or narcotics."). * * *
Further, the rule urged upon us by the
Government appears to make little sense as
a matter of policy. From a practical
perspective, we see little difference between
the confessional statement "The Glock is in
my bedroom on a shelf," which even the
Government concedes is clearly excluded
under Miranda and Wong Sun, and the
Government's introduction of the Glock
found in the defendant's bedroom on the
shelf as a result of his unconstitutionally
obtained confession. If anything, to adopt
the Government's rule would allow it to
make greater use of the confession than
merely introducing the words themselves.
Accordingly, we decline to adopt the
position of the Third and Fourth Circuits
that the Wong Sun fruits doctrine never
applies to Miranda violations.
2. Faulkingham
With its recent decision in United States v.
Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85 (1st Cir.2002),
the First Circuit rejected the Third and
Fourth Circuits' blanket refusal to apply
Wong Sun suppression to the fruits of a
Miranda violation. Id. at 90-91.
Faulkingham acknowledged, contrary to
Sterling and DeSumma, that Dickerson's
recognition that Miranda violations are
constitutional violations strengthened the
argument that their physical fruits must be
suppressed. Id at 92-93. However,
Faulkingham concluded that suppression of
the fruits of a Miranda violation was not
required in every case. Rather, it adopted a
rule mandating suppression of the fruits of a
Miranda violation in individual cases where
"a strong need for deterrence" outweighs the
reliability of that evidence. Id. at 93.
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Because the physical fruits of a Miranda
violation generally will be trustworthy
evidence, it appears that in most cases the
First Circuit's analysis boils down to a rule
excluding the fruits of a Miranda violation
only when there is a "strong need for
deterrence." On each of Faulkingham's two
basic points - that Dickerson alters the
analysis regarding suppression of the fruits
of a Miranda violation, and that suppression
of the physical fruits is required where
necessary to effectuate Miranda's deterrent
purpose - we agree with the First Circuit.
For reasons already stated above, we
conclude that each of these propositions is
compelled by Supreme Court precedent.
Turning to the application of this standard to
circumstances - present both in
Faulkingham and in the present case -
where an officer negligently rather than
intentionally violates a defendant's Miranda
rights, however, we disagree with the First
Circuit. In Faulkingham, the court
concluded that, where the Miranda violation
resulted from mere negligence on the part of
the interrogating officer, there is no strong
need for deterrence and thus the physical
fruits of the Miranda violation need not be
excluded. We conclude that Faulkingham's
cramped view of deterrence leads it to an
erroneous conclusion regarding negligent
Miranda violations.
Faulkingham asserted, without elaboration,
that "[o]nce the un-Mirandized inculpatory
statements of the defendant are themselves
suppressed, the role of deterrence under the
Fifth Amendment becomes less primary."
Id. at 92. The heart of the court's analysis is
the following:
Where, as here, negligence is the reason
that the police failed to give a Miranda
warning, the role of deterrence is weaker
than in a case ... where the apparent reason
the police failed to give a warning was
their intention to manipulate the defendant
into giving them information.
Faulkingham's claim, taking all the
surrounding circumstances into account,
simply does not tip the balance toward a
strong need for deterrence. Faulkingham's
statement was not the result of "coercive
official tactics." There was no deliberate
misconduct by the [police] agents here.
There was no misleading or manipulation
by the government.... The findings of the
magistrate judge and the trial judge give us
no reason to think that the agents
deliberately failed to give the warning in
order to get to the physical evidence or
that they did so to get to another witness
who might or might not incriminate
Faulkingham. The agents' negligence
resulted in the suppression of
Faulkingham's confession, itself a
detriment to the agents....
Id. at 93-94 (citation to opinion below
omitted). The court noted that "Faulkingham
himself started talking without much
questioning" and observed that "there is
nothing to shock the conscience of the court
and no fundamental unfairness." Id. at 94. In
light of the totality of the circumstances, the
court held "that Faulkingham's far weaker
argument for recognition of a deterrence
interest for suppression of derivative
evidence arising from a negligent violation
of his Miranda rights is insufficient to carry
the day." Id
We do not believe that "the role of
deterrence ... becomes less primary" once
the statement itself has been suppressed. Id.
at 92. Instead, the relevant question remains
whether suppression of the statement alone
provides deterrence sufficient to protect
citizens' constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. As we already have stated
above, we answer this question in the
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negative.
Nor do we share Faulkingham 's view that
there is a strong need for deterrence only
where the officer's actions were deliberate
rather than negligent. Finally, Miranda itself
made clear that the privilege against self-
incrimination was animated, not by a desire
merely to deter intentional misconduct by
police, but by the "one overriding thought"
that "the constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a
government ... must accord to the dignity
and integrity of its citizens." Miranda, 384
U.S. at 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also id
("[T]he privilege has come rightfully to be
recognized in part as an individual's
substantive right ... to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life." (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The personal
right to be free of government invasions of
the privilege against self-incrimination is
violated just as surely by a negligent failure
to administer Miranda warnings as a
deliberate failure. Deterrence is necessary
not merely to deter intentional wrongdoing,
but also to ensure that officers diligently
(non-negligently) protect - and properly are
trained to protect - the constitutional rights
of citizens. The call for deterrence may be
somewhat less urgent where negligence
rather than intentional wrongdoing is at
issue, but in either case we conclude that the
need is a strong one.
Moreover, we conclude that a rule limiting
Wong Sun suppression of the physical fruits
of a Miranda violation to situations where
the police demonstrably acted in intentional
bad faith would fail to vindicate the
exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose. Even
in cases where the failure to administer
Miranda warnings was calculated, obtaining
evidence of such deliberate violations of
Miranda often would be difficult or
impossible. Cf Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d
89 (1996) (noting that one reason for the
Court's adoption of an objective test for the
reasonableness of a seizure was "the
evidentiary difficulty of establishing
subjective intent" of officers). *** We
believe a rule that provides certainty in
application and clarity for the officers
charged with operating under it better serves
the interests of citizens, officers, and judicial
efficiency.
Accordingly, we agree with the First
Circuit's conclusion that the Wong Sun fruits
doctrine may apply to the physical fruits of
Miranda violations, but we decline to adopt
Faulkingham 's view that the physical fruits
of a negligent Miranda violation are
admissible. ***
As explained above, we conclude that
Miranda 's deterrent purpose would not be
vindicated meaningfully by suppression only
of Patane's statement. We hold that the
physical fruits of this Miranda violation
must be suppressed,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the
district court's order suppressing the gun.
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Justices Take Case On Scope of Miranda;
Issue Is Evidence Gleaned Before Rights Are Read
The Washington Post
April 22, 2003
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court announced
yesterday that it will review a Colorado
case that could help further define the
constitutional ban on forced confessions.
At issue is whether physical evidence
that authorities discovered because of
what a suspect told them before being
fully informed of his rights should have
been admissible in court.
Under the court's famous 1966 Miranda
ruling, a suspect's statement in police
custody cannot be used against him
unless police first tell him that he has a
right to remain silent and to have a
lawyer present during questioning.
But in this case, U.S. v. Patane, No. 02-
1183, the issue is whether courts must
also exclude physical evidence police
find based on information a suspect gave
without first being "Mirandized."
Legal analysts said the issue is especially
relevant to murder investigations, where
two crucial pieces of evidence - the
victim's body and the murder weapon -
are often found only because of
comments made by suspects.
"It's not most cases, but it's not unusual,"
said William J. Stuntz, a professor of
law at Harvard University. "They read
the warnings, the suspect invokes his
right to remain silent, and then they don't
stop questioning him. They know the
confession is inadmissible, but they feel
they can at least use the physical
evidence."
The Supreme Court ruled in 1985 that a
confession given after a suspect is told
of his rights can be used as evidence
even if it was obtained thanks to a
previous "un-Mirandized" statement.
Lower courts have since interpreted the
decision to mean that physical evidence
may be likewise included.
But last year, a three-judge panel of the
Denver-based U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 10th Circuit ruled that the 1985 case
had not actually settled the issue. That
case, the 10th Circuit noted, had referred
to the Miranda warnings as not
necessarily required by the Constitution.
In light of a 2000 Supreme Court ruling
that reaffirmed that Miranda had
established a fundamental constitutional
right, the 10th Circuit ruled, physical
evidence found thanks to an "un-
Mirandized" statement must be
suppressed as what legal doctrine calls
"fruit of a poisonous tree."
"Now that the court has said Miranda is
constitutionally compelled, it's hard to
see how you can take un-Mirandized
statements and use them without
violating the right against self-
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incrimination," said Deanne Maynard, a
Washington lawyer and Supreme Court
practitioner who studies Miranda issues
for the National Association of Criminal
Defense lawyers.
The Supreme Court said it will hear the
case in response to an appeal by the
Justice Department, which argued in its
brief that the 10th Circuit's decision
would "impose serious costs on the
administration of justice."
The Justice Department argued that the
2000 Supreme Court ruling specifically
endorsed the notion that courts could
admit physical evidence found as a result
of suspects' un-Mirandized statements.
Copyright C 2003 The Washington Post
Co.
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Common Sense And Miranda Rights;
Don't Suppress Evidence A Suspect Volunteered
Rocky Mountain News
April 24, 2003
Editorial
The Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution says that no one can be
"compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." The Fourth
Amendment bars "unreasonable searches
and seizures." In other words, police
can't force someone to confess to a crime
or turn over incriminating evidence, and
they can't burst into your home without a
warrant.
But no one forced a Colorado Springs
man, Samuel Francis Patane, to tell
officers where to find a gun that as a
convicted felon he had no right to own.
Police asked Putane where his Glock
was and he told them - and yet the
evidence was thrown out in court
because Patane hadn't been read his
"Miranda warnings." That not only
defies common sense, it has nothing to
do with the Constitution as it was
actually written, and we hope the
Supreme Court says so now that it has
agreed to hear the case.
To be sure, the high court is hemmed in
by its own recent precedents, including
an opinion three years ago reaffirming
the 1960s requirement that police advise
people of their Miranda rights before
questioning them. What suspects say
before the Miranda warnings, the court
reiterated, cannot be used as evidence
against them in court.
But what about physical evidence that
officers find as a result of what a suspect
says before he's heard the warning?
Shouldn't that at least be admissible?
Lower courts are split on the issue,
which is why the Patane case is
significant.
Patane actually interrupted an officer
who started to read him his rights, saying
he understood what they were and didn't
need to hear the warning. It was only
then that officers asked him where they
could find his Glock.
In the real world, most people would
say, his rights were adequately protected
since he knew them. In cases involving
the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and
seizures, however, the policy has been
that any evidence acquired through an
illegal search must be suppressed
because it is "the fruit of a poisonous
tree." In Patane's case, the 10th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
fruits doctrine broadly and ruled that
prosecutors could not use the Glock as
evidence. Without it, prosecutors could
not convict him of illegal firearms
possession.
Other appeals courts have chosen more
narrow readings, saying physical
evidence obtained as a result of a
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Miranda violation need not be
suppressed.
Suspects are allowed to waive their
Miranda rights, so whether failure to
read the complete paragraph should even
count as a violation could be arguable,
but the government conceded that in
Patane's case it was a violation.
Theodore Olson, the U.S. solicitor
general, will argue for the government
that Miranda covers only confessions,
not physical evidence, and that's the
position the high court should take.
Experienced offenders get to know the
legal rules pretty well. If one way to
ensure that damning evidence will not be
used against them at trial is to announce
its existence before arresting officers
even have a chance to read the Miranda
warnings, expect such announcements to
become more frequent.
Suppressing physical evidence revealed
at a suspect's initiative does nothing to
deter police misconduct, it just makes
the prosecution's job harder.
Copyright C 2002 Denver Publishing
Company
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Will the High Court Revisit 'Miranda' - Again?
The Recorder
April 16, 2003
Tony Mauro
WASHINGTON - Many commentators
were surprised three years ago when the
Supreme Court reaffirmed Miranda v.
Arizona in a 7-2 decision written by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist. After
all, Rehnquist had been a critic of
Miranda throughout his 31 years on the
court.
A case that goes before the court for
consideration at its Friday private
conference could give the court an
opportunity to show its colors again on
the potency of the Miranda rule, which
requires police to warn suspects of their
right to remain silent. The case, United
States v. Patane, 02-1183, is one of
dozens the justices will discuss at the
conference.
Under Miranda, statements made by a
defendant in the absence of a warning
cannot be admitted at trial. In Patane, the
issue is whether physical evidence - in
this case a pistol - obtained as a result of
an un-Mirandized statement must also be
suppressed.
The government asserts that the
Supreme Court answered the question
long ago when it declined in two cases to
apply the "fruits of the poisonous tree"
doctrine to suppress evidence obtained
as a result of an un-Mirandized
confession. The cases cited by the
government are Michigan v. Tucker,
from 1974, and the 1985 ruling Oregon
v. Elstad.
But both of those rulings came before
Dickerson v. United States, the 2000
decision authored by Rehnquist that
upheld Miranda. The Tenth Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals decided in Patane that
because the Dickerson ruling viewed
Miranda as a decision with constitutional
dimensions - not just as a prophylactic
rule - "Dickerson undermined the logic
underlying Tucker and Elstad." As a
result, to give Miranda the constitutional
weight it was accorded in Dickerson, the
circuit panel agreed the gun evidence in
Patane's case should be suppressed.
"Miranda's deterrent purpose would not
be vindicated meaningfully by
suppression only of Patane's statement.
We hold that the physical fruits of this
violation must be suppressed," wrote
Tenth Circuit Judge David Ebel.
Samuel Patane was arrested in Colorado
Springs in June 2001 for violating a
domestic violence restraining order
imposed to protect his ex-girlfriend.
Officers began to read Patane his
Miranda rights, but stopped when he
said he knew his rights. Police then
asked him whether he owned firearms.
Patane revealed he had a Glock pistol.
Police seized it and, after learning
Patane had prior drug convictions,
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charged him with violating the federal
law against possession of firearms by
felons.
In its petition to the Supreme Court, the
solicitor general's office notes that the
First, Third and Fourth Circuits have
ruled on the same issue in light of
Dickerson, and ruled that suppression of
physical evidence is not always required.
As a result, the government says, a
circuit conflict exists "on an important
constitutional issue that arises with
regularity."
Patane's lawyer, Assistant Federal Public
Defender Jill Wichlens, says in her brief
that because the Tenth Circuit's ruling is
consistent with Dickerson, it does not
warrant review. She also argues that
neither Tucker nor Elstad gave the green
light to admitting physical evidence
obtained through an improper police
interview.
"The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
applies to the fruit of a Miranda
violation ... just as the doctrine applies to
the fruit of any other constitutional
violation," writes Wichlens.
Copyright C 2003 ALM Properties, Inc.
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The Exclusionary Rule
Georgetown Law Journal
May, 2002
Miles Clark
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
The exclusionary rule requires that
evidence obtained directly or indirectly
through government violations of the
Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments may
not be introduced by the prosecution at
trial, at least for the purpose of providing
direct proof of the defendant's guilt.
When a court improperly admits
evidence in violation of the exclusionary
rule, reversal is required unless the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. The exclusionary rule is not a
personal constitutional right, but rather a
judicially created remedy to deter
government violations of the
Constitution. Because the goal of
deterrence will not always be advanced
by excluding relevant, though illegally
obtained, evidence, the Supreme Court
has identified several exceptions to the
exclusionary rule, which are discussed
hereinafter.
Standing A defendant has standing
to challenge the admission of evidence
only if the defendant's own
constitutional rights have been violated.
In cases involving Fourth Amendment
violations, courts determine standing by
deciding whether a defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the
area searched or the items seized. When
violations of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments are alleged, courts
similarly focus on the personal nature of
the rights asserted. A defendant must
demonstrate standing before trial unless
the court allows otherwise upon a
showing of good cause. If the
prosecution concedes standing before the
trial court, it may be precluded from
raising the issue on appeal.
Good Faith Exception. In United
States v. Leon, the Supreme Court held
that evidence need not be suppressed
when police obtain the evidence through
objective good faith reliance on a
facially valid warrant that is later found
to lack probable cause.' The Court
concluded that a "good faith" exception
to the exclusionary rule was proper
because under such circumstances
suppression would not advance the
exclusionary rule's goal of deterring
official misconduct. The good faith
exception also applies when the police
obtain evidence in reliance on a warrant
later found technically defective, on a
statute authorizing warrantless searches
that is later declared unconstitutional, or
on an erroneous police record indicating
the existence of an outstanding arrest
468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984). In Leon, a search
conducted pursuant to a "facially valid" warrant
yielded large quantities of drugs and other
evidence. The district court subsequently found
the affidavit insufficient to establish probable
cause and suppressed the evidence. The Supreme
Court held the evidence admissible because the
police acted in good faith reliance on the
warrant.
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warrant. When reviewing suppression
rulings, it is within the discretion of the
appellate court to proceed directly to the
good faith issue without first deciding
the issue of probable cause.
The good faith exception does not
extend to cases where the police have no
reasonable grounds for believing that the
warrant was properly issued. The Court
has identified four situations where
police reliance on a warrant is not
objectively reasonable: (1) when the
magistrate issued the warrant in reliance
on a deliberately or recklessly false
affidavit; (2) when the magistrate failed
to act in a neutral and detached manner;
(3) when the warrant was based on an
affidavit "so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable"; or (4) when the warrant
was so facially deficient that an officer
could not reasonably have believed it to
be valid.
Attenuation Exception. A court may
admit evidence that would not have been
discovered but for official misconduct if
the causal connection between the illegal
conduct and the acquisition of the
evidence is sufficiently attenuated. In
Wong Sun v. United States, the Supreme
Court stated that the proper inquiry is
whether the evidence was obtained
through exploitation of the initial
constitutional violation or by
distinguishable means sufficiently
attenuated from the primary illegality so
as to purge the evidence of its taint.'
2371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). In Wong Sun, federal
drug enforcement agents arrested the defendant
without probable cause. Several days after he
was released on bail, defendant voluntarily
returned to the police station and gave an
unsigned confession. The Court concluded that
the confession was admissible because the
In Brown v. Illinois,' the Supreme
Court set forth three factors for courts to
consider in determining whether the
causal chain has been sufficiently
attenuated: (1) the time elapsed between
the illegality and the acquisition of the
evidence; (2) the presence of intervening
circumstances; and (3) the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct.
In Brown, the Supreme Court also
held that Miranda warnings alone are
not sufficient to dissipate the taint of an
illegal arrest and detention from a
subsequent confession. In contrast, the
Supreme Court in Oregon v. Elstad
found that Miranda warnings alone
ordinarily should suffice to dissipate the
taint of an initial Miranda violation and
render a second confession admissible,
but only if the first confession was given
voluntarily. In cases where a first
confession was involuntary, however, a
subsequent confession may be admitted
only if sufficiently attenuated under the
Brown factors.
Courts also invoke the attenuation
doctrine to admit testimony of a witness
whose identity was discovered through
illegal means. In United States v.
Ceccolini,5 the Supreme Court upheld
the admission of a witness' testimony,
even though discovery of his identity
was the fruit of an unlawful search,
because the witness' uncoerced
testimony was deemed sufficiently
attenuated from the illegal search.' The
Court noted that a rigid application of
the exclusionary rule "would perpetually
defendant's voluntary return to the station
rendered the confession sufficiently attenuated
from his illegal arrest.
422 U.S. 590, (1975).
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
467 U.S. 431 (1984).
6435 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1978).
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disable a witness from testifying about
relevant and material facts, regardless of
how unrelated such testimony might be
to the purpose of the originally illegal
search."
Independent Source Exception. Even
if police engage in illegal investigatory
activity, evidence will be admissible if it
is discovered through a source
independent of the illegality. The
independent source doctrine reflects the
idea that although the government ought
not profit from its misconduct, it also
should not be made worse off than it
would have been had the misconduct not
occurred.
Inevitable Discovery Exception. The
inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule is closely related to the
independent source doctrine. Under this
exception, a court may admit illegally
obtained evidence if the evidence
inevitably would have been discovered
through independent, lawful means. For
example, in Nix v. Williams, the
Supreme Court held that evidence
concerning the location and condition of
a murder victim's body was admissible
even though the police obtained this
information in violation of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. The Court reasoned that a
comprehensive search already under way
at the time of the police illegality would
have inevitably resulted in the discovery
of the body.
Collateral Uses. Even if no
exception to the exclusionary rule
applies, the government may still use
illegally obtained evidence in contexts
outside of the prosecution's case-in-
chief. For example, the government may
introduce tainted evidence in federal
civil tax proceedings, habeas
proceedings, grand jury proceedings,
civil deportation proceedings, parole
revocation proceedings, and at a
defendant's sentencing hearing.
Illegally obtained evidence can also
be used to impeach the testimony of a
defendant given on direct examination or
to impeach a defendant's testimony on
cross-examination, provided that the
prosecution's questioning on cross-
examination was reasonably suggested
by defendant's testimony during direct
examination. The prosecution, however,
may not use illegally obtained evidence
to impeach witnesses other than the
defendant.
Copyright C 2002 by Georgetown Law
Journal Association; Miles Clark
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02-1371 Missouri v. Seibert
Ruling Below: (Mo., 93 S.W.3d 700, 72 Crim. L. Rep. 231)
Rule announced in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)--that "careful and thorough
administration" of warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), will
ordinarily be enough to remove taint of earlier, unwarned questioning--does not apply when
police intentionally violate warnings requirement to facilitate questioning by weakening
defendant's ability to knowingly and voluntarily exercise constitutional rights and then obtain
confession off record, give warnings, and record second confession.
Question Presented: Is rule of Oregon v. Elstad, that suspect who has once responded to
unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and
confessing after he has been given requisite Miranda warnings, abrogated when initial failure to
give Miranda warnings was intentional?
STATE of Missouri, Respondent,
V.
Patrice SEIBERT, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Missouri
Decided December 10, 2002.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge.
The question presented here is whether a
law enforcement officer's intentional
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966),
in obtaining a statement requires
suppression of a second statement, secured
after a Miranda warning was given, where
the second statement was based on the first.
Essential to this inquiry is whether the
presumption that the first statement was
involuntary carries over to the second
statement. In the circumstances here, where
the interrogation was nearly continuous, the
Court holds that the second statement,
clearly the product of the invalid first
statement, should have been suppressed.
Patrice Seibert was convicted of second-
degree murder for her role in the death of
Donald Rector in a fire intentionally set in
the mobile home where Rector resided. She
was sentenced to life imprisonment. On
appeal, Seibert asserts the trial court
committed reversible error when it allowed
the State to introduce inculpatory statements
she made while in custody. Seibert did not
testify at trial.
*** The judgment of the trial court is
reversed, and the case is remanded.
Facts - The Mobile Home Fire and Death
of Donald Rector
Seibert lived in a mobile home in Rolla with
her five sons. The victim, Donald Rector,
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17, who was on medication for a mental
disorder, also lived with them. Jonathan, 12,
one of Seibert's sons, was seriously
handicapped with cerebral palsy. He could
not walk, talk or feed himself. On February
12, 1997, Jonathan died in his sleep. Seibert
was afraid to report his death. He had
bedsores, and she was afraid authorities
would believe she had been neglecting him.
In Seibert's presence, two of her teen-aged
sons and two of their friends discussed a
plan to set the mobile home on fire to cover
up Jonathan's death. They decided Donald
should be present in the fire so it would not
look as though Jonathan had been left alone.
In her statements, Seibert admitted that
Donald, who died in the fire, was supposed
to die in the fire. According to the trial
testimony of Jeremy, one of her son's
friends, Seibert was crying, "pretty much in
hysterics," during the discussion with her
two sons and their friends. She suggested
sending her two younger sons, Patrick and
Shawn, to church during the fire. Seibert
was not present when the fire started.
Darian, age 17, the oldest of Seibert's sons,
and his friend Derrick were to set the fire.
Darian testified that Derrick poured gas
around the trailer and then hit Donald, who
was having a seizure and convulsing on the
floor. Derrick set the fire before Darian was
out of the trailer. Darian suffered serious
burns to his face. Donald's dead body was
found kneeling in front of and partially lying
on a sofa in the west bedroom with a
penetrating wound on the back of his skull.
The cause of death was asphyxiation
secondary to exposure to fire.
The Two-Step Interrogation
On February 17, 1997, five days after the
trailer fire, St. Louis County officer Kevin
Clinton woke Seibert at 3:00 a.m. She was at
a hospital in St. Louis County, where Darian
was being treated for bums. Rolla officer
Richard Hanrahan arranged for Officer
Clinton to arrest Seibert. Officer Hanrahan
specifically instructed Officer Clinton not to
advise Seibert of her Miranda rights.
Once at the police station, Seibert was left in
a small interview room for 15 to 20 minutes
to "give her a little time to think about the
situation." Without issuing a Miranda
warning, Officer Hanrahan then questioned
her for 30 to 40 minutes. He squeezed her
arm and repeated the same statement,
"Donald was also to die in his sleep,"
throughout much of the interview. After she
made an admission indicating that she knew
Donald was to die in his sleep, she was
given a 20-minute break for coffee and a
cigarette. Officer Hanrahan then resumed
the interview, this time using a tape
recorder, and advised Seibert of her
Miranda rights. Seibert signed a waiver
form.
Officer Hanrahan began the second stage of
the interview by referring to the first stage:
"Ok, 'trice, we've been talking for a little
while about what happened on Wednesday
the twelfth, haven't we?" Then, with
occasional reference back to the first stage,
pre-Miranda interview, Officer Hanrahan
continued to question Seibert. She repeated
statements she had made prior to receiving
Miranda. This tape-recorded interview was
played to the jury at trial.
Officer Hanrahan testified that he made a
conscious decision to withhold Miranda
hoping to get an admission of guilt. He
testified that an institute, from which he has
received interrogation training, has
promoted this type of interrogation
''numerous times" and that his current
department, as well as those he was with
previously, all subscribe to this training. In
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the second stage of the interview, Officer
Hanrahan began by reminding Seibert that
they had been "talking for a little while"
about the trailer fire, which occurred on
February 12. Thus, he was able to link
together the unwarned interview with the
warned interview. Seibert was reminded of
the statements she made during the first
stage, which occurred before he gave Seibert
a Miranda warning. He also used Seibert's
pre-warning statements to phrase his
questions. For example, consider the
following excerpt from the second stage of
the interview (emphasis added):
Officer Hanrahan: Now, in discussion you
told us, you told us that there was an
understanding about Donald. (Here, he is
referring to the unwarned portion of the
interview.)
Seibert: Yes.
Hanrahan: Did that take place earlier that
morning [February 12, 1997]?
Seibert: Yes.
Hanrahan: Ok. And what was the
understanding about Donald?
Seibert: If they could get him out of the
trailer, to take him out of the trailer.
Hanrahan: And if they couldn't?
Seibert: I, I never even thought about it. I
just figured they would.
Hanrahan: Trice, didn't you tell me that he
was supposed to die in his sleep?
Seibert: If that would happen, 'cause he
was on that new medicine, you know....
Hanrahan: The Prozac? And it makes him
sleepy. So he was supposed to die in his
sleep?
Seibert: Yes.
Officer Hanrahan, in order to secure an
admissible confession, used information he
gained from Seibert's previous inadmissible
confession. As a result, Seibert's post-
warning statements were closely tied to the
lengthy unwarned interrogation.
The Purpose and Protections of Miranda
To preserve the Fifth Amendment right
against self incrimination where an accused
is subjected to custodial interrogation, which
"exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and
trades on the weakness of individuals," the
United States Supreme Court created the
now well-known safeguard: the Miranda
warning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
455, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
Miranda provided that, "prior to any
questioning " a person must be informed of
certain rights, including the right to remain
silent, which can only be waived knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently. Id. at 444, 86
S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added).
The Miranda requirement serves several
purposes. "For those unaware of the
privilege, the warning is needed simply to
make them aware of it - the threshold
requirement for an intelligent decision as to
its exercise. More important, such a warning
is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the
inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere." Id. at 468, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
Beyond providing these protections, the
Miranda decision and its progeny serve to
guide police and deter improper conduct.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Miranda to "give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and
courts to follow."
Failure to give a Miranda warning does not
result in exclusion of a statement for all
purposes. An unwarned custodial statement
may be used for impeachment. Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28
L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). The prosecution may use
the testimony of a witness who was
identified by the defendant in a statement
given without a Miranda warning. Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S.Ct. 2357,
41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). And, most pertinent
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to this case, the Court in Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d
222 (1985), held that a defendant's prior
remark, in answer to a question during the
police investigation, does not - "without
more" - make a subsequent statement
inadmissible after a Miranda warning was
given. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300, 309, 105
S.Ct. 1285.
As Elstad and Tucker reiterate, the goals of
Miranda are to deter improper police
conduct and to assure trustworthy evidence,
specifically evidence that has not been
obtained in circumstances that appear to be
coercive. Elstad dealt with what the Court
described as "a simple failure to administer
the warnings." 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct.
1285. There was no intentional violation of
Miranda in Elstad, and the Court held "the
admissibility of any subsequent statement
should turn in these circumstances solely on
whether it is knowingly and voluntarily
made." Id
But what about circumstances such as this
case where the violation of Miranda was
intentional? An intentional violation of
Miranda shifts the focus from the goal of
gaining trustworthy evidence - though that
is still a major concern - to the goal of
deterring improper police conduct.
Intentional Miranda Violations
The police officer in this case purposefully
withheld a Miranda warning as part of a
two-step interrogation technique designed to
elicit an initial confession before reading the
accused her rights, hoping that she would
repeat that confession. As noted, Officer
Hanrahan testified that he made a conscious
decision not to advise Seibert of her rights
because he was hoping to get an admission
from her and specifically asked the arresting
officer not to give a Miranda warning.
Officer Hanrahan characterized the strategy
as follows:
Basically, you're rolling the dice. You're
doing a first stage where you understand
that if you're told something that when you
do read the Miranda rights, if they invoke
them, you can't use what you were told.
We were fully aware of that. We went
forward with the second stage, read
Miranda, and she repeated the items she
had told us.
Securing a first admission - no matter how
small - is often called the "breakthrough" or
"beachhead". Interrogators are taught that
procuring the first admission is the "biggest
stumbling block" that, once overcome,
usually leads to a full confession. "The
subject must be motivated to make the first
admission, no matter how apparently small
or trivial," according to Arthur S. Aubry, Jr.,
& Rudolph R. Caputo, Criminal
Interrogation 290 (3d ed.1980). "If this
admission is related to the crime and to the
subject matter of the interrogation, there is
every reason to expect that the first
admission will lead to others, and eventually
to a full confession."
Once the officer has the initial admission,
the officer uses "skillfully applied
interrogation techniques" to "motivate the
suspect into making the confession." Id. at
26. One of these techniques is to confront
the suspect with the earlier admission, which
is what occurred in this case.
If a Miranda warning precedes the
interrogation, this is a perfectly legitimate
technique. But in this case, the interrogation
proceeded without the required warning, and
then after the first admission was made, only
a short break and then a Miranda warning
interrupted the interrogation.
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This was undeniably an "end run" around
Miranda. When an officer chooses to use
this tactic, the officer should, under
Miranda, understand the risks of doing so.
The biggest risk is that the prosecution may
not be able to use the statement in its case in
chief. That risk, of course, may be weighed
against the desirability of getting
information, such as the names of witnesses
or location of physical evidence. And it may
well be, under circumstances that differ
from those in this case, that the prosecution
may nevertheless be able to show that the
confession was voluntary despite the
Miranda- based presumption to the contrary.
Voluntariness
Admission
of the Subsequent
Upon finding an intentional Miranda
violation, a court must ascertain whether the
warned statement was voluntary. In doing
so, the court examines the facts and
circumstances to "determine the degree of
causal connection between any
unconstitutional conduct (and the statement
resulting therefrom) and the confession
made later." State v. Fakes, 51 S.W.3d 24,
30 (Mo.App.2001) (citing State v. Wright,
515 S.W.2d 421, 426 (Mo. banc 1974)). The
court should ascertain whether the purpose
of the violation was to "undermine the
suspect's ability to exercise his free will."
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285.
In light of the record in this case, this Court
presumes the violation of Miranda was a
tactic to elicit a confession and was used to
weaken Seibert's ability to knowingly and
voluntarily exercise her constitutional rights.
If the truth were otherwise, Officer
Hanrahan would not have specifically
instructed the arresting officer to refrain
from giving a Miranda warning. He wanted
to secure a "breakthrough" admission before
warning Seibert of her rights because he
feared that she would assert those rights
were she made aware of them.
Another important consideration in
determining voluntariness is the proximity
in time and place of the subsequent
confession. If the warned confession is far
enough removed from the first confession,
the accused more likely made a voluntary
decision to speak again. While each
situation is fact-specific, courts can look to
whether the subsequent confession closely
followed the first and was obtained by the
same officials in the same surroundings. For
example, in the case at bar, Seibert was
questioned for 30 to 40 minutes, in an
intense manner. She became emotional
during the interview and, at one point,
Officer Hanrahan squeezed her arm and
repeatedly stated, "Donald was to die in his
sleep." He continued in this manner until
Seibert agreed that Donald was supposed to
die in the fire. Then, after a 20-minute
break, Seibert was read and waived her
Miranda rights. The same officers
interrogated her in the same room only
minutes after her unwarned confession. It
was at this point that she confirmed her
unwarned statements.
In these circumstances, little if any weight
can be given to the fact that Seibert signed a
Miranda waiver. I In State v. Fakes, the court
of appeals suppressed a similar confession.
Fakes was interrogated at length while at the
police station before receiving the Miranda
warning. The interrogation was intense, and
officials did not give Fakes a Miranda
I This is true even though Officer Hanrahan read
each part of Miranda to Seibert, having her orally
express her understanding of each right
independently and then instructing her to initial and
sign a waiver form. Adherence to such formality 30
minutes into the interrogation does not change the
fact that she was subjected to a nearly continuous
interrogation, which began without a proper Miranda
warning.
232
warning until she became emotional. Fakes,
51 S.W.3d at 32. In suppressing Fakes' post-
Miranda confession, the court questioned
the voluntariness of Fakes' Miranda waiver:
"In view of the fact that she was so
extensively interrogated before she was
advised of her rights, it is not as clear as in
Wright and Elstad that she later voluntarily
waived those rights when, after finally
having been advised of her rights, she
confirmed the statements made earlier." Id.
at 33. In situations such as these, where the
accused is subjected to a nearly continuous
period of interrogation, it is unreasonable to
assume -and there is nothing in the record to
support such an assumption - that the simple
recitation of Miranda would resurrect the
opportunity to obtain a voluntary waiver.
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v.
Carter, suppressed a written confession,
which was executed after an initial
unwarned interrogation that was followed by
a Miranda warning. In Carter, postal
inspectors interrogated the suspect, without
giving the Miranda warning, about his
alleged possession of stolen mail for nearly
an hour before he confessed. The
interrogation took place in the bank
president's office, in the building where
Carter worked, with Carter seated between
the two inspectors. United States v. Carter,
884 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir.1989). The court
found the second warned confession "came
almost directly on the heels" of the first
unwarned confession and that the unwarned
confession, subsequent warnings and
confession were "part and parcel of a
continuous process." Id. at 373.
When presented with different
circumstances, the result may be different.
In Wright, for example, the accused was
brought into the interrogation room while
the officer was questioning another suspect.
Without first advising Wright of his
constitutional rights, the officer asked him,
"What did you do with the shotgun?" or
words to that effect. Wright replied, "Leroy,
you know I gave you the shotgun. I don't
know where it is at." The officer advised
Wright not to make any further statements.
Wright was then placed in juvenile custody.
Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Mo. banc
1974). In finding that Wright's subsequent
statements were not coerced, the court noted
the second interrogation was held the
following day, at a different location (the
juvenile building instead of the police
station), and with different people present
(Wright's mother and juvenile officers). Id
at 427.
Elstad also is distinguishable in that there
was no evidence, as in the instant case, that
the breach of Miranda was part of a
premeditated tactic to elicit a confession.
"The arresting officers' testimony indicates
that the brief stop in the living room before
proceeding to the station house was not to
interrogate the suspect, but to notify his
mother of the reason for the arrest." Elstad,
470 U.S. at 315, 105 S.Ct. 1285. The Elstad
court did not find that the police engaged in
"improper tactics".
Here, however, Officer Hanrahan candidly
admitted that the breach of Miranda was
intentional and part of a tactic to elicit a
confession. It is presumed that this strategy
was used to weaken Seibert's ability to
knowingly and voluntarily exercise her
constitutional rights. Further, a 20-minute
break and Miranda warning separating the
unwamed confession from the warned
confession was not enough to disturb the
continuity of the interrogation where Officer
Hanrahan tied the two stages of the
interview together by using her statements in
the first stage to correct her during the
second stage.
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Officer Hanrahan's intentional omission of a
Miranda warning was intended to deprive
Seibert of the opportunity knowingly and
intelligently to waive her Miranda rights.
Both stages of the interview formed a nearly
continuous interrogation - she was
interrogated by the same officials in the
same place with only minutes separating the
unwarned and warned questioning. There
are no circumstances that would seem to
dispel the effect of the Miranda violation.
For these reasons, Seibert's post-Miranda
waiver and confession was involuntary and,
therefore, inadmissible. To hold otherwise
would encourage future Miranda violations
and, inevitably, Miranda's role in protecting
the privilege against self-incrimination
would diminish. Were police able to use this
"end run" around Miranda to secure the all-
important "breakthrough" admission, the
requirement of a warning would be
meaningless. Officers would have no
incentive to warn, knowing they could
accomplish indirectly what they could not
accomplish directly. Almost 20 years ago, in
his Elstad dissent, Justice Brennan predicted
in what the Elstad majority described as an
"apocalyptic tone" that Elstad would deliver
a "crippling blow" to Miranda. Elstad, 470
U.S. at 318 n. 5, 319, 105 S.Ct. 1285. ***
And, as evidenced by the testimony of
Officer Hanrahan, officers not only have
incentive to intentionally interrogate
suspects without administering Miranda -
they are being trained to do so. The Elstad
majority, however, said Brennan's
apocalyptic prediction - which is what
happened in this case - would not result.
Prejudice
Because the trial court erred in admitting
Seibert's post-Miranda confession, the case
should be reversed and remanded for a new
trial unless the error was harmless. State v.
Miller, 650 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Mo. bane
1983). Seibert was convicted of second
degree murder as an accessory for
knowingly killing Donald Rector. The jury
was able to both read and hear her
statements that she knew the mobile home
was to be burned and that Donald could die
in his sleep because he was on Prozac. At
one point, she agreed with Officer Hanrahan
that Donald was supposed to die in his sleep
after he reminded her of her pre-Miranda
confession. Because of the evidentiary
strength of a confession, and because of the
contents of Seibert's involuntary statements,
her statements certainly were not harmless.
Conclusion
The interrogation was set up to violate
Miranda to secure a confession. The trial
court suppressed only the unwarned portion
of the interrogation. But on this record, the
prosecution has not overcome the
presumption that this tactic produced an
involuntary confession. The confession in
the remaining portion of the interrogation
also should have been suppressed.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is
remanded for a new trial.
BENTON, J., dissents in separate opinion
filed. LIMBAUGH, C.J., and PRICE, J.,
concur in opinion of BENTON, J.
DUANE BENTON, Judge.
Because the principal opinion does not
follow the binding precedent, Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84
L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), I dissent.
Elstad holds that "a suspect who has once
responded to unwarned yet uncoercive
questioning is not thereby disabled from
waiving [her] rights and confessing after
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[she] has been given the requisite Miranda
warnings." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318, 105
S.Ct. at 1298, 84 L.Ed.2d at 238. Patrice
Seibert's unwarned responses to Officer
Hanrahan's questioning did not prevent her
from waiving her rights and confessing.
"In these circumstances [where the
preceding admission is unwarned but
voluntary], a careful and thorough
administration of Miranda warnings serves
to cure the condition that rendered the
unwarned statement inadmissible." Elstad,
470 U.S. at 310-311, 105 S.Ct. at 1294, 84
L.Ed.2d at 233. In this case, the
administration of Miranda warnings was
careful and thorough, as demonstrated by
the tape recording of the administration, and
by the form that Seibert initialed, dated and
signed. As in Elstad, the reading of Seibert's
rights was undeniably complete and
recorded. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314-315, 105
S.Ct. at 1296, 84 L.Ed.2d at 236. Moreover,
Seibert was 39 years old when she
confessed. Appendix A to this opinion is the
"Warning & Waiver Form." Appendix B is
the testimony discussing it.
"Though Miranda requires that the
unwarned admission must be suppressed, the
admissibility of any subsequent statement
should turn in these circumstances solely on
whether it is knowingly and voluntarily
made." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. at
1293, 84 L.Ed.2d at 232. In this case,
Seibert's unwarned admissions were
suppressed. The circuit court found that the
warned statement was knowingly and
voluntarily made. * * *
"It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda
to hold that a simple failure to administer the
warnings, unaccompanied by any actual
coercion or other circumstances calculated
to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise
[her] free will, so taints the investigatory
process that a subsequent voluntary and
informed waiver is ineffective for some
indeterminate period." Elstad, 470 U.S. at
309, 105 S.Ct. at 1293, 84 L.Ed.2d at 232. In
this case, there was no "actual coercion" of
Seibert, or "other circumstances" that
undermined her free will. Elstad holds flatly
that the "psychological impact of voluntary
disclosure of a guilty secret" is not coercion,
nor does it compromise the voluntariness of
a subsequent informed waiver. Elstad, 470
U.S. at 312, 105 S.Ct. at 1294, 84 L.Ed.2d at
234. The Elstad opinion disapproves such
"cat out of the bag" logic as "expansive." Id.
"[A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper
tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the
mere fact that a suspect has made an
unwarned admission does not warrant a
presumption of compulsion." Elstad, 470
U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. at 1296, 84 L.Ed.2d at
235. In Seibert's case, there were no
deliberately coercive tactics. *** There is no
evidence of deliberately coercive tactics.
If there were substantial evidence that the
officer did the following - "inherently
coercive police tactics or methods offensive
to due process that render the initial
admission involuntary and undermine the
suspect's will to invoke [her] rights once
they are read to [her]" - then the warned
confession should be suppressed. See
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317, 105 S.Ct. at 1297,
84 L.Ed.2d at 237.
At this critical point, the majority presumes
that the officer's strategy had the purpose "to
weaken Seibert's ability to knowingly and
voluntarily exercise her constitutional
rights." No evidence supports this
assumption. Seibert did not testify at any
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hearing or at trial. Officer Hanrahan testified
at the hearing that his "hope" and "intent"
were to gain some sort of confession or
admission of guilt. The officer did not
mention "breakthrough" or "beachhead"
interrogation. In addition to the "rolling the
dice" paragraph quoted in the principal
opinion, Officer Hanrahan testified that
withholding Miranda rights at the outset
means:
A. You may not get any information at all.
Q. In which part of the interrogation?
A. In either part. You may never even get
to the second stage.
Officer Hanrahan testified that based on two
prior conversations with Seibert, he believed
she expected to be arrested and would have
a story rehearsed. Although defense counsel
asked Officer Hanrahan about interrogation
techniques at both the suppression hearing
and the trial, the Officer - the only witness
to testify about the confession - stated that
his hope and intent was to gain a confession
or admission.
Elstad expressly commends confessions:
"Voluntary statements 'remain a proper
element in law enforcement.' Elstad, 470
U.S. at 305, 105 S.Ct. at 1291, 84 L.Ed.2d at
229, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. "Indeed, far from
being prohibited by the Constitution,
admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not
coerced, are inherently desirable.... Absent
some officially coerced self-accusation, the
Fifth Amendment is not violated by even the
most damning admissions." Elstad, 470 U.S.
at 305, 105 S.Ct. at 1291, 84 L.Ed.2d at 229.
"When neither the initial nor the subsequent
admission is coerced, little justification
exists for permitting the highly probative
evidence of a voluntary confession to be
irretrievably lost to the factfinder." Elstad,
470 U.S. at 312, 105 S.Ct. at 1294-95, 84
L.Ed.2d at 234.
The principal opinion, in emphasizing the
factors of lapse-of-time, change-of-place,
change-of-interrogators, and need-to-
dissipate-taint, echoes the Oregon court
reversed in Elstad, and the other courts
criticized in Elstad Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303,
310, 317-18, 105 S.Ct. at 1290, 1293, 1297,
84 L.Ed.2d at 228, 233, 237. Elstad makes
clear that these factors are considered only if
the first confession is coerced. Id.
The principal opinion asserts that Elstad
does not apply where police intentionally
withhold Miranda warnings before the
initial unwarned statement. True, Elstad, at
one point, describes the initial unwarned
statement as "technically in violation of
Miranda." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct.
at 1297-98, 84 L.Ed.2d at 238. This passing
comment in Elstad does not support the
principal opinion, as demonstrated in recent
opinions by the Courts of Appeals.
On facts nearly identical to this case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, en banc, held that Elstad applies so
long as the initial unwarned statement is not
actually coerced. United States v. Orso, 266
F.3d 1030, 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. en banc),
full en banc hearing denied, 275 F.3d 1190
(2001). The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari on the Orso case, while
this case was pending. 123 S.Ct. 125, 154
L.Ed.2d 42 (2002).
It is also true that the Eighth Circuit has
made statements to the contrary. United
States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 372-74 (8th
Cir.1989). However, yet another Circuit, the
First, called Carter's statements "dicta" and
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"facially inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in Elstad" United States v.
Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir.2000).
The First Circuit then holds that deliberate
withholding of Miranda rights before the
unwarned admission does not make a later
warned statement inadmissible. Id at 320-
21. Directly refuting the principal opinion's
reliance on "deterrence" against "improper
tactics," the First Circuit holds:
Although Elstad does not permit
suppression of Esquilin's voluntary
statement made after he was informed of
his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived
them, the basic Miranda rule still operates
here to render Esquilin's initial unwarned
(but voluntary) statement inadmissible.
The Supreme Court has ruled that
Miranda's deterrence rationale requires no
more than that, see Elstad, 470 U.S. at
308, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, and
we are not free to ignore that judgement.
Id. at 321. The Esquilin case also
specifically holds that Elstad rejects the
"inearly continuous" and "time lapse"
arguments, both invoked by the principal
opinion. Id. at 319.
As for the other authority the principal
opinion discusses, Elstad renders obsolete
the contrary approach in this Court's
decision eleven years earlier in State v.
Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421, 426-27 (Mo. banc
1974), and in the Court of Appeal's decision
last year in State v. Fakes, 51 S.W.3d 24, 30
(Mo.App.2001).
*** On this record, there is substantial
evidence that both the unwarned and warned
statements were voluntary. Thus, under
Elstad, the warned statement is admissible,
as the trial judge ruled.
237
APP:NDIX A
e S- aour-r mwrV o rcanc
wIARKIc 6 'AtVER 7OW
Before we ask you any questioM 4 you must ubderstat' what your riBhts rc:
. You do not have to make any stateaenL at thIs time and have a
risht to remai elent.
. Anything you s"y can and will be used sainst you in a court
of law.
a oi are entitled to rmnnult virh an attoory before my inter-
Viev a-nd to hava an attarney pt-esent at the im of interrvga-
tics.
. I you canao &arnd &a A*torne. cie will be appodnted for
5. (Jivwcanl SuspecsE oqly) If you arm fourrcen ygs t oa*. or
older yet could be tried in Court aB an eduic.
I have read the above statement of my rights and I unrstand what my
righte are. I am willing to make a statement and answer qusatflnh. 7
do not want a iaidyer at t rts tive. ! undaretaa and know wtsC I sa dots -
lo praidses or threats have been mm=d E6 ma end un prnsnuru or coercian
of any kind bas been used against us.
Sigtature of Suspect Date / TIM
Witness Data Time
I hereby certify that tb fernoinc Warning and eiver was ruAd by as to
the abovu suspect, that the suspect also read it, md the suspect has
affixed 1is {ler) eignature hereto in my preseuce.
Masature - 7olice Officer
ro. (in the ase ot a jirveils
o1e OC, the attending Deputy
Juvenile OffLeer)
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APPENDIX B
Trial Testimony of Officer Richard E.
Hanrahan (Excerpt * **)
Q. When you arrived at the station, you
had an initial conversation with her - is
that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. After that initial conversation did you
inform the Defendant of her rights under
the Miranda decision?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. I'd like to hand you what's been
marked as State's Exhibit 37 and ask you
if you can tell me what this is please?
A. Yes, sir - this is a rights advisement
provided by the detective with St. Louis
County that night.
Q. And was that, in fact, read to the
Defendant?
A. Yes, sir, it was.
Q. And did you ask her if she understood
each of those rights as you read them to
her?
A. As I read them to her, I simply check-
marked them when I was finished. I
asked her if she understood each right.
Q. Did she indicate to you in some
fashion whether she did or not?
A. Yes, she did.
Q. And what was her response in each
case?
A. She indicated that she understood and
she signed next to each of the rights to
state that she understood.
Q. And sir, did you then read the waiver
portion of the form?
A. I believe I let her read the waiver. I'd
have to check my report to be sure. I
usually allow the suspect to read the
waiver.
Q. How does that waiver read?
A. It says - "I have read the above
statement of my rights and I understand
what my rights are. I am willing to make
a statement and answer questions. I do
not want a lawyer at this time. I
understand and know what I am doing.
No promises or threats have been made
to me and no pressure or coercion of any
kind has been used against me."
Q. In fact, did you threaten the
Defendant in any fashion?
A. I did not.
Q. *** Did you do anything that would
be taken as threatening by the average
person?
A. I don't believe so - no, sir.
Q. Did you promise the Defendant any
benefit of any kind in order to induce her
to speak with you?
A. The truth would make her feel much
better.
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High Court Orders Retrial for Woman who wasn't Read Rights; She was Sentenced
to life in Prison for Role in a Fatal House Fire
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
December 15, 2002
David A. Lieb
A divided Missouri Supreme Court on
Tuesday overturned the murder conviction
of a woman who implicated herself in a fatal
house fire, ruling police failed to properly
notify her of the right to remain silent.
The court ordered a new trial for Patrice
Seibert, who had been sentenced to life in
prison on a second-degree murder
conviction for her involvement in a February
1997 fire at her Rolla mobile home.
Authorities say the fire was set by Seibert's
17-year-old son and his friend to cover up
the apparently natural death of her 12-year-
old son, Jonathan, who had cerebral palsy.
But the fire killed Donald Rector, 17, who
was on medication for a mental disorder and
had been living at the house.
A Rolla police officer intentionally
questioned Seibert without informing her of
her Miranda rights to remain silent or have
an attorney present. After Seibert
acknowledged that Donald was supposed to
die in the fire, the officer took a short break,
informed her of her Miranda rights and
renewed the questioning, referring to the
initial interview to get Seibert to repeat her
statements.
Only Seibert's second statement was used in
her trial.
In a 4-3 decision, Missouri's highest court
said both statements should have been
barred from evidence. Judges appointed by
Democratic governors made up the majority;
Republican-appointed judges dissented.
"The (initial) interrogation was set up to
violate Miranda to secure a confession,"
Judge Michael Wolff wrote for the majority.
"The confession in the remaining portion of
the interrogation also should have been
suppressed."
Wolff s opinion said the interrogating officer
specifically told the arresting officer not to
read Seibert her Miranda rights as part of a
tactic to elicit a confession. Wolff also said
there was not enough separation between the
two interrogations.
In dissent, Judge Duane Benton asserted that
the Missouri ruling ran contrary to a 1985
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, as well as a
2001 federal appeals court case with a
nearly identical situation to Seibert's.
Seibert's first statement was not coerced and
her second statement was voluntary. So her
conviction should have been upheld, Benton
said.
Rolla Police Chief Dave Pikka said the
police officer who questioned Seibert no
longer works for the department. But he said
the two-step interrogation process -
including the delayed notification of
Miranda rights - was not an unusual tactic.
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"It is common among police in general, not
just in Rolla," Pikka said. "Many times what
could happen is if you offer them the
Miranda warning on the front end, they
won't give you that statement."
Seibert had been tried on a first-degree
murder charge, for which prosecutors would
have sought the death penalty. But jurors
acquitted her of that and instead convicted
her of the second- degree murder charge,
which cannot result in the death sentence.
Copyright C 2002 St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
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New clamor on right to silence Miranda: Several local and Supreme Court cases are
the latest to test the long-standing warnings
The Baltimore Sun
June 26, 2003
Andrea F. Siegel
Over nearly four decades, Miranda
warnings have become so culturally
ingrained - from America's courtrooms
to television dramas - that the timeworn
declaration by police would seem to be
settled and routine. Far from it.
And the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed
to hear three cases that could give police
more leeway with the warnings. In one
case, Missouri police, who were trained
to sidestep the Miranda protections, used
a two-part interrogation to obtain a
confession in a murder case.
"These cases pose a great danger to
Miranda," says supporter Yale Kamisar,
a law professor at the University of
Michigan and the University of San
Diego who has been writing about
confessions for 40 years. "If the court
backs away, the original opinion doesn't
mean anything."
The warnings, which begin "You have
the right to remain silent," combine two
rights aimed at preventing police abuses
in questioning suspects: the
constitutional rights to a lawyer and to
not incriminate oneself.
The warnings are named for the
landmark 1966 Supreme Court ruling
Ernesto Miranda vs. Arizona, which was
designed to prevent coerced confessions.
In tossing out Miranda's rape conviction,
the court said he was not told of his right
to a lawyer. On top of his written
confession was a typed paragraph stating
that he knew his legal rights, but that did
not show he had intelligently waived
those protections, the court said.
Today, the four warnings are a staple of
American culture - so ingrained that
suspects in Italy and Spain, where the
protections do not apply, have asked to
be read their rights, says Robert McCrie,
chairman of the Department of Law and
Police Science at New York's John Jay
College of Criminal Justice.
The warnings have long been a target of
conservative groups and others
concerned about the effect on crime
control. Although critics and supporters
of Miranda point to studies and
anecdotal evidence to back their
positions, there is no definitive study
about the case's effect.
"So many of us in law enforcement are
going to seek to confine Miranda. And
people in criminal defense want to
expand Miranda," says Joshua K.
Marquis, who is district attorney for
Clatsop County, Ore., and a board
member of the National District
Attorneys Association.
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Miranda and later rulings require that
police, before questioning a suspect in
custody, must explain the right to remain
silent, to have a lawyer and to have a
lawyer appointed if the suspect cannot
afford one. Police must also tell the
suspect that if he decides to talk, those
words may be used against him.
Today, most police departments
incorporate the warnings into written
forms that suspects sign. Still, gray areas
have emerged ever since the ruling, and
the high court has made exceptions to
the Miranda rule.
For example, police need not give the
warnings if they feel there is a public
safety emergency. And even if a
suspect's statement is thrown out
because Miranda warnings weren't
given, a prosecutor can sometimes use it
to show the suspect lied on the witness
stand.
"It keeps coming up because you have
all these little wrinkles. Was that an
interrogation? Was he in custody?" says
Abraham A. Dash, professor at the
University of Maryland School of Law.
"There is a line. But where the line is,
God knows."
The three pending Supreme Court cases
could shift that line.
"The court will take this opportunity to
explain and fine-tune and possibly cut
back on Miranda vs. Arizona," says
Byron L. Warnken, professor at the
University of Baltimore School of Law
who has counseled police about Miranda
and served as a defense attorney.
Most worrisome for Miranda's
proponents is a two-step process -
headed for Supreme Court review - that
police used with murder suspect Patrice
Seibert in a Missouri case. In
overturning her murder conviction, that
state's highest court called it "undeniably
an 'end-run' around Miranda."
An officer - who admitted that his and
other police departments were trained
this way - questioned her without
explaining her rights. After she
confessed, he gave the Miranda
warnings, which she waived, and
questioned her based on what she had
told him previously.
Defense lawyers say that technique, if
allowed by the Supreme Court, would
gut Miranda because it would encourage
police to use confessions and data gained
by deliberately not giving the warnings
to unwary people.
But Paul D. Kamenar, senior executive
counsel of the Washington Legal
Foundation, says it makes more sense
for judges to focus on whether a
confession is voluntary. Crucial
evidence should not be tossed aside for a
procedural glitch. That, he says, risks
freeing a person who admitted to a
crime.
Another case up for Supreme Court
review is the Nebraska drug conviction
of John Fellers, who says he was tricked
by police at his home. Police told him
they were there because he was indicted
and asked about his involvement with
certain people and drug activities. He
spoke freely. Police then arrested him
and, while he was in custody, gave him
Miranda warnings. At that point, he
waived his rights and again spoke with
them.
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In the third case under review by the
high court, Samuel Patane cut police off
as they tried to explain his rights at his
Colorado home, insisting he knew the
rights. He then told them where to find
his gun. A federal appellate court ruled
the gun inadmissible before Patane could
be tried on a firearms charge; the
government has appealed.
and to have an attorney present during
questioning.
If you cannot afford an attorney, one will
be provided for you.
Source: Adapted from Black's Law
Dictionary.
Copyright 0 2003, The Baltimore Sun
The Supreme Court cases come as police
look increasingly to scientific evidence,
such as DNA analyses that can point to a
suspect with a mathematical certainty.
"There is less reliance on custodial
interrogation," says David B. Mitchell,
former Maryland State Police
superintendent. He now teaches in the
Police Executive Leadership Program at
the Johns Hopkins University.
Still, a confession is prized evidence and
can make or break a case. A trial judge's
ruling on alleged police misconduct can
trigger a plea, abruptly end a prosecution
or even land cases before the Supreme
Court for further honing of Miranda.
"It is never," says Marquis, the Oregon
prosecutor, "going to be fully resolved."
Miranda warnings
Before questioning a suspect who is
being taken into custody, police must
issue a version of these warnings:
You have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law.
You have the right to have an attorney
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RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION -- CONSECUTIVE CONFESSIONS
99 Harvard Law Review I
November, 1985
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
Almost twenty years ago, in Miranda
v. Arizona,I the Warren Court
pronounced the most widely publicized
criminal justice opinion of its era,
holding that suspects held in police
custody must be notified of their fifth
and sixth amendment rights prior to any
interrogation and that confessions
elicited without such warnings cannot be
admitted into evidence against them in
criminal proceedings. In the 1970s,
however, a new majority of the Court
began to limit the scope of the Miranda
exclusionary rule in certain contexts.
Last Term, in Oregon v. Elstad,2 the
Court still more sharply circumscribed
Miranda's exclusionary scope by
holding that a suspect's 'voluntary'
confession obtained in violation of
Miranda does not presumptively taint a
later confession elicited after proper
warnings were given. In a more
sweeping pronouncement, the Court
further held that the established rule
barring the use of evidence derived from
constitutional violations does not apply
to a 'simple' failure to administer
Miranda warnings. In so doing, the
Court gave short shrift to the general
concerns for judicial competence and
economy and its declared goal of
deterring improper police practices.
More fundamentally, although the Court
purported to adhere to Miranda, its
reasoning evinces practical and
theoretical doubts about the continuing
viability of the Miranda requirements.
On December 17, 1981, two county
police officers went to the home of
eighteen-year-old Michael James Elstad
with a warrant for his arrest in
connection with a neighborhood
burglary. Elstad's mother allowed them
in the house. After summoning Elstad
alone into the living room, one of the
officers asked him a series of questions
without administering any Miranda
warnings. The officer said that he
believed Elstad had been involved in the
burglary, and Elstad stated, 'Yes, I was
there.' The officers then took Elstad to
the sheriffs office, where they advised
him for the first time of his Miranda
rights. Elstad proceeded to give a full
oral statement of his involvement in the
burglary, which was later reduced to a
signed confession.
At his trial for first-degree burglary,
Elstad moved to suppress the first oral
statement and the written confession, the
latter on the ground that the oral
admission elicited in violation of
Miranda had induced him to make the
later confession. After excluding Elstad's
first oral statement, the trial court
admitted the written confession, finding
that it was both voluntarily given and
untainted by the improperly obtained
statement. Elstad was found guilty and
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'384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 105 S. Ct. 1286 (1985).
subsequently appealed. Relying on
United States v. Bayer,3 the Oregon
Court of Appeals held that the statement
obtained in violation of Miranda let the
cat 'sufficiently out of the bag to exert a
coercive impact' on Elstad during his
subsequent interrogation. Noting that
only a brief period had separated the two
confessions, the court of appeals held the
written confession inadmissible and
overturned Elstad's conviction.
The Supreme Court reversed.
Writing for a six-member majority,
Justice O'Connor first rejected the
applicability of the so-called 'tainted
fruit' or derivative-evidence doctrine to
evidence derived from 'simple' Miranda
violations. The Court emphasized that
the Miranda exclusionary rule 'sweeps
more broadly than the Fifth Amendment
itself because it may operate to exclude
testimony that was not actually
compelled. In the Court's view, then,
although a failure to administer Miranda
warnings creates an irrebuttable
'presumption' that a suspect's statement
was coerced, it does not itself violate a
constitutional right; the statement
therefore is not 'inherently tainted.'
Justice O'Connor concluded that if a
suspect voluntarily confesses before the
prescribed warnings have been given,
Miranda requires suppression of the
confession itself, but not of any evidence
derived from it. Relying on Michigan v.
Tucker, 4 Justice O'Connor explained that
'the absence of any coercion or improper
tactics undercuts the twin rationales--
trustworthiness of evidence and
deterrence of improper police conduct --
for a broader rule.'
'331 U.S. 532 (1947).
4 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
Recognizing that the subsequent
confession must itself by voluntary in
order to be admissible, Justice O'Connor
next argued that the psychological
impact of having once confessed neither
constitutes coercion by the state nor can
be presumed to be the motivating force
behind the second confession through
some 'subtle form of lingering
[psychological] compulsion.' In the
Court's view, as long as the first
confession was 'voluntary' in fact and the
second confession was obtained after
proper administration of Miranda
warnings, the second confession should
not be presumed to have been given
involuntarily. A contrary rule, the Court
reasoned, would 'immunize a suspect
who responds to pre-Miranda warning
questions from the consequences of his
subsequent informed waiver of the
privilege of remaining silent.'
Finally, the Court rejected Elstad's
contention that he was unable to give a
completely informed waiver of his fifth
amendment rights in making the second
confession because he was unaware that
his prior admission could not be used
against him. Citing a number of cases in
which a suspect's ignorance of the 'full
consequences' of his decisions had not
been held to negate their voluntariness,
the Court concluded that the police need
not inform a suspect of the legal
consequences of an improperly obtained
confession in order for the suspect to
give a knowing and voluntary waiver of
his Miranda rights. The Court explicitly
rejected as 'neither practicable nor
constitutionally necessary' Elstad's
suggestion that an additional warning
should have been provided to him
respecting the possible inadmissibility of
his prior confession.
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In a lengthy dissent, Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall, rejected
virtually every conclusion reached by
the majority. Justice Brennan first
disputed the majority's view that an
admission obtained in violation of
Miranda should not presumptively
compromise the voluntariness of a
subsequent confession. Relying on the
conclusions of numerous criminal
interrogations specialists, Justice
Brennan argued that a defendant's belief
that he has little to lose by repeating an
earlier confession can compromise the
voluntariness of the second confession.
The majority was content to rely on the
subsequent recitation of Miranda
warnings to cure whatever coercion
results from a suspect's having confessed
without the benefit of proper warnings.
Justice Brennan, on the other hand,
insisted the only certain well-recognized
intervening factors--such as a warning
that any earlier confession might be
inadmissible, a significant lapse of time
between the confessions, a change in
location, or the intervention of counsel--
should be presumed to transform a
coercive atmosphere into one conducive
to the exercise of free will.
Justice Brennan then attacked the
majority's holding that the derivative-
evidence doctrine has no application to
simple Miranda violations. Arguing that
Miranda procedures are not merely
prophylactic safeguards of the privilege
against self-incrimination, Justice
Brennan contended that the fifth
amendment not only requires exclusion
of improperly obtained statements, but
also affirmatively requires that the police
give suspects Miranda warnings. Justice
Brennan therefore dismissed as
fallacious the majority's position that a
statement elicited in violation of
Miranda can at once be irrebuttably
presumed to have been compelled and
yet actually uncoerced. Hence Justice
Brennan contended that the rule
excluding evidence derived from
compelled statements is 'coextensive
with the scope of the privilege' against
self-incrimination itself.'
The Court's decision in Elstad
artificially bifurcates Miranda's
presumption that testimony induced
without the benefit of proper warnings is
the product of coercion. Under the
Court's new framework, Miranda
procedures will continue to serve as a
bright-line test by which courts may
distinguish coercive from noncoercive
interrogation for the purpose of
determining whether the fifth
amendment requires exclusion of a
suspect's custodial statements. When
considering the admissibility of
derivative evidence, however, courts are
no longer bound by this bright-line test.
Because the costs of lost evidence are
high and the benefits of further exclusion
are low, courts must find 'actual'
coercion in obtaining the original
statement in violation of Miranda in
order to bar admission of derivative
evidence. When evaluated against
familiar justifications for bright- line
judicial presumptions, such as
considerations of judicial competence
and economy, efficient translation of
legal norms into actual practices, and
fulfillment of constitutional objectives,
the Court's reformulation of Miranda's
bright-line test leaves much to be
desired.
The decision in Elstad also affords
law enforcement officers positive
incentives to withhold Miranda
warnings strategically and thus vitiates
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the ability of Miranda's bright-line test
to instill norms of proper conduct in law
enforcement agents. With the assurance
that any evidence derived from a
voluntary confession taken in violation
of Miranda will be presumed admissible
in court, police officers can simply
'forget' to give timely warnings.
Assuming that Miranda warnings deter
some suspects from confessing, police
under Elstad can only gain by employing
such tactics. Suspects who would have
confessed even if given proper Miranda
warnings will arguably still confess
under more coercive conditions, and
police can elicit the same statements by
prompting the suspects to repeat their
confessions after tardy administration of
the warnings. For suspects who would
not have confessed if initially notified of
their rights, and for suspects who refuse
to repeat their confessions once so
notified, the police at least gain the
information and evidence derived from
the statements elicited in violation of
Miranda. As they have in other contexts,
police officers may be expected to push
the Elstad derivative-evidence loophole
to its limits and withhold Miranda
warnings whenever strategic objectives
are served.
Copyright C 1985 by the Harvard Law
Review Association
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02-1019 Arizona v. Gant
Ruling Below: (Ariz. Ct. App., 202 Ariz. 240, 43 P.3d 188)
Arrest of defendant after he voluntarily stopped his vehicle, exited it, and began to walk away
with no awareness of police presence did not justify search of vehicle under rule of New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), which held that Fourth Amendment permits police to search
passenger compartment of vehicle incident to arrest of occupant; in absence of any other
justification, search was illegal and its fruits should have been suppressed.
Question Presented: When police arrest recent occupant of vehicle outside vehicle, are they
precluded from searching vehicle pursuant to New York v. Belton unless arrestee was actually or
constructively aware of police before getting out of vehicle?
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
V.
Rodney Joseph GANT, Appellant.
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2, Department A.
Decided March 29, 2002
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
BRAMMER, Presiding Judge.
After a jury trial, appellant Rodney Gant was
found guilty of unlawful possession of cocaine
for sale and unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced him to
concurrent, mitigated prison terms, the longest
of which was three years. Because we agree
with Gant that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress evidence, we reverse his
convictions.
Standard of Review and Background
Gant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress a handgun and a plastic
bag of cocaine found when his vehicle was
searched after his arrest, asserting that the
warrantless search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. When reviewing a trial
court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence
based on an alleged Fourth Amendment
violation, we defer to the court's factual findings
but review de novo mixed questions of law and
fact. State v. Wyman, 197 Ariz. 10, 3 P.3d 392
(App.2000). Because warrantless searches are
presumptively unreasonable and
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment,
the state bears the burden of proving the
lawfulness of the acquisition of evidence seized
without a warrant. Rodriguez v. Arellano, 194
Ariz. 211, 979 P.2d 539 (App.1999); see also
State v. Valle, 196 Ariz. 324, 996 P.2d 125
(App.2000). In determining whether the state
has carried that burden, we consider only the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing.
See State v. Sanchez, 200 Ariz. 163, 24 P.3d 610
(App.2001). And, we view that evidence in the
light most favorable to sustaining the trial
court's ruling. Id.
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At the hearing on Gant's motion to suppress, the
court stated:
Are any of the facts in issue? It seemed to me
that from your respective briefs, that there
didn't seem to be any disagreement. As I
understand the facts - and let me repeat what I
understand they are: That this arose out of a
report of possible narcotic activity; . police
went to the residence, knocked on the door.
The defendant answered....
... [The police] ran a computer check on
Rodney Joseph Gant and found that he was
wanted on a suspended driver's license and,
also, an outstanding warrant for failure to
appear....
... [The police] left and then came back to the
residence, found a man and a woman around
the residence. The woman had a crack pipe.
The man, they didn't apparently find any
contraband on him. Then the defendant
arrived, driving a vehicle, and the officer, as
the car pulled into the driveway, shined his
flashlight into the car, recognized Mr. Gant as
the individual he had previously met at the
door and identified him as Mr. Gant.
And as the officer was walking toward the
vehicle, Mr. Gant got out of the vehicle and
started walking toward the officer when the
officer called him by name, and he responded
that that was who he was. And the officer
took him in custody for the outstanding
warrant and suspended driver's license, having
seen him operating a motor vehicle....
[T]here's no question that [the officer] could
legally arrest and did lawfully arrest the
defendant on the outstanding warrant and for
operating a motor vehicle without a driver's
license.
Gant was removed from the vehicle - from the
vicinity of the vehicle to the officer's patrol
car and placed in the back of the patrol car,
and the officers then did a search of the
defendant's vehicle, found a weapon and
found the jacket. And, apparently, feeling the
jacket, felt something that they felt might be
drugs and took it out of the pocket and found
cocaine.
Gant's counsel stated that, "if the State concedes
those are the facts, I think those are facts
sufficient to proceed on the motion." The
prosecutor replied: "I have no disagreement
with the facts. I'd be happy to submit, also, on
my pleading as well." Consequently, the parties
did not introduce any evidence at the
suppression hearing either in support of or in
opposition to Gant's motion.
In his motion to suppress the evidence found in
his vehicle, Gant did not contest the lawfulness
of his arrest but, rather, argued only that the
ensuing warrantless search of his vehicle was
illegal because no exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement applied. The
state argued that the search was lawful because
it had been conducted incident to Gant's arrest
or, alternatively, that, because the police had
probable cause to search his vehicle, a
warrantless search was permissible under the
automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement. The trial
court denied Gant's motion, finding that the
search of the car was lawful because it was a
search incident to his arrest. We disagree.
Warrantless Search Incident to Arrest
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89
S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 (1969),
the Supreme Court held that, when police make
a lawful arrest, they may, without a warrant,
search the person in custody as well as the "area
from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence." Applying that
principle to a situation in which the person
arrested had been occupying a vehicle when
police initiated contact with him, the Court later
held that officers may search the entire
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passenger compartment of a vehicle, and all
containers therein, as a "contemporaneous
incident" of a lawful arrest. New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69
L.Ed.2d 768, 775 (1981).' This rule,
denominated "bright-line" by one of the
dissenting justices, id at 463, 101 S.Ct. at 2866,
69 L.Ed.2d at 777, was premised on the
generalization, rather than the probability in a
given case, that objects within a vehicle's
passenger compartment are within an arrestee's
reach. Even so, the Court specifically stated
that its holding was limited to the "particular
and problematic" context in which it had arisen,
and did not "alter[ ] the fundamental principles
established in the Chimel case regarding the
basic scope of searches incident to lawful
custodial arrests." 453 U.S. at 460 n. 3, 101
S.Ct. at 2864 n. 3, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775 n. 3; see
also State v. Lopez, 198 Ariz. 420, 10 P.3d 1207
(App.2000).
Taking Belton one step further, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a vehicle search
conducted five minutes after an arrestee had
been removed from both the automobile and the
scene qualified as a search incident to arrest
under Belton because the search had "occurred
during a continuous series of events closely
connected in time to the arrest." United States v.
McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir.1999);
see also United States v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789
(1st Cir.1994).
The state contends that the question of whether
i In Belton, the Court also used the term "recent
occupant," which, when read in context, clearly refers to
someone who, once arrested and removed from a vehicle,
necessarily becomes its "recent occupant." 453 U.S. at
460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775. Some courts
have, in our opinion, misconstrued this language to justify
extending Belton's reach to cases in which a person
voluntarily exited a vehicle before the police initiated any
contact. See, e.g., Glasco v. Commonwealth, 257 Va.
433, 513 S.E.2d 137 (1999).
Belton applies to Gant's situation "appears to be
a matter of first impression in Arizona."2 We
agree and conclude that, not only are Belton
and McLaughlin both factually distinguishable
from this case, but also that the rationale
underlying those cases does not extend to this
situation. We further conclude, therefore, that
the warrantless search of Gant's vehicle was not
a lawful search incident to his arrest.
In Belton, an officer stopped the vehicle in
which Belton was a passenger because the
officer had seen the vehicle speeding. In
McLaughlin, an officer stopped the vehicle
because it had an illegally tinted rear window.
Here, in contrast, the facts as summarized by the
trial court do not show, nor can we infer, that
Gant was or should have been aware either of
the police presence at the residence as he
approached it or of the light the officer shined
into his vehicle. And if, as the state suggested at
oral argument in this court, the trial court
implicitly drew either inference, we conclude it
erred in doing so because neither inference is
reasonably suggested by these facts. What is
clear from these facts, however, is that Gant
voluntarily - that is, not in response to police
direction - stopped his vehicle, exited it, and
began to walk away from it. We believe that
this factual distinction is significant and requires
a different result than that in Belton and
McLaughlin.
We agree with the holding of United States v.
Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.1993), in which
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that Belton was inapplicable to a situation in
which an arrestee had been apprehended
2 In contrast to that assertion in its brief, at oral argument
in this court, the state referred to this as a "run-of-the-mill
Belton case," citing State v. Crivellone, 138 Ariz. 437,
675 P.2d 697 (1983), and State v. Hanna, 173 Ariz. 30,
839 P.2d 450 (App.1992). Crivellone and Hanna,
however, both involved situations in which officers
stopped a suspect's vehicle, which was not the case here.
The state's reliance on these cases, therefore, is misplaced.
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approximately thirty feet from his automobile
because the police had not initiated contact with
him until that time and, therefore, he was not an
occupant of the vehicle. The court instead held
that the test outlined in Chimel applied. We
further agree with the reasoning expressed in
United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360
(D.C.Cir.1989), in which the court held
inapplicable the rationale underlying Belton's
bright-line rule allowing police to search the
entire passenger compartment of a vehicle - that
it is, at least hypothetically, within the reach of
its arrested occupant--to a case in which the
police had first encountered the arrestee outside
the automobile. In such cases, the court said,
the twin concerns of officer safety and evidence
preservation that justify, at least theoretically,
the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the
warrant requirement discussed in Chimel
disappear because the vehicle's passenger
compartment is not available to the arrestee at
the time the police encounter or arrest the
person. Other courts have expressed similar
reasoning and have reached similar results.
Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383
(D.C.1993); Thomas v. State, 761 So.2d 1010
(Fla.1999); State v. Foster, 127 Idaho 723, 905
P.2d 1032 (Ct.App.1995); People v. Stehman,
324 Ill.App.3d 54, 257 Ill.Dec. 607, 753 N.E.2d
1233 (2001); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410
Mass. 737, 575 N.E.2d 350 (1991); People v.
Fernengel, 216 Mich.App. 420, 549 N.W.2d
361 (1996).
By its own terms, Belton is limited to the
particular factual situation in which it arose.
Accordingly, it applies only when "the officer
initiates contact with the defendant, either by
actually confronting the defendant or by
signaling confrontation ... while the defendant is
still in the automobile, and the officer
subsequently arrests the defendant (regardless of
whether the defendant has been removed from
or has exited the automobile)." United States v.
Hudgins, 52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir.1995); see
also Thomas. We believe that "the Belton
objectives and Fourth Amendment principles
are best served by limiting Belton's" reach in
this way. Foster, 905 P.2d at 1039.3 However,
we emphasize that, when police attempt to
initiate contact by either confronting or
signaling confrontation, a vehicle's occupant
cannot avoid Belton's application and create a
haven for contraband simply by exiting the
vehicle when officers are seen or approach. If
the record shows that police overtly initiated
contact before a suspect exits a vehicle and the
suspect is subsequently arrested, the vehicle
may nonetheless be searched without a warrant
incident to an arrest under Belton. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mans, 999 F.2d 966 (6th
Cir.1993).
The two cases the state asserts "are not
meaningfully distinguishable" from this case,
State v. Wanzek, 598 N.W.2d 811 (N.D.1999),
and People v. Savedra, 907 P.2d 596
(Colo.1995), can, in fact, be distinguished on
this very basis. In Wanzek, the arresting officer
testified that, when he had pulled up next to the
defendant in his patrol car, she had "looked over
at [him], looked straight ahead, backed the
vehicle up, and exited the vehicle." 598 N.W.2d
at 813. And, in Savedra, the court stated that,
because the defendant had been in his vehicle
when he "first saw the police officer approach,"
it was "not unreasonable to assume that he
exited the vehicle to avoid contact with the
police officer." 907 P.2d at 599-600.
In contrast, the summarized facts here do not
show, nor can we infer, that the police attempted
to initiate contact with Gant while he was still in
3 We acknowledge that not all courts agree with this
construction of Belton. See, e.g., United States v.
Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 817 (7th Cir.1997) (extending
Belton to a case in which the defendant was not an
occupant but was " 'positively linked' " to the vehicle at
the time of his arrest), quoting United States v. Adams, 26
F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Snook, 88
F.3d 605 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Schecter, 717
F.2d 864 (3d Cir.1983); see also Glasco.
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his vehicle or that he had attempted to evade
contact with the police by exiting his vehicle.
Contrary to the state's assertion, we do not
believe that, by shining a flashlight into Gant's
vehicle, the officer necessarily initiated contact
with him. These facts do not show the distance
between Gant's vehicle and the officer, either
when he shined the flashlight at Gant's car or
when the officer approached it after Gant had
exited it, or that a person in Gant's position
would even have been aware that a light had
been shined into the vehicle, much less who had
shined it. Nothing shows or suggests that Gant
looked in the direction of the light when it was
shined or that he had seen officers or any other
sign of police activity at the residence, such as
flashing emergency lights, marked police
vehicles, or uniformed officers, either when he
arrived at the residence or before he exited his
vehicle. The record is also silent about the
lighting in the areas where Gant parked his
vehicle, those places where the officers were
positioned when he arrived, and the spaces that
separated those areas. Additionally, the record
does not support a finding that Gant was or
should have been aware of anyone's approach as
he exited his vehicle.4 Furthermore, nothing in
the record shows that, by shining the light, the
officer was attempting to signal his intent to
confront Gant. Rather, the officer might simply
have been attempting to ascertain the identity of
the vehicle's occupant as he observed the
vehicle approach the residence. Lastly, the
record does not reflect the time each of these
4 Citing the following statements the trial court made
when denying Gant's motion to suppress, the state asserts
that the court made implicit factual findings that Gant had
been aware of the police presence at the residence and had
been only a few steps away from the officer when contact
occurred. The court stated: "I don't think [Gant] can
limit the scope of the search by vacating the car faster
than the officers can get up to the car," and "[t]he fact that
Mr. Gant was fast enough or clever enough to get out of
the vehicle I don't think limits the officer's ability to
search the vehicle." But, nothing in the trial court's
factual summary, nor any reasonable inferences
therefrom, supports those remarks.
various events consumed nor the time intervals
separating them.
It is unfortunate that the record was not based
on witnesses' testimony, under both direct and
cross-examination but, rather, on the trial court's
apparently extemporaneous summary of the
facts as it understood them from the materials
contained in Gant's motion to suppress and the
state's opposition to it. We believe the better
practice is to have the facts flow from witness
testimony and other admitted evidence or to be
stated in a written stipulation of the parties.
Indeed, the law favors a stipulation of facts,
especially if the stipulation is carefully
considered and crafted in advance of a hearing
or trial, that would be binding both below and
on appeal. See State v. Sorrell, 109 Ariz. 171,
506 P.2d 1065 (1973); Bennett ex rel. Arizona
State Personnel Comm'n v. Beard, 27 Ariz.App.
534, 556 P.2d 1137 (1976). We can only
observe that many of the critical facts that bear
upon resolution of the contested issues would
likely have been addressed had the parties
questioned witnesses. We appreciate a trial
court's attempt to conserve judicial resources by
acknowledging its understanding of the factual
background and the parties' relative positions at
the outset of a contested matter. But, this does
not relieve the party bearing the burden of
persuasion, here the state, from ensuring that the
record contains adequate information for
judicial decision-making at both the trial and
appellate levels. See State v. Rogers, 186 Ariz.
508, 924 P.2d 1027 (1996) (stressing necessity
of making factual record below in order for
appellate court to decide fact-intensive issue and
base holding on it).
Accordingly, the record before us does not
support a finding that the police were attempting
to initiate contact with Gant while he was in the
vehicle either by confronting him or by
signaling an intent to confront him,
notwithstanding the officer's shining the
flashlight. Therefore, the search of Gant's
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vehicle was outside the scope of Belton. See
Lewis, 632 A.2d at 388 ("[A]ppellant had left
the vehicle and [had] become a pedestrian
before the police officer initiated contact with
him; he was not an 'occupant' within the
meaning of Belton."). Because the narrow
Belton exception is inapplicable, the search
must satisfy the Chimel test to have been a
lawful search incident to Gant's arrest. See
Strahan; see also Fafowora. Because the
passenger compartment of his vehicle was not "
'within his immediate control' " at the time of
his arrest, Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at
2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694, the search was not
conducted as an incident to his arrest. Strahan;
see also Fafowora. Because the state failed to
meet its burden of proving that the warrantless
search of Gant's vehicle was a lawful search
incident to his arrest, we must reverse the trial
court's denial of his motion to suppress the
evidence found in his vehicle unless the search
can be justified by another exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See
Valle.
Probable Cause
Because we can uphold a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress if the court reached the
correct result even though based on an incorrect
reason, State v. Nadler, 129 Ariz. 19, 628 P.2d
56 (App.1981), we must consider the state's
alternative argument that the police were
justified in searching Gant's vehicle independent
of the search-incident-to- arrest exception. The
state asserts that, because Gant was present at a
house where narcotics trafficking was suspected
to be occurring and where the police had found
a person with drug paraphernalia,5 the police
had probable cause to search Gant's vehicle
under the automobile exception to the warrant
'in its answering brief, the state cites additional facts that
were not included in those summarized by the trial court
at the hearing on Gant's suppression motion. Therefore,
we do not consider them in our analysis. See Sanchez.
requirement. See State v. Weinstein, 190 Ariz.
306, 947 P.2d 880 (App.1997) (police may
search vehicle without warrant if vehicle readily
mobile and if they have probable cause to
believe it contains contraband). That exception,
however, is inapplicable here.
The state has not cited any case, nor have we
found any, in which the police were found to
have probable cause to search a vehicle based
on facts such as these. Based on the sparsely
developed factual record before us on this issue,
we must conclude that the police did not have
probable cause to believe that Gant's vehicle
contained contraband. Indeed, it would be
inappropriate for us to do otherwise. See
Rogers.
Conclusion
In sum, the state failed to meet its burden of
proving the legality of the warrantless search of
Gant's vehicle. See Valle; Rodriguez
Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Gant's
motion to suppress the evidence found in his
vehicle. Because of our resolution of this issue,
we need not address Gant's remaining argument
on appeal. We reverse Gant's convictions and
sentences.
FLOREZ, J., concurs.
PELANDER, Judge, specially concurring.
I concur with the court's opinion but write
separately to make several additional
observations. Cases such as this are difficult
and have produced disparate results around the
country primarily because the law relating to
warrantless vehicle searches after Belton has
become so muddled. As Justice Lacy noted in
her concurring opinion in Glasco v.
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 433, 513 S.E.2d 137,
142 (1999) (Lacy, J., concurring):
[N]othing in Belton specifically defined what
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circumstances qualified an arrestee as a
"irecent occupant." Consequently, from its
inception, application of the so-called "bright
line" Belton rule has not provided clear
resolution of search issues in cases with facts
that do not mirror the facts in Belton or the
precise words of the rule.
The Belton rule was premised, at least
theoretically, on concerns for officer safety and
evidence preservation. See New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454, 457, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2862, 69
L.Ed.2d 768, 773 (1981); State v. Hanna, 173
Ariz. 30, 32, 839 P.2d 450, 452 (App.1992).
As routinely applied, however, the rule "may be
invoked regardless of whether the arresting
officer has an actual concern for safety or
evidence." United States v. McLaughlin, 170
F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir.1999). See also Hanna;
State v. Wanzek, 598 N.W.2d 811 (N.D.1999);
Glasco. As Judge Trott aptly noted in his
concurring opinion in McLaughlin: "In our
application of Belton's 'bright-line' [rule] ... the
rationales behind the search incident to arrest
exception have been abandoned, the purpose has
been lost, and, as Chief Justice Rehnquist
predicted, little certainty remains." 170 F.3d at
894 (Trott, J., concurring).
"The purposes behind Belton were two-fold: to
create a single familiar standard to guide police
officers in automobile searches and to eliminate
the need for litigation in every case to determine
whether the passenger compartment of the
vehicle is within the scope of a search incident
to arrest." Wanzek 598 N.W.2d at 815. See
also Belton, 453 U.S. at 458-60, 101 S.Ct. at
2863-64, 69 L.Ed.2d at 774-75; Glasco, 513
S.E.2d at 141. Based on the varying results of
cases decided in the twenty years following
Belton, it is questionable whether those
purposes have been achieved. And, I have
some concerns that our ruling today, although
correct on the very sparse, undeveloped record
before us, may frustrate those purposes and
incorporate unintended nuances into this already
complicated Fourth Amendment arena. As the
state points out, the fine lines that courts may
have to draw in this area are problematic:
[W]ould a suspect who has one foot in the
vehicle and one on the ground be deemed "in"
or "out" for purposes of Belton? Would that
depend on whether some part of his body was
still touching the seat? What if he had both
feet on the ground but the door is still open
and he's leaning into the passenger
compartment--or just reaching in? What if
he's sitting on the tailgate of a station wagon
but his feet are touching the ground--could he
merely stand up to render Belton inapplicable?
What if the suspect is standing outside the
vehicle but has left the engine running? ...
[C]ould the initial contact [by police] be non-
verbal, such as a signal by hand, whistle, or
flashlight? Or, because an actual-occupancy
concept necessarily depends on the suspect's
precise physical location at the time of
contact, would the initial contact have to
involve at least the officer's present ability to
make immediate physical contact? Under
such a rule, given the endless variations in the
facts that Fourth Amendment issues inevitably
engender, suppression hearings on Belton
searches could become extended mini-trials on
factual minutiae, and the actions of police
officers in the field would have no predictable
legal consequences in the courtroom.
Regardless of whether those issues and concerns
may be legitimate, this case does not raise any
of them. Fourth Amendment determinations
typically involve fact-intensive inquiries and,
inevitably, line-drawing. And resolution of any
such issues, of course, depends on analysis of
specific facts actually presented in a particular
case. Based on the record here, the state simply
did not carry its burden of establishing the
legality of the warrantless search of Gant's
vehicle.
Nonetheless, I agree with the state's protest that
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"police should not have to run a footrace to
implement Belton." See Wanzek, 598 N.W.2d at
815 ("Police officers should not have to race
from their vehicles to the arrestee's vehicle to
prevent the arrestee from getting out of the
vehicle in order to conduct a valid search.");
Thomas v. State, 761 So.2d 1010, 1014
(Fla.1999) ("[Tihe arrest and subsequent search
should not be invalidated merely because the
defendant is outside the automobile. The
occupants of a vehicle cannot avoid the
consequences of Belton merely by stepping
outside of the vehicle as the officers
approach."). Indeed, our opinion expressly
emphasizes that point. I further note that we
do not limit Belton's reach to cases in which
police first initiate or attempt to initiate contact
with the arrestee when he or she is in a moving,
as opposed to a parked or otherwise stationary,
vehicle.
Despite my concerns about the state of the law
in this area, affirming the trial court's ruling here
essentially would not only overlook, but also
tacitly approve of the significant factual
deficiencies in the record; minimize the state's
burden of establishing the legality of this
warrantless search; disregard the Supreme
Court's cautionary note in Belton that it was "in
no way alter[ing] the fundamental principles
established in the Chimel case regarding the
basic scope of searches incident to lawful
custodial arrests," 453 U.S. at 460 n. 3, 101
S.Ct. at 2864 n. 3, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775 n. 3; and
stretch the concept of "recent occupant" beyond
Belton's intended, contextual meaning. See
Glasco, 513 S.E.2d at 144 (Lacy, J., concurring)
(noting that in all but one case cited in Belton on
this point, "the arrestee was arrested while in the
vehicle, and in all the cases the search of the
vehicle occurred after the arrestees exited the
vehicles at the direction of the police and while
they were still within close proximity of the
vehicles"). Accordingly, I concur that the trial
court erred in denying Gant's motion to
suppress.
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Court agrees to look at police search rules
Associated Press Newswires
April 21, 2003
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Supreme Court
agreed Monday to take a fresh look at police
rules for searching stopped cars.
The court agreed to hear an appeal from
Arizona, in which police arrested a man who
had just parked his car in a driveway.
A search of Rodney Gant's car turned up
cocaine and drug paraphernalia. A state
appeals court ruled that the evidence could
not be used against Gant because he did not
know police were after him when he parked
the car.
The appeals court wrongly interpreted an
earlier Supreme Court case when it ruled for
Gant on that point, and other state and
federal courts have made the same mistake,
former Arizona Attorney General Janet
Napolitano wrote.
The lower court determined that under the
1981 Supreme Court ruling, police should
have confronted Gant or signaled to him
before he parked.
An officer walked toward the parked car
and shined a flashlight inside. Gant then got
out and met the officer outside the car. He
was arrested on an outstanding warrant in an
unrelated case.
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III. BRIGHT LINE RULES
There are many more examples which
could be offered to show that the world of
law enforcement as described by the
Supreme Court is very different from the
real world as perceived by many people.
But, as there are other subjects to cover, it is
time to turn to the subject of bright line
rules. I submit that the only bright line rules
that make sense and provide reasonable
guidance to law enforcement, while
appropriately protecting privacy, are those
based on principle.
A. Searches Incident to Arrest
In Chimel v. California,41 the Court, after
much vacillation, finally decided how far
police could go in searching a home incident
to arrest and, in the process, articulated a
rationale that any reasonable police officer
should have been able to follow. The Court
said there are two reasons for making a
search incident to arrest. First, officers need
to take any weapons away from an arrestee
that could be used to resist arrest or harm
officers or the subject. Second, officers need
to prevent destruction of evidence. With
these rationales clearly stated, the Court
offered a reasonable rule: officers may
search the subject's person and the area into
which a subject could reach in order to
42
obtain a weapon.
This rule is so clearly based upon the
rationales offered for the search that any
officer should have little doubt how to apply
it. It might be true that some officers would
intuit that a suspect could reach farther than
other officers might, but such differences of
view should matter little in day-to-day
police work. Any reasonable judgment by
the police should be upheld.
When a rationale is so clear, cases that
otherwise might be hard should be easy. In
United States v. Edwards, 43 the Court
actually should have had a much easier time
than it did in upholding a search of an
arrestee's clothes some hours after the arrest.
The Court maintained that the arrest process
was not completed, but it is hard to see what
remained. The better approach would have
been to focus on the rationales of Chimel
and hold that, if it is possible that an arrestee
may still have evidence or a weapon, a
search incident is permissible. Principles
matter, and when they are clear, they
provide guidance as to how to deal with new
facts.
Despite the clarity of the rationales offered
by Chimel, the Court maintained that there
42 Id. at 762-63.
41 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
258
was a need for a "bright line" rule in New
York v. Belton.4 5 An officer stopped a car
for speeding, suspected that the four
passengers possessed marijuana, arrested
them, and searched a jacket in the car before
removing the suspects from the scene in his
automobile. If ever there were an exigent
circumstance search, this was it. The officer
was removing four suspects from the scene,
had probable cause to believe the car
contained drugs, and could not reasonably
be expected to leave the car unprotected
without first looking for the drugs. But the
Supreme Court did not uphold the search on
this ground. Instead, it maintained that there
was a need for a bright line rule that police
could search the passenger compartment of a
car including any containers found therein,
incident to any arrest of an auto occupant.
The Court suggested that there was some
need for this rule, and Justice Stewart, who
wrote Chimel, authored the majority opinion
in Belton. But Belton lacked principle. In
any case in which an officer orders someone
out of a car and arrests that person, if the
person cannot reach into the car there is no
reason why the car should be subject to
search. The only reason offered in Belton is
that the Supreme Court says so. As a result,
if a lawyer has confidential files in a locked
briefcase in the backseat of a car and the
lawyer is arrested for not coming to a
complete stop at a stop sign, an officer may
handcuff the lawyer, place the lawyer in the
officer's car, and then break open the
briefcase and search it (which presumably
means reading privileged correspondence).
Why? Again, the answer is because the
Supreme Court said so.
When the officer arrests someone on a bus,
as in Bostick and Drayton, what is the scope
of search incident to arrest? Is it the
passenger compartment of the bus? No one
can answer this question confidently after
Belton because a bright line rule that is not
based on principle is arbitrary and cannot
provide an answer to even a slight change of
facts. What about the arrest of a taxi driver
for speeding? Does the passenger
compartment of the car, including the
passenger's belongings, get searched? There
is no answer in Belton because the decision
is arbitrary and unprincipled. It is a bright
line rule without a reason.
If an officer arrests someone about to enter
a car, does Belton apply? Suppose an officer
stops a car, the driver gets out, and thereafter
the officer makes an arrest? Does Belton
apply? If an officer arrests someone who has
just driven a car, does Belton apply? Under
Chimel, the answer to all these questions
should be easy: the officer may search if he
or she reasonably believes that the arrestee
could reach into an area for a weapon or to
destroy evidence. Because of Belton, we
must await the announcement of another
bright line rule.
B. Automobile Searches
Belton involved a search of an automobile,
but the search was incident to arrest. Bright-
line rules seem particularly attractive when
applied to cars generally, as the automobile
exception demonstrates. That exception was
articulated in Carroll v. United States48 and
involved a prohibition- era stop of an
automobile and a search for liquor. At the
time, Terry v. Ohio was not decided, and the
Court did not therefore have occasion to
address whether a seizure of a car while a
warrant was obtained might have been
required (although there might well have
been exigent circumstances similar to
Belton). When it did confront the question in
48 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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45 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Chambers v. Maroney, 49 the Court held that
an automobile could be searched with
probable cause and without a warrant even
though it was in police custody and was no
longer mobile. Justice Harlan pointed out in
dissent that the Court was authorizing a
seizure first and a search second without
justifying the warrantless search. The
majority maintained that the mobility of the
vehicle remained even at the station house,
which is a remarkable assertion in light of
the complete control of the police over the
vehicle.
The Court has zealously safeguarded the
automobile exception, reaching out for cases
that cast doubt on the proposition that
automobiles are always mobile even when
they clearly are not.52 If a car is in police
custody and cannot be moved (police can
remove parts of the engine to assure this),
why should the car be different from any
other property? Well, the Supreme Court
says it is. There is no principle underlying
the automobile exception other than
mobility, and when mobility disappears, so
does the principle.
What happens then when there is probable
cause to believe that a motor home has
evidence? Is a motor home a car or a house?
In any sensible world, it would not matter,
because the rule would be it could be seized
while a warrant is sought absent exigent
49399 U.S. 42 (1970).
52 See, e.g., Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per
curiam) (citing Chambers to uphold a search of an
automobile at a station house); Florida v. Meyers,
466 U.S. 380, 382 (1984) (per curiam) (upholding a
"warrantless search of an automobile even though the
automobile was in police custody" notwithstanding a
prior inventory search because "the justification to
conduct such warrantless search does not vanish once
the car has been immobilized" (internal citations
omitted)).
circumstances. People who live in motor
homes believe their home is their castle as
well as their car, but the Supreme Court
concludes that if people *148 live on
wheels, they have a car and not a home.
Such is the holding of California v.
Carney.
By the time it decided Carney, the Court
had articulated a reason other than mobility
for treating automobiles as deserving lesser
protection than other property--namely, that
there is a diminished expectation of privacy
regarding their automobiles. This may be the
single best example of a rationale that fails
to recognize the way in which most
Americans think of their cars, as symbols of
freedom of movement. It is almost
incredible to think that the Supreme Court
believes that people have a greater
expectation of privacy in the lugage they
put on a bus or in a footlocker than in a
car. Teenagers in the United States regard
the right to drive as one of the passages
toward adulthood. The car is not a symbol of
freedom only to the young. It is a pathway to
incredible mobility for all. The car enables
Americans to travel where they want, when
they want, as they want.
Although the Justices may not realize it,
many very intimate encounters occur in
vehicles. People have private conversations
in automobiles. People who are not driving
read private messages in automobiles.
People make love in automobiles. They
rarely do these things in luggage or
footlockers. Indeed, most people who move
$ 471 U.S. 386, 394 (1985) ("Our application of the
[Fourth Amendment's] vehicle exception has never
turned on the other uses to which a vehicle might be
put. The exception has historically turned on the
ready mobility of the vehicle ....").
54 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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their luggage and their footlockers do it with
an automobile, and to pretend that the
automobile is not a private place so that a
bright line rule can be employed means that
a rule without a principle or rationale is
created to enable law enforcement to act in a
world that is unreal.
The emptiness of a bright-line rule without
an underlying principle is demonstrated by
California v. Acevedo.5 5 The Court found
itself facing a difficulty it alone had created.
Law enforcement and lower courts were
confused as to whether probable cause
justified a search of an automobile if the
probable cause focused on a container like a
footlocker or a bag that was located in an
automobile. In short, the question was
whether a footlocker in an automobile is
entitled to the same protection as a
footlocker outside an automobile. One thing
is clear: a footlocker is a footlocker whether
it is in or out of a car. But the Supreme
Court held that a footlocker or a bag in a car
could be searched with probable cause
without a warrant simply because it fell
within the automobile exception. Why?
Because the Court said so. It needed another
bright line rule.
Well, there was readily available a handy
bright line rule based upon principle. A
principled rule would permit the seizure of
property, including a car, based upon
probable cause while a warrant is sought.
This is the rule the Court has adopted for
property other than cars in cases like United
States v. Van Leeuwen,5 7 Segura v. United
States,5 8 and Illinois v. McArthur.5 9 A rule
" 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
1 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970) (holding First Class mail
may be seized if there is probable cause while a
warrant is sought).
" 468 U.S. 796, 798 (1984) (holding evidence seized
based on principle is easy to apply and
avoids arbitrariness. Such a rule would
require rejection of the automobile
exception and recognition of what the Court
said in Delaware v. Prouse: 60
An individual operating or traveling in an
automobile does not lose all reasonable
expectation of privacy simply because the
automobile and its use are subject to
government regulation. Automobile travel is
a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode
of transportation to and from one's home,
workplace, and leisure activities. Many
people spend more hours each day traveling
in cars than walking on the streets.
Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of
security and privacy in traveling in an
automobile than they do in exposing
themselves by pedestrian or other modes of
travel."
Prouse described the world as it really was
and still is. The automobile exception is a
bright line rule without any justification. It is
a rule invented by the Court and one that
ignores the real world so well described by
the Court in Prouse.
from an apartment that police had secured prior to
warrant was admissible despite the "administrative
delay" in getting the warrants).
s9 531 U.S. 326, 331-34 (2001) (holding that when
police had probable cause to get a warrant, refusing
to allow defendant to enter his own apartment until
warrant arrived was not impermissible seizure of
apartment).
' 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
61 Id. at 662 (footnote omitted).
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[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
A. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment grants individuals
a general constitutional right to privacy and
protects against inappropriate government
intrusion. The Fourth Amendment states as
follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
The test most frequently cited to determine
whether an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights have been violated originated in
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz
v. United States.9 The test requires "first
' 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The majority reasoned that the Fourth Amendment
did not protect information that a person knowingly
exposed to the public, but what a person kept private,
even in a public place, might be protected. Id. at 351-
52.
that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."' Cases following Katz have
used this test to determine if the Fourth
Amendment was violated."
B. Exceptions to the Rule
1. Automobile Exception
Cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment
state that a government search or seizure of
a person, a person's home, or a person's
effects without a warrant is unreasonable
unless it falls within one of the exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized a distinction
between a person's reasonable expectation of
" See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
184 (1984) (holding that a person does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in an open field);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)
(holding that an individual does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
information given to a third person); United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-54 (1971) (holding that an
individual does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy when revealing information to someone with
whom he is speaking).
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privacy in his home and in his automobile.
According to the Court in Carroll v. United
States, [there is] a necessary difference
between a search of a store, dwelling house
or other structure in respect of which a
proper official warrant readily may be
obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat,
wagon, or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. 14
In Chambers v. Maroney, the Court
interpreted Carroll to hold that "a search
warrant [is] unnecessary where there is
probable cause to search an automobile
stopped on the highway; the car is movable,
the occupants are alerted, and the car's
contents may never be found again if a
warrant must be obtained.""
The Chambers Court followed Carroll and
held that a warrantless police search of a
vehicle at the police station following the
arrest of four men suspected of armed
robbery was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Based on the constitutional
difference between houses and cars, the
Court held that a warrantless search of an
automobile was reasonable whenever the
police had probable cause to search the
vehicle. Carroll and Chambers established
this now well-settled automobile exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement based on automobiles' mobility,
the lessened expectation of privacy to which
they are entitled, and the pervasive
government regulation to which they are
subject.
3. Search Incident to a Lawful Warrantless
Arrest
A search and seizure conducted incident to
a lawful warrantless arrest is another
exception to the Fourth Amendment's
general warrant requirement. 52 Following a
lawful warrantless arrest, an officer may
search the person arrested and the area
within the arrestee's reach based on the need
to seize weapons and to prevent the
destruction of evidence. In Chimel v.
California, the Supreme Court held that a
warrantless search incident to an arrest was
unreasonable because after the suspect had
been arrested, the officers searched his
entire home, including the attic and garage,
and eventually seized numerous items. The
Court concluded that the search "went far
beyond the [arrestee's] person and the area
from within which he might have obtained
either a weapon or something that could
have been used as evidence against him.
There was no constitutional justification, in
the absence of a search warrant, for
extending the search beyond that area."
A movement toward a bright-line approach
to warrantless searches incident to arrests
has emerged in cases where the arrest is
made in conjunction with a traffic violation.
In United States v. Robinson, the Supreme
Court upheld the reasonableness of a police
officer's search of a driver following the
driver's arrest for operating a motor vehicle
without a license. The police officer
searched the driver's pocket, found a
cigarette package, and unwrapped an object
found inside the cigarette package which
turned out to be heroin.5 8 In his dissenting
14 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
1s Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970)
52 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760
(1969).
58 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 222-23.
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opinion, Justice Marshall questioned
whether the officer had reason to believe
that the cigarette package could have
contained any weapons and argued that the
search constituted an abuse of police
discretion. However, the majority reasoned
that police officers needed a bright-line rule
to follow and concluded that "[a] police
officer's determination as to how and where
to search the person of a suspect whom he
ha[d] arrested [was] necessarily a quick ad
hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment
[did] not require to be broken down in each
instance into an analysis of each step in the
search."
In New York v. Belton, the Supreme Court
held that the police may search not only
one's person following a warrantless arrest
related to a traffic violation, but also the
passenger compartment of the automobile. 61
Based on the reasoning in Chimel, the Court
explained that the passenger compartment of
an automobile would be "within 'the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]."'
Therefore, the Belton Court held that a
police officer's search of the automobile's
passenger compartment did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. According to the Court,
the searches were lawful because the driver's
traffic violation justified the stop.
Additionally, once the officer smelled
marijuana, he had probable cause to arrest
the men for narcotics possession.
A police officer's discretion to search a
person and the passenger compartment of an
automobile incident to a warrantless arrest
does not change based on the officer's
motivations for the arrest. 66 Justice Scalia,
6 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
66 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996).
writing the opinion for a unanimous Court in
Whren v. United States, reasoned that the
Court "described Robinson as having
established that 'the fact that the officer does
not have the state of mind which is
hypothecated by the reasons which provide
the legal justification for the officer's action
does not invalidate the action taken as long
as the circumstances, viewed objectively,
justify that action."'
The events described in Whren occurred in
a "high drug area" of the District of
Columbia. The police officer passed a truck
with a temporary license plate which was
being driven by a young man who was
looking down into the lap of the passenger
in the front seat. When the officer made a U-
turn to drive toward the truck, the driver
quickly turned to the right and "sped off."
After catching up with the young men, the
officer approached the vehicle and spotted
two bags of crack cocaine in the passenger's
lap. The officer arrested the two men and
seized various illegal drugs from the vehicle.
At a pretrial suppression hearing, the
petitioners argued that the drugs should be
inadmissible because the police officer had
made a "pretextual" stop unsupported by
probable cause. The petitioners further
claimed that the test of reasonableness
should be "whether the officer's conduct
deviated materially from usual police
practices, so that a reasonable officer in the
same circumstances would not have made
the stop for the reasons given." The Court
refused to apply this test due to its subjective
nature (notwithstanding its objective
language) and instead stated that "the Fourth
Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness'
allows certain actions to be taken in certain
circumstances, whatever the subjective
intent." Therefore, the Court held that since
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the officer had probable cause to search the
petitioners for a traffic violation, the stop
was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Furthermore, when the officer
viewed the illegal drugs in the passenger's
lap, the Court held that he acted
appropriately in arresting the young men and
in seizing the evidence.
The Court applied the Whren holding to a
minor, fine-only offense in Atwater v. City
78
of Lago Vista. In Atwater, decided on
April 24, 2001, Gail Atwater and her
husband filed suit against the City of Lago
Vista under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Atwaters
claimed that Gail's warrantless arrest for the
misdemeanor charges of driving without her
seatbelt, failing to secure her children in
seatbelts, and driving without a license and
proof of insurance was unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. A majority of the
Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals and held that
Atwater's arrest was "not so extraordinary as
to violate the Fourth Amendment."
In Atwater, Officer Turek pulled Atwater
over for seatbelt violations. Officer Turek
asked to see Atwater's license and
registration, as required by state law, and
Atwater replied that she did not have the
paperwork because her purse had been
stolen the day before. The officer placed
Atwater under arrest, prevented her from
taking her children anywhere, and took her
into police custody, where she remained in a
jail cell for about one hour.
Atwater argued that her warrantless arrest
for a fine-only misdemeanor was an
unreasonable seizure because the police
officer did not encounter a threat of violence
and she had not committed a felony. After
examining a lengthy history of the common
law concerning an officer's arrest authority
pursuant to a misdemeanor not amounting to
a "breach of the peace," Justice Souter,
writing for the majority, stated:
Atwater has cited no particular evidence
that those who framed and ratified the
Fourth Amendment sought to limit peace
officers' warrantless misdemeanor arrest
authority to instances of actual breach of the
peace, and our own review of the recent and
respected compilations of framing-era
documentary history has likewise failed to
reveal any such design.
In addition, the Court rejected Atwater's
proposal for a modem test that would forbid
a warrantless arrest "when conviction could
not ultimately carry any jail time and when
the government show[ed] no compelling
need for immediate detention." Justice
Souter explained that the Fourth
Amendment was not well-served by a case-
by-case approach to determining
reasonableness. Souter further stated that
the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on
the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and
the object in implementing its command of
reasonableness is to draw standards
sufficiently clear and simple to be applied
with a fair prospect of surviving judicial
second-guessing months and years after an
arrest or search is made.
In short, the Court held that the arrest of
Gail Atwater was not unreasonable and did
not violate her Fourth Amendment rights
because Officer Turek had probable cause to
believe Atwater had committed a traffic
violation, he was authorized to make a
custodial arrest, and he made the arrest in an
ordinary manner.
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" 532 U.S. 318, 353-54 (2001).
02 -809 Maryland v. Pringle
Ruling Below: (Md., 370 Md. 525, 805 A.2d 1016)
Discovery, during concededly valid search of vehicle driven by its owner, of money in closed
glove compartment and drugs in backseat armrest does not provide probable cause to believe that
defendant, who was passenger in front seat, knew about those items or had possession or control
of them, and, therefore, arrest of defendant violated Fourth Amendment; invalid arrest tainted
defendant's confession.
Question Presented: In case in which drugs and roll of cash are found in passenger
compartment of car with multiple occupants, and all deny ownership, does Fourth Amendment
prohibit police officer from arresting occupants of car?
Joseph Jermaine PRINGLE
V.
STATE of Maryland.
Court of Appeals of Maryland
Decided August 27, 2002.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
CATHELL, J.
On April 11, 2000, Joseph Jermaine Pringle,
petitioner, was convicted by a jury in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine
and possession of cocaine. On May 9, 2000,
petitioner was sentenced to a term of ten
years incarceration without the possibility of
parole.
Petitioner appealed this conviction to the
Court of Special Appeals. On appeal,
petitioner asserted, inter alia, that there was
no probable cause to support his arrest
which led to his conviction. On November
28, 2001, the intermediate appellate court
held that there was probable cause to arrest
petitioner and affirmed his conviction.
Pringle v. State, 141 Md.App. 292, 785
A.2d 790 (2001).
On March 6, 2002, we granted petitioner's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Pringle v.
State, 368 Md. 239, 792 A.2d 1177 (2002).
Petitioner presents one question for our
review:
"Did the police have probable cause to
arrest the petitioner where he was a front
seat passenger in a vehicle also occupied
by the driver/owner and a rear seat
passenger, and in which a sum of money
was found inside the closed glove
compartment and a quantity of drugs was
found hidden behind a rear armrest, and
where there was neither the odor of drugs
within the vehicle nor any other indicia of
drug activity?"
We reverse. We hold that there was not
probable cause to support the arrest of
petitioner in the car when he had not
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admitted ownership of the drugs.
Specifically, we hold that there was not
probable cause to arrest petitioner, who was
not the owner of the vehicle, when petitioner
was merely the front seat passenger and the
only evidence supporting the arrest was a
sum of money in the closed front glove
compartment and drugs that were hidden
from view in the armrest in the backseat of
the vehicle.
I. Facts
Officer Jeffrey Snyder of the Baltimore
County Police Department testified that at
3:16 a.m. on the morning of August 7, 1999
*** he conducted a traffic stop. Officer
Snyder asked the driver for his license and
registration. The driver/registered owner of
the car was Donte Carlos Partlow (Partlow).
Also in the vehicle were petitioner, the front
seat passenger, and Otis Calvin Smith
(Smith), the back seat passenger.
When Partlow opened the glove
compartment for the vehicle registration,
Officer Snyder saw a large amount of rolled
up money in the glove compartment. At this
time, Officer Snyder did not ask about the
money, but went back to his patrol car with
Partlow's license and registration to check
the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration
computer system for outstanding violations.
The computer check did not reveal any
violations and Officer Snyder returned to the
car, had Partlow exit the vehicle, and issued
him an oral warning.
At this time, a second patrol car arrived and
Officer Snyder then "asked him [Partlow] if
he had anything in the vehicle, any drugs,
weapons, narcotics in the vehicle?" Partlow
responded that he did not. Officer Snyder
then asked for and received permission from
Partlow to search the vehicle. Prior to doing
so, Officer Snyder asked the other two men
in the vehicle, petitioner and Smith, to exit
the vehicle and he patted them down. All
three men were asked to sit on the curb
while he searched the vehicle.
During the search, Officer Snyder seized
$763.00 from the glove compartment and
five plastic glassine baggies containing
suspected cocaine from inside an armrest in
the backseat. Officer Snyder questioned all
three men about the ownership of the drugs
and money, and told the three men that if no
one admitted to ownership of the drugs he
was going to arrest them all. None of the
men offered any information regarding the
ownership of the drugs and/or money, and
all three were placed under arrest and
transported to the police station.
Sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m.,
Officer Snyder met with petitioner and,
following a waiver of his Miranda rights,'
obtained an oral and written confession in
which petitioner acknowledged that the
cocaine belonged to him, that he and his
friends were going to a party in
Westminster, and that he intended to sell it
or "Use it for sex." Petitioner maintained
that neither Partlow nor Smith knew of the
drugs. Partlow and Smith were released.
At trial, during a suppression hearing,
petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner's
arrest was unlawful because it was not
supported by probable cause and that his
confession should be suppressed as the
unlawful fruit of an illegal arrest. The trial
court judge agreed with the State that
Officer Snyder "had probable cause to make
the arrest." After a jury trial, petitioner was
found guilty and sentenced to ten years
incarceration without the possibility of
parole. The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the conviction.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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II. Discussion
a. Probable Cause
In the case sub judice, petitioner is not
contending that the vehicle was stopped, or
that the vehicle was searched, in violation of
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Petitioner's only contention is that the police
officer did not have probable cause to arrest
him; therefore, his confession was the fruit
of an illegal arrest.
In order for a warrantless arrest to be legal it
must be based upon probable cause. We
have held that a police officer can arrest an
accused without a warrant if the officer has
probable cause to believe that a felony has
been or is being committed by an alleged
offender in the officer's presence. Woods v.
State, 315 Md. 591, 611-12, 556 A.2d 236,
246 (1989); Nilson v. State, 272 Md. 179,
184, 321 A.2d 301, 304 (1974). Maryland
Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Article 27,
section 594B, then stated, in relevant part:
" § 594B. Arrests without warrants
generally.
(a) Arrest for crime committed in presence
of officer. - A police officer may arrest
without a warrant any person who
commits, or attempts to commit, any
felony or misdemeanor in the presence of,
or within the view of, such officer.
(b) Arrest for crime apparently committed
in presence of officer. - A police officer
who has probable cause to believe that a
felony or misdemeanor is being committed
in the officer's presence or within the
officer's view, may arrest without a
warrant any person whom the officer may
reasonably believe to have committed such
offense.
(c) Arrest for crime committed generally. -
A police officer may arrest a person
without a warrant if the officer has
probable cause to believe that a felony has
been committed or attempted and that such
person has committed or attempted to
commit a felony whether or not in the
officer's presence or view."
We examined the application of probable
cause to a warrantless arrest in Collins v.
State, 322 Md. 675, 589 A.2d 479 (1991),
when we stated:
"Probable cause, we have frequently
stated, is a nontechnical conception of a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt. A
finding of probable cause requires less
evidence than is necessary to sustain a
conviction, but more evidence than would
merely arouse suspicion. Our
determination of whether probable cause
exists requires a nontechnical, common
sense evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances in a given situation in light
of the facts found to be credible by the
trial judge. Probable cause exists where
the facts and circumstances taken as a
whole would lead a reasonably cautious
person to believe that a felony had been or
is being committed by the person arrested.
Therefore, to justify a warrantless arrest
the police must point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warranted the intrusion."
Id. at 680, 589 A.2d at 481. To determine
whether an officer had probable cause in a
specific case, "the reviewing court
necessarily must relate the information
known to the officer to the elements of the
offense that the officer believed was being
or had been committed." DiPino v. Davis,
354 Md. 18, 32, 729 A.2d 354, 361 (1999).
Petitioner was charged and eventually
convicted of violating sections 286 -
possession of cocaine with intent to
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distribute and 287 - possession of cocaine.
In order for petitioner's arrest to be valid, the
officer must have had probable cause at the
time of the arrest to believe that petitioner
was in possession of cocaine. Possession is
defined in Maryland Code (1957, 1996
Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), Article 27, section
277(s) as "the exercise of actual or
constructive dominion or control over a
thing by one or more persons." This statute
recognizes, as we have held, that possession
may be constructive or actual, exclusive or
joint. State v. Leach, 296 Md. 591, 596, 463
A.2d 872, 874 (1983).
While the quantum of evidence is different,
we have discussed possession issues in
several sufficiency of the evidence cases,
which are instructive in respect to the
definition of possession. [In Garrison v.
State, 272 Md. 123, 321 A.2d 767 (1974),
the court held "that the State had not met the
standard of legal sufficiency because there
was no evidence which directly or
inferentially demonstrated that the defendant
had exercised actual or constructive
dominion or control, solely or jointly, over
the narcotics."]
In State v. Leach, 296 Md. 591, 463 A.2d
872 (1983), Stephen Leach and his brother,
Michael Leach, were convicted of
possession of a controlled dangerous
substance. On appeal, Stephen Leach
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in
his conviction for possession. [On appeal,
the court found the evidence to be legally
insufficient because it could not be
"reasonably inferred that he exercised
restraining or directing influence over"
drugs and drug paraphernalia in the bedroom
of his brother's apartment. Id. at 596, 463
A.2d at 874.]
[In Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d
1041 (1988), the court held that knowledge
was an element of possession. Judge
Eldridge, writing for the Court, stated:
"Knowledge of the presence of an object is
normally a prerequisite to exercising
dominion and control." Id. at 649, 547 A.2d
at 1046.]
Therefore, in order to prove "possession,"
the State must prove the elements of
"dominion or control" and "knowledge."
These elements were applied in two other,
more recent, sufficiency of the evidence
cases, White v. State, 363 Md. 150, 767 A.2d
855 (2001) and Taylor v. State, 346 Md.
452, 697 A.2d 462 (1997). [In White, the
court held that the evidence was insufficient
to support the conviction of a passenger for
possession of cocaine that was in a sealed
box in the trunk. The court said that the
passenger "did not have a possessory right
in, or control over, the vehicle," and even if
he had the requisite knowledge, "we
conclude nonetheless that there was not
sufficient evidence establishing that [White]
exercised dominion and control over the
cocaine." White, 363 Md. at 164-65, 767
A.2d at 863.]
[In Taylor, police discovered drugs and
paraphernalia in the bags and wallet of
occupants of a motel room, but arrested only
the occupant who was present during the
search. The court held that the evidence was
insufficient to establish possession. Judge
Raker, writing for the court, stated:
In sum, the evidence presented in this
case was insufficient to establish that
Taylor was in possession of the marijuana
seized from Myers's carrying bags.
Taylor's presence in a room in which
marijuana had been smoked, and his
awareness that marijuana had been
smoked, cannot permit a rational trier of
fact to infer that Taylor exercised a
restraining or directing influence over
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marijuana that was concealed in personal
carrying bags of another occupant of the
room. Because Petitioner was in joint
rather than exclusive possession of the
hotel room, his mere proximity to the
contraband found concealed in a travel bag
and his presence in a room containing
marijuana smoke were insufficient to
convict him."
Taylor, 346 Md. at 459-63, 697 A.2d at 465-
68 (footnote omitted) (alteration in
original).]
While the cases we have discussed above
involve the sufficiency of the evidence, they,
nonetheless, establish the law for
determining some possession issues, even at
the probable cause to arrest stage. Moreover,
we have also had occasion to apply the
elements of possession to cases, like the case
at bar, where the probable cause to make an
arrest for possession is being challenged. In
Livingston v. State, 317 Md. 408, 564 A.2d
414 (1989), Wesley Livingston was one of
three people in a vehicle that was stopped
for speeding. Livingston, who was not the
owner of the vehicle, was sitting in the
backseat. During the stop for speeding, the
state trooper saw two marijuana seeds on the
floor of the front passenger's side. The state
trooper arrested all three occupants of the
car and upon searching Livingston pursuant
to the arrest, the state trooper discovered
cocaine and marijuana in Livingston's
pocket. Livingston was charged with
possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute, possession of cocaine, and
possession of marijuana. He moved to
suppress the evidence as the product of an
illegal arrest but the motion was denied by
the trial court. Livingston was convicted on
all three counts and he appealed.
While we found that the two marijuana
seeds on the floor provided the state trooper
with probable cause that a misdemeanor was
being committed in his presence, the
question became who could the state trooper
arrest for the offense. We held that the two
marijuana seeds on the floor in the front of
the vehicle did not provide the state trooper
with probable cause to arrest Livingston and
then conduct a search incident to that arrest.
We stated:
"Merely sitting in the backseat of the
vehicle, Livingston did not demonstrate to
the officer that he possessed any
knowledge of, and hence, any restraining
or directing influence over two marijuana
seeds located on the floor in the front of
the car.
"Without more than the mere existence of
two marijuana seeds located in the front of
the car, we hold that the police officer
lacked probable cause to arrest Livingston,
a rear seat passenger, for possession of
marijuana. Thus, Livingston's arrest was
illegal, and the contraband seized in the
search arising out of that arrest must be
suppressed."
Id. at 415-16, 564 A.2d at 418 (footnote
omitted).
We further examined when a police officer
has probable cause to make a warrantless
arrest in Collins v. State, 322 Md. 675, 589
A.2d 479 (1991). On September 20, 1988, at
3:00 a.m., Officer Holmes of the Salisbury
Police Department noticed five men
standing about five feet from a Mustang that
was parked in the entrance to a car
dealership. The Mustang was not owned by
Collins. Officer Holmes approached the men
and asked what they were doing. The driver
of the Mustang, Steven Lewis, stated that
they were looking at the BMWs. Officer
Ewing arrived on the scene to assist Officer
Holmes. Officer Ewing saw a 35 mm film
canister on the rear seat of the Mustang and
270
he asked one of the men to retrieve the
canister for him. Inside the canister, Officer
Ewing found over twenty cellophane
wrapped packets containing cocaine.
Officers Ewing and Holmes then arrested all
five men for possession of cocaine. Collins
alleged at a suppression hearing that there
was not probable cause for his arrest. The
trial court denied his suppression motion and
Collins was convicted of possession of
cocaine.
Before this Court, Collins once again
asserted that there was not probable cause
for his arrest. Specifically, relying on
Livingston, supra, he asserted that his mere
proximity to incriminating evidence, or to an
offender, is not enough for a finding of
probable cause for arrest. Furthermore,
Collins asserted that there was no further
factual basis to connect him to the drugs or
to having committed any crime. We first
discussed the United States Supreme Court
case of United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948), in which
the Supreme Court had examined the arrest
of Di Re, who was seated in the passenger
seat of a vehicle from which an informant
had purchased counterfeit gasoline ration
coupons from the driver and the backseat
passenger was seen holding gasoline ration
coupons. The police arrested and searched
all three men. The Supreme Court held that
Di Re's mere presence in a vehicle involved
in criminal activity, without more, did not
cause him to lose his right to be free from a
search of his person. We then discussed our
holding in Livingston, supra, and we held
that there was not probable cause to arrest
Collins for possession. We stated:
"Considering the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that the mere
presence of a closed film canister in a car
found to contain cocaine was legally
insufficient to support the requisite
probable cause to arrest Collins as he
stood outside of the vehicle. No testimony
suggested that he arrived at the lot in the
car, that he had even been in the vehicle,
or that he knew the suspected cocaine was
in the back seat of the car. Even if the
police had probable cause to arrest Lewis
or Parker for unlawful possession, there
was no probable cause to arrest Collins.
As there was no evidence which
criminally linked Collins to either the car,
or to the film canister, there was no
probable cause to believe that he
committed or attempted to commit a
felony as required by Art. 27, § 594B."
Collins, 322 Md. at 682-83, 589 A.2d at
482.
As stated, supra, to determine whether a
police officer had probable cause to make a
warrantless arrest, we evaluate the totality of
the circumstances as to whether the facts
and circumstances, with rational inferences
derived therefrom, would lead a reasonable
person to believe that a felony has been or is
being committed. In a specific case, we
apply the elements of the alleged offense to
the facts and circumstances of that case to
determine whether the police officer had
probable cause to make a warrantless arrest
of a particular individual for that specific
offense.
In the case sub judice, applying the facts and
circumstances of this case to the elements of
possession requiring "knowledge" of the
controlled dangerous substance and
"dominion or control" over the substance,
and relying on the holdings of our previous
cases, specifically our holding in Livingston,
we find that the police did not have probable
cause to arrest petitioner. Similar to the
situation in Livingston, where the defendant
was sitting in the backseat and two
marijuana seeds were in open view on the
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floor in the front seat, petitioner in this case
was sitting in the front seat and the cocaine
was found hidden from view in the armrest
in the back seat of the car. Without
additional facts available to the officer at
that time that would tend to establish
petitioner's knowledge and dominion or
control over the drugs, the mere finding of
cocaine in the back armrest when petitioner
was a front seat passenger in a car being
driven by its owner is insufficient to
establish probable cause for an arrest for
2possession. As we stated in Livingston:
"Merely sitting in the backseat of the
vehicle, Livingston did not demonstrate to
the officer that he possessed any
knowledge of, and hence, any restraining
or directing influence over two marijuana
seeds located on the floor in the front of
the car.
"Without more than the mere existence of
two marijuana seeds located in the front of
the car, we hold that the police officer
lacked probable cause to arrest Livingston,
a rear seat passenger, for possession of
marijuana."
Livingston, 317 Md. at 415-16, 564 A.2d at
418 (footnote omitted).
The State points to the additional fact that
the police officer saw a large amount of
rolled up money in the glove compartment
located in front of petitioner. Money,
without more, is innocuous. In Leach, we
held that there was insufficient evidence to
convict Stephen Leach, the brother of
2 Under respondent's reasoning, if contraband was
found in a twelve-passenger van, or perhaps a bus or
other kind of vehicle, or even a place, i.e., a movie
theater, the police would be permitted to place
everyone in such a vehicle or place under arrest until
some person confessed to being in possession of the
contraband- Simply stated, a policy of arresting
everyone until somebody confesses is constitutionally
unacceptable.
Michael Leach, when the drugs were found
in Michael Leach's bedroom. In that case,
the police had also discovered a large table
scale and a magnifier in plain view on the
kitchen table. We held that the table scale
and magnifier were intrinsically innocuous
and that they only became significant when
associated with drugs. The money in the
case at bar was not in the plain view of the
police officer or petitioner; rather it was
located in a closed glove compartment and
only came into view when the glove
compartment was opened by the car's
owner/driver in response to the officer's
request for the car's registration. There are
insufficient facts that would lead a
reasonable person to believe that petitioner,
at the time of his arrest, had prior knowledge
of the money or had exercised any dominion
or control over it. We hold that a police
officer's discovery of money in a closed
glove compartment and cocaine concealed
behind the rear armrest of a car is
insufficient to establish probable cause for
an arrest of a front seat passenger, who is
not the owner or person in control of the
vehicle, for possession of the cocaine.
As noted, supra, we hold that there was not
probable cause to arrest petitioner at the
time of the routine traffic stop. Under the
"fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,"
evidence tainted by Fourth Amendment
violations may not be used directly or
indirectly against the accused. See Miles v.
State, 365 Md. 488, 781 A.2d 787 (2001).
The exclusionary rule "applies to any 'fruits'
of a constitutional violation - whether such
evidence be tangible ... or confessions or
statements of the accused obtained during an
illegal arrest and detention." United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470, 100 S.Ct. 1244,
1249, 63 L.Ed.2d 537, 545 (1980) (footnote
omitted).
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b. Attenuation
The State has not argued that the confession
was admissible as a result of attenuation. We
do not believe that the parties have properly
presented that issue to this Court. Even if
properly presented, the concept would not
be applicable under the circumstances here
present.
[The court then turns "to whether, if
attenuation had been properly presented, the
taint of the illegal arrest was sufficiently
attenuated to permit the admission into
evidence of petitioner's confession, which
would otherwise be barred as the fruit of a
poisonous tree because the arrest was
effectuated without probable cause. See
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83
S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)."]
III. Conclusion
In order for the warrantless arrest of
petitioner for possession to be legal, there
must be probable cause as applicable to the
elements of the offense of possession.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances,
and after examining our case law, we
conclude that there was not probable cause
to arrest petitioner for possession.
The totality of the circumstances of the facts
of this case, as interpreted under the Brown
factors and the further consideration of
voluntariness, clearly show that the
necessary severing of the relationship
between the primary illegality and the
evidence derived therefrom to satisfy
attenuation, even if the issue had been
properly presented to this Court, does not
exist. While petitioner was given his
Miranda warnings, an application of the
remaining Brown factors and a consideration
of voluntariness, in light of the continuing
inducement and the confession's proximity
in time to the illegal arrest and the coercion,
makes clear that the temporal proximity
between the illegal arrest and the confession,
the lack of intervening circumstances and
the purposefulness of the illegal police
conduct all indicate a direct causal nexus
between the illegal arrest for lack of
probable cause and petitioner's confession
used by the State at trial.
Therefore, we hold that the arrest of
petitioner was illegal and that there were
insufficient facts and circumstances to prove
petitioner's confession was adequately
attenuated from the point of his illegal arrest
to the giving of the confession.
BATTAGLIA, J. in which WILNER and
HARRELL, JJ., join.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority's holding that the police
officers lacked probable cause to arrest the
petitioner for possession of cocaine is based
primarily upon an erroneous blending of the
probable cause standard for an arrest and the
sufficiency of evidence standard for a
conviction. While the majority hastily
acknowledges the differences between these
standards, it devotes most of its attention to
citing and discussing legal authority for
issues involving the standard of legal
sufficiency and gives only brief
consideration to two (more applicable, albeit
distinguishable) opinions concerning the
requisite probable cause for a valid
warrantless arrest. For these reasons, and the
reasons articulated herein, I respectfully
dissent.
Arrests without warrants are constitutionally
and statutorily permitted pursuant to Article
27, Section 594B of the Maryland Code as
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long as the officer has probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed and
the officer reasonably believes the arrestee
committed that crime. Determining whether
probable cause exists to support a
warrantless arrest requires a nontechnical,
common sense evaluation of the totality of
the circumstances in a given situation "in
light of the facts and circumstances found to
be credible by the trial judge." See State v.
Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 379, 568 A.2d 48,
55 (1990). ***
In the present case, the information known
to the officer at the time of the arrest was
that three men were traveling in a vehicle (a
Nissan Maxima) around 3:00am with a large
stash of cash in the glove compartment and
several plastic baggies of cocaine in the rear
armrest. None of the men claimed
ownership of the drugs or money, yet the
location of the drugs and money in the
Nissan Maxima would lead a reasonable
officer in similar circumstances to believe
that the three men had joint constructive
possession over the contraband. In my view,
this establishes probable cause for the arrest
of each of the three individuals, including
the petitioner.
What more would the majority require to
justify an arrest? From the emphasis in its
opinion, the majority would seemingly
require police officers to consider whether
the evidence gathered would be legally
sufficient for a possession conviction prior
to making the arrest. The majority asserts
that "[w]hile the cases we have discussed
above involve the sufficiency of the
evidence, they, nonetheless, establish the
law for determining some possession issues,
even at the probable cause to arrest stage;"
yet cites no authority for this proposition.
Granted, the arresting officer must
comprehend that which "possession of a
controlled dangerous substance" entails. The
officer should not, however, be required to
base a determination to arrest on the ability
of the State to meet the standard of legal
sufficiency for a conviction; nor should the
reviewing courts measure the propriety of
the arrest by such a standard.
Let me be clear on this point: I agree that the
legal sufficiency of evidence in possession
of narcotics cases requires the State to
produce evidence of dominion or control
over the narcotic allegedly possessed, and
knowledge therewith, beyond a reasonable
doubt. I disagree, however, that the degree
of evidence required for a conviction on the
charge of possession of narcotics can be
equated to that which is required of police
officers when making probable cause
determinations for warrantless arrests.
Courts reviewing such determinations must
not confuse or blend the two standards:
probable cause for an arrest (a lower
standard than legal sufficiency for a
conviction) requires the reasonable belief
that the person arrested had committed or
was committing the felony crime of
possession of narcotics. As we have oft
explained, "probable cause is a nontechnical
conception of a reasonable ground for belief
of guilt, requiring less evidence for such
belief than would justify a conviction, but
more evidence than that which would arouse
a mere suspicion." Woods v. State, 315 Md.
591, 611, 556 A.2d 236, 246 (19 89 )(quoting
Nilson v. State, 272 Md. 179, 184, 321 A.2d
301, 304 (1974)). A police officer who
discovers (at 3 a.m.) three passengers in a
vehicle which contained several baggies of
cocaine in the rear armrest and a large wad
of money (arguably, "drug money") in the
front glove compartment could reasonably
believe that those persons were exercising
joint and constructive possession of the
contraband in the vehicle, were engaging in
drug trafficking, or conspiring to engage in
drug trafficking, thus establishing probable
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cause for the arrest of each individual.
Whether the State's Attorney can produce
sufficient evidence to demonstrate, beyond a
reasonable doubt, actual or constructive
dominion or control over the narcotics and
knowledge therein to warrant a conviction is
another question - one that is properly left to
the prosecutor, initially, and the trier of fact,
subsequently.
The majority's attempt, however discrete, to
incorporate a higher standard - that of the
sufficiency of evidence - into the properly-
applied probable cause standard will only
serve to burden the law enforcement
community. ***
For the aforementioned
respectfully dissent.
reasons, I
Instead of focusing on the factual scenario
presented to the Court, and more apposite, to
the police officer, the majority chooses to
jump to hypothetical extremes in an attempt
to justify its operative heightening of the
probable cause standard. In note [3], the
majority erroneously asserts that if the Court
were to adopt the position proffered by the
appellant, then so long as some contraband
was found, probable cause would exist, per
se, and the police could arrest everyone,
whether in a twelve-passenger van or movie
theater. Such an assertion is specious in that
the totality of the circumstances test, itself,
precludes these sweeping generalizations;
instead, it requires a review of the specific
facts and circumstances presented to the
officer at the scene of the purported crime,
and if questioned, a ruling regarding the
officer's determination based upon these
specific facts and circumstances. A court
should not, and quite simply cannot,
conjecture upon whether probable cause
exists in factual situations not before it.
Should I choose to entertain the majority's
hypotheticals, however, I would
unequivocally assert that baggies of cocaine
found in one area of a packed movie theater,
without more, would not constitute probable
cause to arrest everyone in the theater; I
believe that the totality of circumstances
test, itself, would preclude a finding of
validity in such circumstances.
Judge WILNER and Judge HARRELL have
authorized me to state that they join in the
views expressed herein.
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High Court to Review Traffic Stop Arrests
AP Online
March 24, 2003
Anne Gearan
WASHINGTON (AP) The Supreme
Court said Monday it will consider the
scope of police power to arrest all
occupants of a car during a traffic stop,
agreeing to look at a case in which
everyone in a car denied knowledge of
drugs and a roll of cash found inside.
The case from Maryland continues a line
of Supreme Court cases clarifying when
officers have probable cause and can
apprehend someone without a warrant.
In this case, the court will consider
whether it was an unconstitutional
stretch for the officer to link the front-
seat passenger to drugs found in a back
armrest, and then to arrest all three
people in the car.
Twenty states had urged the court to
hear the case, involving a 1999 early
morning traffic stop in Baltimore County
that yielded $763 in the glove
compartment and five baggies of cocaine
in an armrest in the backseat.
"Countless times each day, officers
make traffic stops and uncover
contraband in multi-passenger situations.
Police need the clarity of authority to
know who may be arrested in such
cases," Maryland Attorney General
Joseph Curran argued in a court filing.
Joseph Jermaine Pringle, the front seat
passenger, was convicted of drug
charges and sentenced to 10 years in
prison.
He later told police the drugs were his
An appeals court threw out Pringle's
conviction on grounds that his arrest was
unconstitutional and the confession was
tainted.
The Constitution's Fourth Amendment
prohibits unreasonable searches or
seizures. That means police almost
always need a warrant to search
someone's house without permission, but
the Supreme Court has interpreted the
protection more narrowly when it comes
to automobiles and public transportation.
Lower courts have differed on the
correct standard for determining
probable cause to arrest a car's
occupants, and the Supreme Court has
never squarely ruled on the question,
Maryland and the other states argued.
"The uncertainty generated by
conflicting court decisions does not
make the officers' already-difficult job
any easier," Ohio Attorney General Jim
Petro wrote on behalf of the 20 states
siding with Maryland.
The case is Maryland v. Pringle, 02-809.
Copyright 0 2003 The Associated Press
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WITHOUT A WARRANT, PROBABLE CAUSE, OR REASONABLE
SUSPICION: IS THERE ANY MEANING TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
WHILE DRIVING A CAR?
Houston Law Review
Spring, 1999
Chris K. Visser
[Excerpt;
omitted.]
some footnotes and citations
The Range of Permissible Police Activity
After a Stop
Although inconvenient for the
motorist, a traffic stop is a reasonable
response to an observed traffic violation
because generally a stop is minimally
intrusive, of short duration, and takes
place in public. After the initial stop, the
driver expects, at a minimum, that he or
she will be questioned about the
observed infraction, have to submit his
or her license and registration to the
officer, and will possibly be cited for the
traffic offense. What the driver may not
expect, however, is the extent to which
the police officer may expand the scope
of the search after the initial traffic stop.
In analyzing the validity of a traffic
stop, the second prong of the Terry test
requires that any subsequent search or
seizure be reasonably related in scope to
the original reason for the stop.
Subsequent to Terry, however, the Court
has diluted this prong of the test and now
specifically allows police to conduct
protective searches of the driver and
automobile, seize items that arc in plain
view, search the motorist incident to an
arrest, run background checks, conduct a
consensual search of the automobile, and
use drug-sniffing dogs to search for
illegal drugs. Using any of these
techniques, the police can legally
conduct a comprehensive search of the
automobile and its occupants, provided
that the basis of the initial stop was
reasonable (i.e., based on an observed
traffic violation).
1. Protective Search of the Driver
and the Car. As noted, the stop-and-
frisk principles in Terry are applicable to
traffic stops because traffic stops are
analogous to Terry stops. Terry allows
for a frisk to protect the officer--an
intrusion that is more limited (or, at
least, is more justifiable) than a full-
fledged search because it is designed to
search for weapons that could harm the
stopping officer.
In Michigan v. Long,' the Court
extended the use of the protective search
to include a limited search of the
automobile's interior. The rationale for
this decision was that the officer could
be threatened by weapons within the
motorist's reach inside the car. This
search of the automobile interior
includes areas inside the passenger
compartment itself, as well as all closed
containers in that area. If, during this
search for weapons, the officer discovers
463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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drugs or other contraband, the Fourth
Amendment does not require that the
officer ignore the contraband. Within
constitutional limits, therefore, the
officer may search for drugs while
performing a protective search of the
automobile.
After a legitimate stop, the officer
may also conduct a protective search of
the driver. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 2
the Court found that a protective search
of the driver after a traffic stop was
reasonable. As with protective searches
of the automobile interior, the
justification for the driver search is to
protect the officer. In general, though,
contraband evidence will be admissible
only if the incriminating nature of the
contraband was "immediately apparent"
to the officer.
2. Seizure of Items in Plain View. In
addition to protective searches, the
officer may also seize, without a
warrant, items that are in "plain view"
after stopping the car.3 The "plain view"
doctrine applies to the traffic stop
context if the officer has probable cause
to believe that a traffic violation
occurred, and if the officer can
immediately recognize that the item in
plain view is contraband or evidence of a
crime.
The rationale for the "plain view"
doctrine is that police should not have to
obtain a warrant for evidence that they
have lawfully discovered. While the
police may not rummage through the car
to "discover" evidence, the "plain view"
2 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
See Coolidge v. Ncw Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
468-69 (197 1) (holding that police may seize
evidence in plain view as long as the discovery
of that eidence is inadvertent).
doctrine gives police a powerful motive
to stop motorists for observed traffic
violations as a pretext, in hope of finding
contraband in plain view.
[3.] Conducting a Consensual
Search. Another powerful weapon in the
police officer's arsenal to turn routine
traffic stops into full-scale searches is
the consensual search. Subsequent to a
legitimate traffic stop, a police officer
may ask for consent to search the
automobile. Officers often ask for
consent in order to get around the
traditional requirement of a warrant.
More importantly, the officer usually
asks for consent because there is no
other legitimate basis for conducting the
search.
The Supreme Court has held that the
burden of a consensual search is that it is
voluntary.4 The inquiry into whether
consent was voluntary is factual and
depends on the totality of the
circumstances. Some of the factors that
are relevant, but not dispositive, in
determining if consent was voluntary
include the following: knowledge of the
right to refuse consent; presence of
coercive surroundings, including the
location of the request and the number of
police officers present; [and] whether the
officers displayed their weapons *** .
Copyright C 1999
Review; Chris K. Visser
Houston Law
4 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,(1973) (noting that a search authorized by
consent is constitutionally permissible if the
prosecutor can show that the consent was freely
and voluntarily given).
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02-811 Groh v. Ramirez
Ruling Below: (Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 9th Cir., 298 F.3d 1022)
Search warrant that did not list objects to be seized and did not incorporate, by reference or
attachment, affidavit listing those objects violated Fourth Amendment; officers could not cure
violation by orally informing person at target premises of objects to be seized; officer who led
search without fulfilling his obligation to read warrant is not entitled to qualified immunity from
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
Question Presented: (1) Did Ninth Circuit err in ruling that law enforcement officer violated
clearly established law, and thus was personally liable in damages and not entitled to qualified
immunity, when at time he acted there was no decision by U.S. Supreme Court or any other court
so holding, and only lower court decisions addressing issue had found same conduct did not
violate law? (2) Did law enforcement officers violate particularity requirement of Fourth
Amendment when they executed search warrant already approved by magistrate judge, based on
attached application and affidavit properly describing with particularity items to be searched and
seized, but warrant itself did not include same level of detail?
Joseph R. RAMIREZ; Julia L. Ramirez; Joshua Ramirez; Regina Ramirez,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
BUTTE-SILVER BOW COUNTY; John McPherson, Sheriff of Butte-Silver Bow County;
Joe Lee, Undersheriff of Butte-Silver Bow County; John Does 1-50, in their
individual and/or official capacities, Defendants,
and
Jeff Groh, Special Agent with The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,
Defendant-Appellee.
Joseph R. Ramirez; Julia L. Ramirez; Joshua Ramirez; Regina Ramirez,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Butte-Silver Bow County; John McPherson, Sheriff of Butte-Silver Bow County;
Joe Lee, Undersheriff of Butte-Silver Bow County; Jeff Groh, Special Agent
iwith The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; John Does 1-50, in their
individual and/or official capacities, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Argued September 10, 2001.
Submission Deferred September 10, 2001.
Submitted and Filed March 13, 2002.
Amended July 25, 2002.
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[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge.
We consider whether and under what
circumstances law enforcement officers who
execute a search pursuant to a defective
warrant enjoy qualified immunity.
I
Agent Jeff Groh of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") received
two reports that the Ramirezes kept an
automatic rifle, a rocket launcher, a grenade
launcher and grenades on their ranch in
western Montana. Groh prepared an
application for a search warrant and
supporting affidavit, and presented them to a
magistrate judge who issued the warrant.
The application properly described both the
place to be searched and the objects sought.
However, the warrant itself omitted the
latter information entirely: In the space
provided to list the items to be seized, Groh
mistakenly typed a description of the
Ramirez home.
Groh led BATF agents and members of the
county sheriffs department, including
Sheriff John McPherson and Undersheriff
Joe Lee, in the execution of the warrant.
When the officers entered the Ramirez
home, only Mrs. Ramirez was present. Groh
told her they had a search warrant and were
there "because somebody called and said
you have an explosive device in a box." The
officers found no illegal weapons or
explosives, but photographed the home's
interior and recorded the serial numbers of
the Ramirezes' legal firearms. Mrs. Ramirez
tried to call her attorney during the search
but could not reach him. As Groh left, he
gave Mrs. Ramirez a copy of the defective
search warrant; neither the application nor
the affidavit were attached. Nothing was
seized, and no charges were subsequently
filed against the Ramirezes.
The next day, Mrs. Ramirez reached her
attorney and faxed him the warrant. The
attorney then called Groh and questioned the
warrant's validity because of the omitted
information. He also demanded a copy of
the warrant application and supporting
affidavit. Groh replied that the documents
were under court seal, but faxed him the
page of the application that contained the list
of items to be seized.
The Ramirezes sued the officers under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and
42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights. The district court
granted summary judgment to defendants,
holding that there was no constitutional
violation and defendants enjoyed qualified
immunity in any case. The Ramirezes also
brought two other Bivens and section 1983
claims, see Parts III & IV infra, but the
district court ruled against them on those as
well. The Ramirezes appeal.
II
A. Was there a Fourth
violation?
Amendment
To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a search
warrant must describe with particularity the
place to be searched and the items to be
seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States
v. Sayakhom, 186 F.3d 928, 934 (9th
Cir.1999). The particularity requirement
protects the individual from a "general,
exploratory rummaging in [his] belongings."
United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 n.
7 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Coolidge v. New
280
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct.
2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). It does so
both by "limit[ing] the officer's discretion"
and by "inform[ing] the person subject to the
search what items the officers executing the
warrant can seize." United States v.
McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 850 (9th Cir.1997)
(emphasis removed).
We addressed the particularity requirement
in McGrew, where federal agents searched
the home of a suspected drug trafficker. The
warrant itself did not specify the evidence
sought. Rather, in the space provided for
that information, it referred to the "attached
affidavit which is incorporated herein." Id.
at 848. However, agents never served
McGrew with a copy of the affidavit, either
during or after the search. Id. at 849.
According to the "well settled law of this
circuit," a warrant "may be construed with
reference to the affidavit ... if (1) the
affidavit accompanies the warrant, and (2)
the warrant uses suitable words of reference
which incorporate the affidavit." Id. (quoting
United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336,
1340 (9th Cir.1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). When officers fail to attach
the affidavit to a general warrant, the search
is rendered illegal because the warrant
neither limits their discretion nor gives the
homeowner the required information. Id. at
850.
Appellees concede that the warrant here was
facially defective because it provided no
description of the evidence sought. It also
didn't refer to or incorporate the application
or affidavit. Groh attached no documents to
the warrant when he served it on Mrs.
Ramirez. Nonetheless, appellees argue that
McGrew does not control and that the search
was lawful because Groh's words remedied
the defect. According to Groh, he spoke at
length with the Ramirezes during the search
- Mrs. Ramirez in person, Mr. Ramirez on
the telephone - and listed all of the items
sought. However, the Ramirezes claim that
Groh spoke only to Mrs. Ramirez, and told
her simply that the officers sought "an
explosive device in a box."
This factual dispute is immaterial: Groh
could not have cured the flaw because he
lacked the authority to amend the warrant.
As a law enforcement officer, Groh was
empowered only to execute the warrant.
Therefore, he could no more have
supplemented it verbally than he could have
amended it by crossing out the terms
approved by the magistrate and scribbling
new ones in the margins. The only way
Groh could have remedied the defect in the
warrant was to ask a magistrate to issue a
corrected version. McGrew therefore
controls and the warrant failed to comply
with the Fourth Amendment.
Our holding is consistent with the goals of
the particularity requirement, which went
unfulfilled here despite Groh's alleged oral
statements. First, the absence of a
sufficiently particular warrant increased the
likelihood and degree of confrontation
between the Ramirezes and the police. The
presence of a comprehensive and valid
warrant "greatly reduces the perception of
unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by
assuring the individual whose property is
searched or seized of the lawful authority of
the executing officer, his need to search, and
the limits of his power to search." Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317,
76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Second, the invalid warrant deprived the
Ramirezes of the means to be on the lookout
and to challenge officers who might have
exceeded the limits imposed by the
magistrate. "Citizens deserve the
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opportunity to calmly argue that agents arc
overstepping their authority or even
targeting the wrong residence." United
States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 991 (9th
Cir.1999). Such a dialogue is impossible if
citizens must rely on officers' verbal
representations of the scope of their
authority. To stand a real chance of policing
the officers' conduct, individuals must be
able to read and point to the language of a
proper warrant.
Third, permitting officers to expand the
scope of the warrant by oral statements
would broaden the area of dispute between
the parties in subsequent litigation. The
parties' disagreement over exactly what
Groh said during the search, and to whom he
said it, is immaterial because the warrant
must contain all authorizations and
limitations in writing.
B. Are Defendants Protected by Qualified
Immunity?
Law enforcement officers are entitled to
qualified immunity if they act reasonably
under the circumstances, even if the actions
result in a constitutional violation.' Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 119 S.Ct. 1692,
143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999); Marks v. Clarke,
102 F.3d 1012, 1026 (9th Cir.1996). What's
reasonable for a particular officer depends
on his role in the search. Because searches
often "require[ ] cooperation and division of
labor," Guerra v. Sutton, 783 F.2d 1371,
1375 (9th Cir.1986), officers' roles can vary
widely. Typically, only one or a few officers
plan and lead a search, but more - perhaps
many more - help execute it. The officers
who lead the team that executes a warrant
While the Ramirezes sued the federal officers under
Bivens and the county officers under section 1983,
"the qualified immunity analysis is identical under
either." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119
S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999).
are responsible for ensuring that they have
lawful authority for their actions. A key
aspect of this responsibility is making sure
that they have a proper warrant that in fact
authorizes the search and seizure they are
about to conduct. The leaders of the
expedition may not simply assume that the
warrant authorizes the search and seizure.
Rather, they must actually read the warrant
and satisfy themselves that they understand
its scope and limitations, and that it is not
defective in some obvious way. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23, 104
S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (search
pursuant to a warrant is invalid if no
reasonable officer could have believed the
warrant was valid). The leaders of the search
team must also make sure that a copy of the
warrant is available to give to the person
whose property is being searched at the
commencement of the search,2 and that such
copy has no missing pages or other obvious
defects.
Line officers, on the other hand, are required
to do much less. They do not have to
actually read or even see the warrant; they
may accept the word of their superiors that
they have a warrant and that it is valid.
Guerra, 783 F.2d at 1375; Marks, 102 F.3d
at 1029-30. So long as they "ma[k]e inquiry
as to the nature and scope of [the] warrant,"
Guerra, 783 F.2d at 1375, their reliance on
leaders' representations about it is
reasonable. Id.; Marks, 102 F.3d at 1029-30.
The line officers here acted reasonably:
They were told that a warrant had been
obtained and learned through an advance
briefing what items could be seized. Guerra,
783 F.2d at 1375; Marks, 102 F.3d at 1030.
Because they were not required to read the
warrant, the line officers conducting this
2 We note that in this case Agent Groh did not serve a
copy of the warrant on Mrs. Ramirez until after the
search was completed. Of course, this was much too
late. See Gantt, 194 F.3d at 1000-01
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search cannot reasonably have been
expected to know that it was defective.
The Ramirezes argue that none of the
officers enjoy qualified immunity because,
under McGrew, all of them - leaders and
line officers alike - should have known that
the defective warrant made the search
illegal. McGrew, 122 F.3d at 850 n. 5. But
McGrew said nothing about the different
duties of leaders and line officers. We held
only that "[i]t is the government's duty," not
the duty of any particular officer, to serve a
sufficiently particular warrant. Id. at 850
(emphasis added). Because we were
reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress,
we had no occasion to address the allocation
of responsibilities between leaders and the
rank and file.
The record identifies only Groh as the leader
of the search. He received two reports of
illegal weapons, obtained and served the
warrant, conducted the pre-search briefing
and supervised the search itself. However,
he neglected to check the warrant for errors.
The presence of errors in a warrant does not
automatically deprive search leaders of
immunity. The question is whether the
defects are such that they would have been
noticed by a reasonably careful officer who
read the warrant before executing it. Cf
Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971,
981 (9th Cir.1985) (holding that a search
conducted pursuant to a facially flawed
warrant did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because "the discrepancy [was]
not a serious one"). Even the most careful
proofreaders let mistakes slip by, especially
when checking their own work.
Nevertheless, Groh is not entitled to
qualified immunity. According to his own
affidavit, he did not read the warrant after
the magistrate issued it and before he began
the search. Had he done so, he would surely
have realized that it did not contain a list of
items to be seized and was therefore facially
defective. He would then have been able to
correct the error before going forward with
the search. In most cases, "an officer cannot
be expected to question the magistrate's ...
judgment that the form of the warrant is
technically sufficient." Leon, 468 U.S. at
921. But "the officer's reliance on [that
judgment] must be objectively reasonable,
and it is clear that in some circumstances the
officer will have no reasonable grounds for
believing that the warrant was properly
issued." Id. at 922-23 (citation omitted). No
reasonable grounds exist here: The warrant
was "so facially deficient ... in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the
things to be seized" that, had Groh read it,
he could not "reasonably [have] presume[d]
it to be valid." Id. at 923.
It is possible that Groh shared authority over
the search with other officers, such as
Sheriff McPherson and Undersheriff Lee.
However, nothing in the record indicates
this was the case. Therefore, all officers
except Groh are protected by qualified
immunity.
III
The Ramirezes also appeal the dismissal of
their claim that the officers violated their
right to privacy as protected by the Fifth and
Ninth Amendments. This claim has two
parts. First, the Ramirezes argue that the
officers violated their right to privacy by
notifying the media of the search
immediately before it was executed. They
claim that the resulting publicity damaged
their standing in the community.
Although the Ramirezes present this claim
as one for invasion of privacy, the
circumstances of the search show that it is
actually a defamation claim. Nothing in the
record suggests that the media gained access
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to the Ramirez property. Whatever
information the media obtained during the
raid was gathered from the road adjacent to
the ranch, where any member of the public
could have observed the goings on. Cf
Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808, 809-10,
119 S.Ct. 1706, 143 L.Ed.2d 978 (1999)
(holding that police violated the Fourth
Amendment by allowing a media crew to
accompany them onto the premises and
observe a search); Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614,
119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 ("[I]t is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment for
police to bring members of the media or
other third parties into a home during the
execution of a warrant...."). Therefore, the
only harm that the Ramirezes can show they
have suffered is reputational injury, from
which the Constitution offers no protection.
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233-34, 111
S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991).
The Ramirezes also argue that the search
itself violated not only their right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures,
but also their right to privacy. "[C]ertain
wrongs affect more than a single right and,
accordingly, can implicate more than one of
the Constitution's commands." Armendariz
v- Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th
Cir.1996). However, the Supreme Court has
held that plaintiffs cannot "double up"
constitutional claims in this way: Where a
claim can be analyzed under "an explicit
textual source" of rights in the Constitution,
a court may not also assess the claim under
another, "more generalized," source.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394- 95,
109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)
(analyzing claim under Fourth Amendment
but not under substantive due process); see
also Hufford v. Mcfnaney, 249 F.3d 1142,
1151 (9th Cir.2001) (analyzing claim under
First Amendment but not under substantive
due process); Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1319
(analyzing claim under Fourth and Fifth
Amendments but not under substantive due
process). Here, because the Fourth
Amendment supplies an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection against
unlawful searches, that Amendment, and not
the more general right to privacy, governs
the constitutionality of the search.
IV
Finally, the Ramirezes appeal the dismissal
of their claim that each of the officers is
liable as a bystander for failing to intercede
and prevent his co-defendants' constitutional
violations. See United States v. Koon, 34
F.3d 1416, 1424-25 (9th Cir.1994), rev'd on
other grounds, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035,
135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). The district court
dismissed this claim on the basis of its
holding that no constitutional violation
existed.
As to the line officers, this claim is
foreclosed by our ruling that they had no
duty to read the warrant and therefore could
not have known that the warrant was
defective. They cannot therefore reasonably
be held liable for failing to intercede. As to
Groh, it is clear from the record that he was
not aware that the warrant was defective
until long after the search was completed,
when he spoke to the Ramirezes' attorney.
Groh cannot be held liable for failing to stop
a search he did not know was illegal.
AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in
part. No costs.
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Liability in Searches Is Debated
Los Angeles Times
March 4, 2003
David G. Savage
WASH[NGTON -- The Supreme Court
said Monday it would reconsider another
ruling from the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals, this one saying police officers
can be held personally liable if they
carry out a search with a warrant that is
missing key facts.
Officers have a duty to proofread
warrants, even after they have been
approved by a judge, the appeals court
said. And officers who slip up can be
forced to pay damages to those who
were subjected to the search, the 9th
Circuit held last year.
A lawyer for a federal agent in Montana
called this strict rule "radical" and
"intolerable" in an appeal.
The justices said they would hear the
case, Groh vs. Ramirez, in the fall.
Jeff Groh, an agent for the federal
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives, received two reports that
a ranch in western Montana owned by
the Ramirez family had illegal weapons,
including grenades and a rocket
launcher.
He presented the evidence to a
magistrate. But on the warrant, he
mistakenly omitted the description of the
items sought and instead typed a
description of the Ramirez home. The
magistrate approved the warrant, and
Groh led a team of federal agents and
county sheriffs to the ranch.
But the agents found nothing, and no
charges were filed. Groh left a copy of
the warrant with Julia Ramirez.
Afterward, a lawyer for the family noted
the warrant was defective, and he sued
Groh and the other agents for conducting
an unreasonable search in violation of
the 4th Amendment. A federal judge
threw out the claim, but the 9th Circuit
revived it. "The well-settled law of this
circuit," the appeals court said, is that a
search warrant must list all the items that
are sought.
Because Groh failed in that duty, he can
be held liable, the 9th Circuit said. But
Groh's lawyer said no other appeals
court has adopted such a rigid rule.
Copyright V 2003 Los Angeles Times
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02-473 United States v. Banks
Ruling Below: (9th Cir., 282 F.3d 699, 70 Crim. L. Rep. 526)
When law enforcement officers seeking to enter premises to execute search warrant do not face
exigent circumstances and, absent cooperation from persons inside, would have to make forcible
entry entailing destruction of property, they may not do so unless, after knocking and announcing
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3109, they receive explicit refusal of admittance or wait amount of time
that is significant and longer than they would be required to wait if nonforcible entry were
possible; police in this case who had no knowledge suggesting that drug suspect posed special
risk and, upon knocking on apartment door, heard no sound suggesting that he was moving away
from door violated Fourth Amendment and knock-and-announce statute by waiting only 15-20
seconds before making forcible entry.
Question Presented: Did law enforcement officers executing warrant to search for illegal drugs
violate Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109, thereby requiring suppression of evidence,
when they forcibly entered small apartment in middle of afternoon 15-20 seconds after knocking
and announcing their presence?
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Lashawn Lowell BANKS, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Argued and Submitted September 10, 2001
Filed March 5, 2002.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
POLITZ, Circuit Judge.
Lashawn Lowell Banks appeals his guilty
plea conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to
distribute, and for being a drug user in
possession of a firearm. His plea followed
the distnict court's denial of his motion to
suppress certain evidence. Banks reserved
his right to appeal. A close review of the
record, counsel's arguments, and guiding
principles, persuades us that a reversal and
remand is in order.
BACKGROUND
The present action concerns the execution of
a search warrant on Banks' apartment by
North Las Vegas Police Department officers
and FBI agents. The officers positioned
themselves at the front and rear of the
apartment and followed the statutory "knock
and announce" procedure by knocking
loudly on the apartment door and
announcing "police search warrant." See 18
U.S.C. § 3109. After fifteen to twenty
seconds without a response, armed SWAT
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officers made a forced entry into Banks'
apartment.
Once inside, the officers found Banks in the
hallway outside his bathroom. Banks, who
obviously had just emerged from his
shower, was forced to the floor and
handcuffed. He then was seated at his
kitchen table for questioning and shortly
thereafter was provided underwear with
which to cover himself. Two agents
questioned Banks while other officers
searched his apartment. Banks maintains
that he was under the influence of drugs and
alcohol during the interrogation. Both
agents, however, testified that they
perceived no indications that Banks was
under the influence. Banks also asserts that
he was nervous and intimidated by a "good-
cop versus bad-cop" routine utilized by the
interrogating agents and the hooded SWAT
officers searching the apartment. The
interrogating agents maintain that Banks
appeared calm and was able to reason
throughout the interview.
The agents questioned Banks for
approximately forty-five minutes, and about
midway thereof asked Banks to reveal his
suppliers. Banks stated that he would not
reveal his suppliers before talking to an
attorney. The agents continued the
questioning.
Prior to trial Banks moved to suppress the
statements he made during the interrogation.
He contends that the statements should have
been suppressed on the grounds that they
were obtained: (a) in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3109 because the officers failed to wait a
reasonable period of time before forcefully
entering his residence when executing the
search warrant; (b) in violation of the fifth
amendment because he did not make a
knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights
during the interrogation; and (c) in violation
of the fifth amendment because the
interrogation continued after he made an
unequivocal request for an attorney. The
district court denied the suppression motion.
Following this denial, Banks pled guilty to
possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute and to being a drug user
in possession of a firearm.
Banks expressly reserved his right to appeal
the court's denial of his Motion to Suppress.
This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
I. 18 U.S.C. § 3109
We review a trial court's legal conclusions
de novo, reviewing findings of fact
underlying those conclusions for clear error.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3109, commonly referred
to as the "knock and announce" statute,
establishes guidelines for federal law
enforcement officers when executing a
search warrant. The statute directs that:
The officer may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house, or any
part of a house, or anything therein, to
execute a search warrant, if, after notice of
his authority and purpose, he is refused
admittance or when necessary to liberate
himself or a person aiding him in the
execution of the warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109.
Under the facts at bar this statute raises two
critical issues: (a) whether the officers
provided notice of their authority and
purpose; and (b) whether they were refused
admittance. There is no dispute that proper
notice of authority and purpose was given
herein. Before us is the second issue, refusal
of admittance.
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Banks contends that the officers executing
the search warrant entered his apartment
illegally because they failed to wait a
reasonable time, after receiving no response,
before forcefully entering his quarters.
Banks further contends that because the
entry was in violation of his fourth
amendment rights and 18 U.S.C. § 3109, all
evidence, including his statements,
constitute fruits of an illegal search and
should be suppressed. We find this
contention persuasive.
A literal application of the statute would
allow entry only after both announcement
and specific denial of admittance. Our
precedents, however, dictate that an
affirmative refusal of entry is not required
by the statute, and that refusal may be
implied in some instances. See, e.g., United
States v. Allende, 486 F.2d 1351, 1353 (9th
Cir.1973). "A failure to answer a knock and
announcement has long been equated with a
refusal to admit the search party and a
justification for forcible entry." United
States v. Ramos, 923 F.2d 1346, 1356 (9th
Cir.1991) overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Ruiz, 257 F.3d 1030 (9th
Cir.2001) (citations omitted). Furthermore,
"[t]here are no set rules as to the time an
officer must wait before using force to enter
a house; the answer will depend on the
circumstances of each case."
Section 3109 serves the following interests:
(a) reducing the risk of harm to both the
officer and the occupants of the house to be
entered; (b) helping to prevent the
unnecessary destruction of private property;
and (c) symbolizing respect for individual
privacy summarized in the adage that "a
man's house is his castle." United States v.
Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 (9th
Cir.1973) (quoting Miller v, United States,
357 U.S. 301, 307. 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d
1332 (1958)).
Entries may be classified into four basic
categories, consistent with the interests
served by 18 U.S.C. § 3109: (1) entries in
which exigent circumstances exist and non-
forcible entry is possible, permitting entry to
be made simultaneously with or shortly after
announcement; (2) entries in which exigent
circumstances exist and forced entry by
destruction of property is required,
necessitating more specific inferences of
exigency; (3) entries in which no exigent
circumstances exist and non-forcible entry is
possible, requiring an explicit refusal of
admittance or a lapse of a significant amount
of time; and (4) entries in which no exigent
circumstances exist and forced entry by
destruction of property is required,
mandating an explicit refusal of admittance
or a lapse of an even more substantial
amount of time. Id. at 12. The action at bar
falls into the final category because no
exigent circumstances existed and the entry
required destruction of property - i.e., the
door to Banks' apartment.
Consideration of the foregoing categories
aids in the resolution of the essential
question whether the entry made herein was
reasonable under the circumstances. In
addressing that inquiry, we categorize
entries as either forced or non-forced. The
reasonableness must then be determined in
light of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the warrant,
particularly considering the duration of the
officers' pause before making a forced entry
after the required knock and announcement.
Our task is to determine what constitutes a
reasonable waiting period before officers
may infer that they have been denied
admittance. In assessing the reasonableness
of the duration of the officers' wait, we
review all factors that an officer reasonably
should consider in making the decision to
enter without an affirmative denial. Those
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factors include, but are not limited to: (a)
size of the residence; (b) location of the
residence; (c) location of the officers in
relation to the main living or sleeping areas
of the residence; (d) time of day; (e) nature
of the suspected offense; (t) evidence
demonstrating the suspect's guilt; (g)
suspect's prior convictions and, if any, the
type of offense for which he was convicted;
and (h) any other observations triggering the
senses of the officers that reasonably would
lead one to believe that immediate entry was
necessary.
In the case before us, the officers knocked
once and announced their purpose. The
officers heard no sound coming from the
small apartment that suggested that an
occupant was moving away from the door,
or doing anything else that would suggest a
refusal of admittance. We know from the
record that sounds were transmitted
relatively easily, for Officer Tomasso,
waiting outside at the rear of the apartment,
heard Officer Crespo's knock at the front
door. Yet none of the officers testified that
they heard any sound coming from within
the apartment. There was nothing else that
triggered the officers' senses, and there were
no exigent circumstances warranting a
waiver of the reasonable delay. The officers
had no specific knowledge of any facts or
reasonable expectations from which they
could reasonably have believed that entry
into Banks' residence would pose any risk
greater than the ordinary danger of
executing a search warrant on a private
residence.
Because the officers were not affirmatively
granted or denied permission, they were
required to delay acting for a sufficient
period of time before they could reasonably
conclude that they impliedly had been
denied admittance. After pausing a
maximum of fifteen to twenty seconds, the
officers forced entry. Banks came out of his
shower upon hearing the sound of his door
being forced open, and stumbled into the
hallway concerned that his apartment was
being invaded. Upon entering, the officers
found Banks naked, wet, and soapy from his
shower. Under these circumstances, we are
not prepared to conclude that the delay of
fifteen to twenty seconds after a single
knock and announcement before forced
entry was, without an affirmative denial of
admission or other exigent circumstances,
sufficient in duration to satisfy the
constitutional safeguards.
II. Banks' Fifth and Sixth Amendment
Claims
As noted above, we review a trial court's
legal conclusions de novo, and our review of
findings of fact underlying those
conclusions is for clear error. However,
"[w]e review the district court's
determination that the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights
under the clearly erroneous standard."
United States v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284,
1286 (9th Cir.1987).
1. The Voluntariness of Banks' Statements
The fifth amendment states that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself." Under the
teachings of Miranda v. Arizona, to assure
the meaningful protection of this fifth
amendment right, a defendant subject to
custodial interrogation must be advised of
his "right to remain silent, that any statement
he does make may be used ... against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at
444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. A knowing and
voluntary waiver of these rights is
1 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966).
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permissible. Such a waiver, however, must
be established by a preponderance of the
evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157, 168-69, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473
(1986).
Banks contends that his statements were
obtained involuntarily and through coercion
in violation of his fifth amendment rights.
He complains that because he was under the
influence of alcohol and narcotics at the
time of the interrogation, he was unable to
make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his
rights. He further asserts that his statements
were coerced because he was terrorized by
the entry of the police into his home,
intimidated by officers employing the
"good-cop versus bad-cop" routine, and in
fear of being paraded naked around the
neighborhood. Our review of the record,
however, persuades us that the district court
did not err in its determination that he made
a knowing and voluntary waiver of these
rights.
A confession made in a drug or alcohol
induced state, or one that is the product of
physical or psychological pressure, may be
deemed voluntary if it remains "the product
of a rational intellect and a free will...."
Medeiros v. Shimoda, 889 F.2d 819, 823
(9th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). The
interrogating agents testified about Banks'
demeanor during the interrogation. Neither
detected any indication that Banks was
under the claimed adverse influence, and
both described him as calm and able to
reason. Similarly, the record demonstrates
that Banks was able to understand the
circumstances, follow instructions, and
answer questions. From the record, Banks
does not appear to have been "incapacitated"
by his use of drugs and alcohol. During the
interrogation, he answered some of the
agent's questions while refusing to answer
those regarding his suppliers and was able to
provide officers with the combination to his
safe. Prior to being taken to the police
station, he requested that his girlfriend be
contacted so she could secure his apartment.
Because the evidence supports the district
court's conclusion that Banks' statements
were the product of rational intellect and a
free will, we hold that the district court did
not err in finding a knowing and voluntary
waiver.
2. Banks' Right to Counsel Under Miranda
Banks also contends that his statements were
obtained in violation of his right to counsel
under Miranda. No further questioning of a
suspect may occur after he expresses the
desire to consult with counsel, and police
must clarify an ambiguous or equivocal
request for an attorney. Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also United States
v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th
Cir.1985). Notwithstanding, "a defendant
may selectively waive his Miranda rights,
deciding to respond to some questions but
not others." Bruni v. Lewis, 847 F.2d 561,
563 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
In support of his claim that his right to
counsel under Miranda was violated, Banks
asserts that during the latter part of his
questioning he told the agents that he
wanted to consult with a lawyer about the
possibility of making a "deal" in exchange
for divulging information about his
suppliers. The record reflects that when the
agents asked Banks a question regarding his
suppliers, he responded that he wanted to
speak to an attorney before revealing his
suppliers to see if he could secure some
consideration, what one might deem a quid
pro quo, for his cooperation with the
officers. The agents reasonably understood
Banks' statement to mean he was willing to
answer some questions but not others. That
conclusion is fully supported by the record.
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The judgment is AFFIRMED in part,
REVERSED in part and the matter is
REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent herewith.
FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part,
concurring in part.
The majority rules the entry in this case
unconstitutional and in violation of § 3109
because the officers delayed only 15 to 20
seconds after knocking loudly on Banks'
apartment door and announcing "police
search warrant." Simply put, the police
should have waited longer - how much
longer is not specified - before they could
lawfully assume that their knock and
announcement had been heard, that Banks
was not going to open the door voluntarily
and that they were justified in forcing the
door open with a battering ram. I share my
colleagues' concerns that officers not
peremptorily and forcibly invade the privacy
of a suspect's home, and it is disquieting to
visualize Banks' shock and embarrassment
as he emerged naked and still soapy from his
shower and confronted the officers who had
just burst through his front door. ***
Nonetheless, although this case admittedly is
a close call, I cannot agree that the officers
here acted outside the limits of established
case law or - more to the point - even the
criteria the majority articulates. I therefore
respectfully dissent from the § 3 109 portion
of the majority opinion (Part I). Otherwise, I
concur in Part II of the opinion.
I do not think the outcome of this case can
turn simply on the amount of time the
officers waited after knocking. Banks did
not hear the knock or announcement in the
first place; thus it would have made no
practical difference if the officers waited
substantially longer than 15 or 20 seconds. If
there was a problem of procedural or
constitutional dimension, it had to be that
the officers did not knock twice or engage in
some other effort to determine whether
Banks was home and had heard the first
knock. Although hinting that was the real
problem here, the majority nevertheless
holds that the officers:
were required to delay acting for a
sufficient period of time before they could
reasonably conclude that they impliedly
had been denied admittance....
Under these circumstances, we are not
prepared to conclude that the delay of
fifteen to twenty seconds after a single
knock and announcement before forced
entry was, without an affirmative denial of
admission or other exigent circumstances,
sufficient in duration to satisfy the
constitutional safeguards.
In assessing whether there was a reasonable
delay, the majority acknowledges that
"[t]here are no set rules as to the time an
officer must wait before using force to enter
a house; the answer will depend on the
circumstances of each case." McClure v.
United States, 332 F.2d 19, 22 (9th
Cir.1964); see also United States v.
Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9(9th
Cir.1973) ("In short, 'a claim under 18
U.S.C. § 3109 depends upon the particular
circumstances surrounding the [entry]."')
(quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 272, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697
(1960)).
Nonetheless, the majority then extrapolates
from Bustamante-Gamez four basic
categories of entry, placing this case in
category 4: "entries in which no exigent
circumstances exist and forced entry by
destruction of property is required,
mandating an explicit refusal of admittance
or a lapse of an even more substantial
amount of time" - that is, substantially more
than the "significant amount of time"
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required under category 3. Refining its
analysis further, the majority sets forth a
nonexclusive list of factors "an officer
reasonably should consider in making the
decision to enter [forcibly] without an
affirmative denial." The source of this list is
not identified, but I have no quarrel with its
substance - so long as it is not read as
substituting a checklist approach to what our
case law recognizes is a circumstance-
specific evaluation.
Where I do disagree with the majority,
however, is its application of these factors -
or more to the point, its disregard or
discounting of key factors present here.
Among the listed factors are "(a) size of the
residence"; "(c) location of the officers in
relation to the main living or sleeping areas
of the residence"; and "(e) nature of the
suspected offense." Banks lived in a small,
two-bedroom, one-bathroom apartment. The
bathroom was located in the middle part of
the apartment. Banks testified that, "It's not
a very big apartment." And, "2 steps from
the shower is - you can look left, see the
door." Arriving at Banks' apartment at about
2:00 p.m., the officers positioned themselves
at the front and back doors. There is no
dispute that the officers gave proper notice
of their authority and purpose. Officer
Crespo knocked loudly on the front door and
announced "police search warrant." Officer
Tomasso, at the rear, testified he heard
Crespo's loud knock. (The record is silent as
to Tomasso's also having heard the
announcement, or whether anyone heard
water running or other sounds of someone
taking a shower.) On these facts, the officers
could reasonably have assumed Banks had
heard at least the loud knock and probably
the announcement.
Moreover, Banks' suspected offense was
drug dealing; the warrant to search his
apartment was predicated upon information,
corroborated by a controlled buy, that Banks
was selling cocaine at his apartment. Thus
there was some basis for concern that Banks'
delay in responding might be related to
attempts to dispose of evidence. See United
States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 926 (6th
Cir. 1998), where the court noted that "where
drug traffickers may easily and quickly
destroy the evidence of their illegal
enterprise by simply flushing it down the
drain, 15 to 20 seconds is certainly long
enough for officers to wait before assuming
the worst and making a forced entry." Spikes
also cautioned that "[t]his reality, however,
must be balanced against the fact that the
simple presence of drugs alone does not
justify abandoning the 'knock and announce'
rule or so diluting its requirements that it
becomes a meaningless gesture.... Thus the
presence of drugs in the place to be
searched, while not a conclusive factor,
lessens the length of time law enforcement
must ordinarily wait outside before entering
a residence." Id. (citation omitted). See also
United States v. Jones, 133 F.3d 358, 361-62
(5th Cir.1998) (reviewing cases, and
upholding wait of 15 to 20 seconds after
knock "given the possibility that a longer
wait might well have resulted in the
destruction of evidence[illegal drugs]");
United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160,
1168 (1st Cir.1993) (holding wait of 10
seconds after knock reasonable where
occupants of apartment were believed to
possess cocaine, "a substance that is easily
and quickly hidden or destroyed"). But cf
Becker, 23 F.3d at 1541 ("[W]hile peril to
officers or the possibility of destruction of
evidence or escape may well demonstrate an
exigency [justifying immediate entry], mere
unspecific fears about those possibilities will
not."); United States v. Moreno, 701 F.2d
815, 818 (9th Cir.1983), vacated on other
grounds by 469 U.S. 913, 105 S.Ct. 286, 83
L.Ed.2d 223 (1984) ("In order to justify
forced entry without an announcement of
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authority and refusal of admittance, there
must be some evidence to support the
suspicion that contraband will be
destroyed."); United States v. Fluker, 543
F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir.1976) (no evidence
the defendants were destroying narcotics to
justify officers entering without any knock
or announcement).
The majority acknowledges some of these
factors in passing, but gives them little or no
weight. With respect, I fail to see what
guidance law enforcement should draw from
such a holding that disregards some of the
very factors the majority identifies as
relevant. Nor do I think the majority's
conclusion is warranted under these
circumstances, or in light of decisions
involving comparable situations where a 15
to 20 second delay has been held sufficient.
First, 15 to 20 seconds is not an insignificant
amount of time to wait after a loud knock
and announcement. Knock, then count out
the time to see for yourself.
Second, Banks was in the shower and did
not hear the knock and announcement, so
even if the wait had been longer, absent
another knock or announcement, he still
would not have responded.
Third, although there is no Ninth Circuit
precedent directly on point, our case law -
albeit cautionary - and that of other circuits
tends to support the entry here. We
previously have held that a five second wait
after three loud knocks and an
announcement was not a reasonably
significant amount of time to permit the
defendant to determine who was at the door
and to respond to the request for admittance,
where the warrant was executed early in the
morning and the occupants of the apartment
were likely to be asleep. United States v.
Granville, 222 F.3d 1214, 1218-19 (9th
Cir.2000). Here, however, the warrant was
executed in the middle of the afternoon and
there was ample time for Banks to respond
to the request for admittance. The Sixth
Circuit has held that "when officers execute
a warrant in the middle of the day ... the
length of time the officers must tarry outside
diminishes." Spikes, 158 F.3d at 927.
Furthermore, given the small size of Banks'
apartment, there was no reason for the
officers to assume Banks had not had
sufficient time to hear and respond to the
knock and announcement in the 15 to 20
second interval. The Eighth Circuit
specifically addressed such a circumstance
in United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541 (8th
Cir.1994). There, the court concluded a 20
second wait after a knock and announcement
was reasonable where the defendants' houses
were small, the defendants were awake at
the time and there was probable cause to
believe they possessed narcotics. Id. at 549.
"In these circumstances, the possibility was
slight that those within did not hear or could
not have responded promptly, if in fact they
had desired to do so." Id. The Tenth Circuit
has upheld an entry after a 10 to 12 second
wait. United States v. Knapp, I F.3d 1026
(10th Cir.1993). Because the defendant,
whose presence was assumed given the
illuminated lights in the house, gave no
indication he intended to allow the officers
into his home voluntarily, the court held,
"[i]t was plausible for the officers to
conclude that they were affirmatively
refused entry after a ten to twelve second
interval without a verbal or physical
response." Id. at 1031.
In a case quite similar to this, the District of
Columbia Circuit held that a 15 to 20 second
wait after a single knock and announcement
was sufficient, and that a second knock was
not required. United States v. Spriggs, 996
F.2d 320 (D.C.Cir. 1993).
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Clearly the agents did not act
unreasonably in entering the apartment
after knocking and announcing themselves
only a single time.... One need seek
admittance only once in order to be
refused.... With respect to the delay before
entering, under our case law the agents
were justified in concluding that they had
been constructively refused admittance
when the occupants failed to respond
within 15 seconds of their announcement.
Id. at 322-23. On the other hand, in United
States . Phelps, 490 F.2d 644, 646 (9th
Cir.1974), in upholding a forced entry, we
gave weight to the fact that agents had
knocked and announced twice, waiting 5 to
10 seconds after each before forcing entry.
But, noting the circumstance-specific nature
of the inquiry, Phelps emphasized that "it
matters not that the record reveals ten,
fifteen, or twenty seconds, for the true rule
rejects time alone, even 'an exceedingly
short time,' such as ten seconds, as the
decisive factor." Id. at 647(citing Jackson v.
United States, 354 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.1965));
see also United States v. Ramos, 923 F.2d
1346, 1355-56 (9th Cir.1991), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Ruiz, 257
F.3d 1030 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc)
(upholding entry after two knocks and
announcements followed by 45 second
delay). Thus, I do not read Phelps as
requiring a second knock here, although -
given the circumstances - that might have
been a more effective way to assure that
Banks heard the demand for entry and had
an opportunity to respond.
I do not know what the majority makes of
Phelps or Spriggs, because they are not
discussed. Indeed, the majority neglects
most of the authority I discuss above. Such
authority at the very least provides guidance
for determining the reasonableness of the 15
to 20 second wait considering the specific
circumstances of Banks' situation - he
resided in a small apartment, there was a
loud knock and announcement, he was
suspected of possessing illegal narcotics and
the warrant was executed in the middle of
the day. On these facts, I believe it was not
unreasonable for the officers to conclude
that Banks had heard and constructively
denied their request for entry. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent from Part I of the
majority opinion.
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Supreme Court to Consider Police Search
AP Online
February 24, 2003
Gina Holland
WASHINGTON (AP) The Supreme
Court agreed Monday to consider how
long police with a search warrant must
wait before breaking down a door, using
as a test case the arrest of a drug suspect
who was in the shower when the SWAT
team stormed in.
An appeals court ruled that authorities
acted unreasonably in using a battering
ram to knock down Lashawn Lowell
Banks' door just 15 to 20 seconds after
demanding entrance.
The commotion interrupted Banks'
shower and also violated the
constitutional ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures, the San Francisco-
based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled.
The Supreme Court will consider this
fall whether narcotics found during the
search of Banks' Las Vegas apartment
could have been used as evidence.
In 1997 the Supreme Court ruled that
police armed with court warrants to
search for drugs must knock and
announce themselves unless they can
show they had reason to believe a
suspect would be dangerous or would
destroy evidence if alerted to the raid.
The Banks case is a follow-up to that
decision.
The Bush administration urged the
justices to use the case to clarify how
long officers must wait during raids like
the one on Banks' small apartment in
1998.
The appeals court decision "creates
significant uncertainty - and needless
and potentially dangerous delays in a
recurring aspect of police practice,"
justices were told in a filing by Solicitor
General Theodore Olson, the
administration's top Supreme Court
lawyer.
Olson said Banks could have flushed
drugs down the toilet while officers
waited outside during the afternoon raid.
Banks' attorney, Randall Roske, said if
officers had waited just a few more
seconds, "it might have afforded (Banks)
the chance to have met the intruders with
the small dignity of a towel. It is just this
sort of privacy interest which is at the
very core of the Fourth Amendment."
He also said in filings that the Supreme
Court should not set rigid rules that a 20-
second delay during a police raid is
constitutional. Courts should handle
questionable searches on a case-by-case
basis, Roske told the court.
Banks was sentenced to 11 years in
prison for possession of drugs with
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intent to distribute and possession of a
gun.
Officers were told by an informant that a
drug dealer known as "Shakes" lived in
the apartment. They knocked down the
door after knocking and announcing that
they had a search warrant. They forced
Banks to the floor and handcuffed him,
then moved him to a kitchen chair for
questioning. Officers gave him some
underwear, court records show.
"They only knocked once, that could
become an issue. Should they have
knocked twice?" said John Wesley Hall
Jr., a specialist in search and seizure
cases who sits on the board of the
National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers. "The poor guy was
naked coming out of the shower. Fifteen
seconds is not enough time."
James Tomkovicz, a criminal law
professor at the University of Iowa, said
it would be hard for the court to tell law
officers how many seconds, or minutes,
they have to wait before entering a
home.
"There's no way they'll put a stopwatch
on this," Tomkovicz said.
The case is United States of America v.
Banks, 02-473.
Copyright C 2003 The Associated Press
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In the Ninth we trust
Two recent opinions by the Ninth Circuit should be celebrated, while they last.
Champion
May, 2003
Milton Hirsch & David Oscar Markus
United States v. Banks
First up is United States v. Banks.
Lashawn Lowell Banks' life changed one
recent afternoon as he was showering in
his small two-bedroom/one- bathroom
apartment. North Las Vegas Police
Department officers and FBI agents,
attempting to execute a search warrant
on that apartment, positioned themselves
at the front and rear of the apartment.
They "knock[ed] loudly on the
apartment door and announc[ed] 'police
search warrant."'
No one answered their calls. So after 15
to 20 seconds without a response, armed
SWAT officers huffed and puffed and
knocked Banks' door down. Banks,
hearing the officers rumble into his
apartment, emerged from his shower,
"naked, wet and soapy." He was forced
to the floor and handcuffed, without
being given any clothes or an
opportunity to dry off After being
questioned by agents for some time, he
was provided "underwear with which to
cover himself."
During questioning, Banks made
incriminating statements. He moved to
suppress those statements, arguing that
the officers violated 18 U.S.C. § 3109
"because the officers failed to wait a
reasonable period of time before
forcefully entering his residence when
executing the search warrant." The
district court denied that motion, and
Banks, a Las Vegas resident, decided to
take his chances with the Ninth Circuit.
Good bet, Banks.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. Fifth Circuit
Senior Judge Henry Politz wrote the
opinion for the majority, which also
included Judge Fletcher. Judge Fisher
dissented. Judge Politz started by
examining the plain wording of Title 18
U.S.C. § 3109, commonly referred to as
the "knock and announce" statute. It
provides:
The officer may break open any outer
or inner door or window of a house, or
any part of a house, or anything
therein, to execute a search warrant, if,
after notice of his authority and
purpose, he is refused admittance or
when necessary to liberate himself or a
person aiding him in the execution of
the warrant.
The court pointed out that the officers
"provided notice of their authority and
purpose." Accordingly, the issue was
"whether they were refused admittance."
Of course, "[a] literal application of the
statute would allow entry after both
announcement and specific denial of
admittance."' But just about every court,
' 282 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition
to the literal reading of the statute, a historical
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including the Ninth, has ruled that an
affirmative refusal of entry is not
required by the statute, and that refusal
may be implied in some instances.
In determining what was reasonable in
this case, the court explained that the
knock and announce rule served the
following interests: reducing risk of
harm to both law enforcement and
occupants of the house; helping to
prevent unnecessary destruction or
property; and symbolizing respect for
individual privacy summarized in the
adage that "a man's house is his castle."
The court concluded that taking these
principles into account, combined with
the fact that in this entry, no exigent
circumstances existed and force had to
be used to enter the home, an explicit
refusal of admittance or a lapse of a
substantial amount of time was
necessary before breaking into Mr.
Banks' home.
The court made this determination
examining the chameleon we call the
totality of the circumstances, i.e., "size
of the residence, location of the
residence, location of the officers in
relation to the main living or sleeping
areas of the residence, time of day,
nature of the suspected offense, evidence
demonstrating the suspect's guilty
suspect's prior convictions, ... and any
other observations triggering the senses
review of the knock and announce rule
demonstrates that refusal was required before the
police could forcibly enter. See Tracey Maclin,
Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why The Supreme Court
Should Leave Fourth Amendment History
Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 903-14
(2002) (discussing the history of the knock and
announce rule and the requirement that at
common law it was an officer's obligation to
refrain from using force until his request for
entry had been refused).
of officers that reasonably would lead
one to believe that immediate entry was
necessary."
Here "there was nothing ... that triggered
the officers' sense, and there were not
exigent circumstances warranting a
waiver of the reasonable delay" and "the
officers had no specific knowledge of
any facts or reasonable expectations
from which they could reasonably have
believed that entry into Banks' residence
would pose any risk greater than the
ordinary danger of executing a search
warrant on a private residence." And
because they were never denied
permission to enter the residence, the
officers "were required to delay acting
for a sufficient period of time before
they could reasonably conclude that they
impliedly had been denied admittance."
Fifteen to twenty seconds after a single
knock didn't cut it under these
circumstances because there was no
affirmative denial of admission or other
exigent circumstances.
Copyright C 2003 by National
Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, Inc.; Milton Hirsch, David
Oscar Markus
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WHY KNOCK? THE DOOR WILL INEVITABLY OPEN: AN ANALYSIS OF
PEOPLE VSTEVENS AND THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT'S
DEPARTURE FROM FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
46 Wayne Law Review 1659
Fall, 2000
Robin L. Gentry
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
2. The Knock-and-Announce Rule
The knock-and-announce rule has its
roots in English common law. The first
judicial ruling came in 1603 in
Semayne's Case, which held that a
sheriff must announce his presence and
purpose and request entrance before
breaking into a home. The holding in
Semayne's Case relies on a statute that
can be traced back to 1275, which was
enacted as a declaration of the common
law.
In the United States, individual states
adopted this rule either by statute or
judicial decision. The federal
government enacted the federal knock-
and-announce statute in 1917. ***
Important policy considerations
underlie the knock-and-announce rule.
The protection of both officers and
homeowners is a primary reason for the
rule. Police are required to announce
their presence in order to avoid being
mistaken for a burglar. A homeowner's
and an occupant's privacy interests are
also protected by the knock-and-
announce rule. The requirement of
waiting before entering gives the
homeowner a chance to ready himself
before the police enter his house. The
homeowner's property interest is
protected by giving him an opportunity
to open a door before a forcible entry is
attempted, therefore preventing
unnecessary property damage. The
knock-and-announce rule protects the
"overriding respect for the sanctity of the
home that has been embedded in our
traditions since the origins of the
Republic."
Three exceptions to the knock-and-
announce requirement have arisen due to
exigent circumstances: peril, useless
gesture, and destruction of evidence.
Police are permitted to forgo the knock-
and-announce requirement if they have a
reasonable basis to suspect that they are
in physical danger from the homeowner
or occupant. The useless gesture
exception is permitted when the
occupants of the house already have
knowledge of the police presence and
purpose prior to their entrance. The
police may also enter without waiting if
they can establish that there is a danger
evidence will be destroyed between the
time the police knock and enter. A
violation of the knock-and-announce
statute will be excused if any of these
exigent circumstances are proven. These
exceptions are limited; the United States
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Supreme Court has refused to allow a
per se blanket exception to the knock-
and-announce rule.
3. Knock-and-Announce Within the
Constitutional Framework
Prior to 1993, the United States
Supreme Court had not directly
addressed whether the knock-and-
announce rule had a Fourth Amendment
basis. In Wilson v. Arkansas,I the Court
granted certiorari to resolve lower court
conflicts over whether the knock-and-
announce principle was a part of the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness
determination. After examining the
common law protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures at
the time the Constitution was written,
the Court held that there was "no doubt"
that the reasonableness of a search
depends on the manner of entry.
The Court did not abolish the
established exceptions to the knock-
and-announce rule, however. Officers
may still legally violate the knock-and-
announce rule if exigent circumstances
exist. Further, the Court left the question
of what would constitute reasonable
unannounced entry to the lower courts.
The Wilson Court did not address the
issue of whether the independent source
or inevitable discovery doctrines should
apply to prevent exclusion of evidence
after a knock-and- announce violation
because the issue was not raised in the
lower court and the Court had not
granted certiorari on the issue.
Copyright C 2000 Wayne State
University; Robin L. Gentry
514 U.S. 927 (1995).
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02-9410 Crawford v. Washington
Ruling Below: (Wash., 147 Wash. 2d 424, 54 P.3d 656)
Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause was not violated by admission of pretrial, tape-recorded
statement of defendant's wife who, because defendant invoked marital privilege, was not
available to testify, who was present during defendant's assault of third party, was arrested, and
arguably has motive to shift blame from herself, and whose self-inculpatory statement was
admissible hearsay because its failure to state clearly that defendant acted in self-defense was
virtually identical to defendant's pretrial statement and thus "interlocks" with it, rendering wife's
statement reliable.
Question Presented: (1) Does Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause permit admission
against criminal defendant of custodial statement of potential accomplice on ground that parts of
statement "interlock" with defendant's custodial statement? (2) Should this court re-evaluate
confrontation clause framework established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and hold that
clause unequivocally prohibits admission of out-of-court statements insofar as they are contained
in "testimonial" materials, such as tape-recorded custodial statements'?
STATE of Washington, Petitioner,
V.
Michael D. CRAWFORD, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Washington,
En Banc
Decided September 26, 2002.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
BRIDGE, J.
This case presents two issues: (1) whether a
defendant waives an objection under the
confrontation clause to the admission of his
wife's hearsay statements by exercising his
marital privilege to prevent his spouse from
testifying; and (2) whether the wife's
statements are otherwise admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule or as an
interlocking confession. We hold that a
defendant does not waive his confrontation
rights when he invokes the marital privilege.
We also conclude that the statements here
are admissible because the wife's statements
interlock with those of her husband and
hence provide adequate indicia of reliability
to satisfy confrontation clause concerns.
FACTS
On August 5, 1999, Michael Crawford
stabbed Richard Rubin Kenneth Lee at Lee's
apartment. State v. Crawford, noted at 107
Wash.App. 1025, 2001 WL 850119, at *1
(2001). Police arrested Crawford that
evening and they collected two taped
statements from both Crawford and his wife,
Sylvia, who had been present at the time of
the assault. Id. The first statements
contained roughly the same account of the
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attack: the three had collected at Lee's
house; Crawford left to buy alcohol; when
he returned, Lee was making sexual
advances toward Sylvia; Crawford stabbed
Lee twice. Id.
Several hours after police taped the first
statements, they again questioned the
Crawfords independently regarding the
events of August 5. Id. Their stories were
again similar to each other, but distinctly
different from the earlier version of the
encounter. Id. This time the Crawfords each
revealed that the alleged sexual assault had
actually occurred several weeks earlier. Id.
On the night in question, both Crawfords
contended, Michael became angry when Lee
was mentioned and he and his wife left to
find Lee. Id. Sylvia directed her husband to
Lee's apartment and after talking with him
for a short period, Crawford stabbed Lee
twice. Id. Although unclear, the main
distinguishing factor in these second
statements was that Crawford alluded that
Lee may have had something in his hand
when Crawford stabbed Lee, while Sylvia
implied that Lee may have grabbed for
something after Crawford stabbed Lee. Id.
Crawford was charged with attempted first
degree murder while armed with a deadly
weapon and first degree assault while armed
with a deadly weapon. Clerk's Papers (CP)
at 2. At trial, Crawford claimed that he acted
in self-defense and he invoked the marital
privilege to prevent his wife from testifying
against him. Report of Proceedings (RP) at
7-8. The trial court admitted both of Sylvia's
statements on the grounds that the
statements would not violate the marital
privilege and because the court determined
that the statements were sufficiently reliable
to alleviate confrontation clause concerns.
RP at 45, 53; RP at 219-21, Exs. 37, 38; RP
at 231, Exs. 41-42. A jury subsequently
convicted Crawford of first degree assault
while armed with a deadly weapon. CP at 2.
In an unpublished opinion, a divided Court
of Appeals concluded that Crawford did not
waive his right to confrontation when he
invoked the marital privilege. Crawford,
2001 WL 850119, at *1. It then held that
admitting Sylvia's second statement was
reversible error because her statement did
not possess adequate indicia of reliability,
nor did it interlock with Michael's second
statement. Id. at *5-7. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals reversed Crawford's
conviction. Id. at *1. We granted review.
WAIVER OF RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION
Crawford invoked the marital privilege,
RCW 5.60.060, to keep his wife from
testifying against him at trial. RP at 7. The
marital privilege in Washington states in
relevant part:
A husband shall not be examined for or
against his wife, without the consent of the
wife, nor a wife for or against her husband
without the consent of the husband; nor
can either during marriage or afterward, be
without the consent of the other, examined
as to any communication made by one to
the other during marriage.
RCW 5.60.060(1). Neither Crawford nor the
State called Sylvia to testify. See RP at 7-14.
Crawford claims, however, that his
confrontation right under the Sixth
Amendment, as applied to the states through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, was violated when Sylvia's
hearsay statements to the police were
admitted at trial.
The State contends that Crawford waived his
right to confrontation when he neglected to
call Sylvia at trial, relying on State v.
Salazar, 59 Wash.App. 202, 796 P.2d 773
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(1990) and In re Personal Restraint of
Sauve, 103 Wash.2d 322, 692 P.2d 818
(1985), to support its position. While
instructive, both Salazar and Sauve contain
a key distinction from the case before us,
making them distinguishable. In those cases
the witness was "available"; Sylvia
Crawford was not an available witness.
In Salazar, the defense counsel did not call
an informant suggesting that defense was
unable to locate him. 59 Wash.App. at 216,
796 P.2d 773. Rejecting the assertion that
the witness was unavailable, the court stated,
"We have held that a defendant who fails to
call an available hearsay declarant waives an
objection under the confrontation clause to
admission of the hearsay." Salazar, 59
Wash.App. at 217, 796 P.2d 773 (citing
State v. Borland, 57 Wash.App. 7, 12, 786
P.2d 810 (1990)). "Similarly, defense
counsel's failure to call [the informant], who
we assume was available absent persuasive
evidence to the contrary, waived any
confrontation clause objection." Id.
In Sauve, the defendant claimed that his
confrontation right was violated when the
police officer who received an informant's
tip, failed to testify at the suppression
hearing. 103 Wash.2d at 329, 692 P.2d 818.
Although the court did not directly hold that
Sauve had waived his confrontation right, it
did note that the defendant's failure to
exercise his rights at trial did not constitute a
denial of such rights by the court. Sauve,
103 Wash.2d at 330, 692 P.2d 818 (citing
State v. Murphy, 35 Wash.App. 658, 669
P.2d 891 (1983); State v. Whittington, 27
Wash.App. 422, 618 P.2d 121 (1980)).
Accordingly, the court stated,
There is no evidence that petitioner asked
the State for the testimony of the officer
who received the tip, nor did petitioner
himself attempt to call the officer to the
stand. The State was not given a chance at
trial to either present the officer's
testimony or prove his unavailability. The
failure of petitioner to exercise his rights at
trial does not constitute a denial of such
rights.
Id.
In both Salazar and Sauve the witnesses
were available, but the defense failed to call
them at trial. In the case presented, in
contrast, the witness, Sylvia Crawford, was
unavailable to testify because Michael
Crawford had invoked his marital privilege.
The marital privilege explicitly states that
"[a] husband shall not be examined for or
against his wife, without the consent of the
wife, nor a wife for or against her husband
without the consent of the husband." RCW
5.60.060(1). This language specifically
denies Sylvia the ability to testify either for
or against her husband, rendering her
unavailable as a witness. Although Michael,
not Sylvia, invoked the privilege, the result
is the same - Sylvia was unavailable to
testify, unlike the witnesses in Salazar and
Sauve. Therefore, the situation before us is
distinct from Salazar and Sauve and it does
not logically follow that Crawford waived
his confrontation rights by not calling his
wife to testify.
The conclusion that Crawford did not waive
his confrontation rights is supported by a
decision from this court that directly
addressed the issue of marital privilege and
extrajudicial statements by a third party. See
State v. Burden, 120 Wash.2d 371, 374, 841
P.2d 758 (1992). In Burden, this court
stated, "Here, the defendant asserts
admission of Mary Burden's extrajudicial
statements by third persons would indirectly
violate the testimonial privilege and place
[the defendant] in the position of having to
waive the privilege to refute the testimony
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or allow the testimony without cross
examination. We have previously rejected
this argument." Id. (citing State v. Kosanke,
23 Wash.2d 211, 160 P.2d 541 (1945)). By
recognizing the rejection of this argument,
this court implied that the testimonial
privilege is not violated by admissible
hearsay statements and, furthermore, that the
defendant does not have to waive the marital
privilege to refute the testimony. Therefore,
the defendant cannot be said to have waived
his right to cross examination.
Further, courts are hesitant to accept waiver
of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
because of their significance in the trial
process. See generally John R. Kroger, The
Confrontation Waiver Rule, 76 B.U. L.REV.
835 (1996). "'There are few subjects,
perhaps, upon which [the Supreme Court]
and other courts have been more nearly
unanimous than in their expressions of belief
that the right of confrontation and cross-
examination is an essential and fundamental
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is
this country's constitutional goal."' Id at 840
(quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
405, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965)).
Where a waiver has been recognized, the
waiver usually occurs when the defendant
has inappropriately caused the witness's
unavailability. Id. at 844. Thus, "'a
defendant may waive the right to confront
witnesses against him when his own
misconduct is responsible for a witness's
unavailability at trial."' Id. at 842 (quoting
United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784,
788 (2d Cir.1984)). Misconduct is not
apparent when a defendant invokes a
statutory privilege, however. See United
States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 962 (6th
Cir.1982) (suggesting that only sham
marriage would result in waiver, but
admitting legitimate spouse's grand jury
testimony when it met adequate guarantees
of trustworthiness). In the case before us
Crawford invoked a recognized statutory
privilege.'
As the Court of Appeals acknowledged here,
forcing the defendant to choose between the
marital privilege and confronting his spouse
presents an untenable Hobson's choice.
Crawford, 2001 WL 850119, at *1. The
Court of Appeals aptly noted that this court
traditionally has "not required a defendant to
waive one right to preserve another." Id.
(citing State v. Michielli, 132 Wash.2d 229,
246, 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (upholding
dismissal of case where defendant was
forced to choose between waiving right to
speedy trial or right to effective assistance of
counsel); State v. Price, 94 Wash.2d 810,
814, 620 P.2d 994 (1980) (stating that
forcing defendant to choose between
effective assistance of counsel and speedy
trial impermissibly prejudices defendant)).
Both Michielli and Price present situations
where a defendant was forced to balance his
trial rights and ultimately select one right to
the exclusion of the other. To force a
defendant to choose the more difficult
position of confronting his spouse on the
stand, or to assume that he has waived his
confrontation right by electing not to call his
wife, presents a similarly untenable choice
and undermines the marital privilege itself.
Therefore, we hold that Crawford did not
waive his right to confrontation when he
Although no formula has emerged for application of
the confrontation waiver rule, case law suggests six
major legal issues that courts will resolve before
applying the doctrine: "(1) witness unavailability, (2)
cause of unavailability, (3) intent, (4) standard of
proof, (5) statement reliability, and (6) waiver
hearing procedure." Kroger, supra, at 846. The key
element for this case is the cause of the
unavailability. "Two paradigmatic ways in which adefendant satisfies the causation requirement have
evolved: murder and threats." Id. at 849. From this
statement it is apparent that the evolution of the
waiver doctrine has not been directed at the
legitimate invocation of statutory privileges, absent
threat or other indication of malfeasance.
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invoked the marital privilege.
ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY
If Crawford did not waive his right to
confrontation, the State contends in the
alternative that Sylvia's out-of-court
statements to the police were admissible
hearsay that did not violate the Sixth
Amendment.
This court has noted a distinction between
in-court testimony and extrajudicial
statements by a spouse. In drawing a
distinction between the two, we have
concluded that hearsay statements may be
admissible under certain circumstances.
Burden, 120 Wash.2d at 377, 841 P.2d 758.
Forcing a spouse to testify, however,
challenges the policy purposes behind the
privilege. In Burden, this court determined
that the policy purposes - fostering domestic
harmony and preventing discord, reflecting
the natural repugnance of having one spouse
testify against the other, and preventing the
testifying spouse from having to choose
between perjury, contempt of court, or
jeopardizing the marriage - supported this
distinction. Id. at 375, 841 P.2d 758 (citing
State v. Thorne, 43 Wash.2d 47, 55, 260
P.2d 331 (1953); State v. Wood, 52
Wash.App. 159, 163, 758 P.2d 530 (1988);
Teresa Virginia Bigelow, Comment, The
Marital Privileges in Washington Law:
Spouse Testimony and Marital
Communications, 54 WASH. L.REV. 65, 70
(1978-79)). We concluded that the latter two
purposes would not be affected by allowing
third person testimony, because the spouse
would not be testifying in court, and
questioned the applicability of the first
purpose. Burden, 120 Wash.2d at 375-76,
841 P.2d 758. Thus, as we have
acknowledged, confronting a spouse on the
stand is quite distinct from admitting an
extrajudicial statement.
To assess whether an extrajudicial hearsay
statement is admissible we apply a
multilayered analysis, in consideration of the
valuable constitutional protections afforded
by the Sixth Amendment. Simply because a
statement falls within a hearsay exception
does not mean that it will satisfy the Sixth
Amendment. State v. Rice, 120 Wash.2d
549, 565, 844 P.2d 416 (1993). Therefore,
the court will employ specific safeguards
"'to ensure that the proffered evidence offers
some reliability in terms of the declarant's
perception, memory and credibility-a
function traditionally performed by cross
examination."' Id at 566, 844 P.2d 416
(quoting State v. Anderson, 107 Wash.2d
745, 750-51, 733 P.2d 517 (1987)).
First, the statements must be admissible
under the rules of evidence. Rice, 120
Wash.2d at 564, 844 P.2d 416. Second, the
statements must contain a sufficient indicia
of reliability and trustworthiness to satisfy
the requirements of the confrontation clause.
Id. A firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule will satisfy this requirement. State v.
Davis, 141 Wash.2d 798, 845, 10 P.3d 977
(2000). If the exception is not firmly rooted,
then the court will consider nine
nonexclusive factors to determine the
relative reliability of the hearsay
statements.2 Rice, 120 Wash.2d at 565-66,
2 The nine factors include: (1) whether the declarant,
at the time of making the statement, had an apparent
motive to lie; (2) whether the declarant's general
character suggests trustworthiness; (3) whether more
than one person heard the statement; (4) the
spontaneity of the statement; (5) whether
trustworthiness is suggested from the timing of the
statement and the relationship between the declarant
and the witness; (6) whether the statement contains
express assertions of past fact; (7) whether the
declarant's lack of knowledge could be established by
cross- examination; (8) the remoteness of the
possibility that the declarant's recollection is faulty;
and (9) whether the surrounding circumstances
suggest that the declarant misrepresented the
defendant's involvement.
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844 P.2d 416; State v. Whelchel, 115
Wash.2d 708, 722-25, 801 P.2d 948 (1990).
Alternatively, the indicia of reliability test
can be met if the statements "interlock" in
accordance with our decision in Rice. 120
Wash.2d at 569-70, 844 P.2d 416.
Sylvia's first statement to the police is not
hearsay because it was not offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.3 ER 801(c).
Instead, as the Court of Appeals noted, it
was offered to demonstrate that the
Crawfords lied about the circumstances
preceding the assault. Crawford, 2001 WL
850119, at *5. Considering that out-of-court
statements raise hearsay and confrontation
clause objections only when they are offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted,
Sylvia's first statement is not inherently
objectionable. State v. Parris, 98 Wash.2d
140, 145, 654 P.2d 77 (1982). It will be
admissible, however, only if it is relevant
under ER 401, and it is relevant only if her
second statement is admitted.
Sylvia's second statement is hearsay: The
declarant is unavailable at trial-because
Crawford invoked the marital privilege-
and the statement is being offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. ER 801(c).
The State contends that Sylvia's second
statement is admissible under ER 804(b)(3),
the hearsay exception for a declarant's
statement against penal interest. A statement
against penal interest is not considered a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule,
however. Whelchel, 115 Wash.2d at 715,
801 P.2d 948. Therefore, "out-of-court
statements from a nontestifying codefendant
made against penal interests and which
The defense counsel did not object to the admission
of the statements as hearsay when they were
presented at trial. See RP at 219- 32. Defense
argument appears to hinge on the previous invocation
of the marital privilege and right to confrontation. See
RP at 7-21, 37.
inculpate the defendant are admissible
against the defendant only when they bear
adequate indicia of reliability." State v. St.
Pierre, 111 Wash.2d 105, 113, 759 P.2d 383
(1988) (citing Anderson, 107 Wash.2d at
750, 733 P.2d 517; State v. Dictado, 102
Wash.2d 277, 287-88, 687 P.2d 172 (1984)).
Thus, we must determine whether the
statement contains a sufficient indicia of
reliability to satisfy the confrontation clause.
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100
S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980).
Before we determine whether the statement
is sufficiently reliable to satisfy
confrontation clause concerns, we must
assess which portions of the statement were
actually against Sylvia's penal interest. Only
the portions of Sylvia's statement that are
self-inculpatory will be admitted under the
statement against interest exception to the
hearsay rule. See State v. Roberts, 142
Wash.2d 471, 491-97, 14 P.3d 713 (2000);
ER 804(b)(3). In Roberts this court adopted
the Supreme Court's rejection of a "whole
statement" approach to defendant
declarations. 142 Wash.2d at 494, 14 P.3d
713 (adopting Williamson v. United States,
512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d
476 (1994)). Therefore, even though self-
exculpatory statements may be included
within a statement that is generally
inculpatory, only those portions that are
actually self-inculpatory are admissible. Id.
at 492-94, 14 P.3d 713.
A statement against interest, or self-
inculpatory statement, is defined as:
A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject the declarant to civil or
criminal liability, or to render invalid a
claim by the declarant against another, that
a reasonable person in the declarant's
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position would not have made the
statement unless the person believed it to
be true.
ER 804(b)(3) (emphasis added).
Crawford objected to the admission of
Sylvia's statements that he was 'infuriated,"'
"'past tipsy,"' and that he said Lee "'deserves
a ass whoopin."' Crawford, 2001 WL
850119, at *7 n. 3 (Armstrong, C.J.,
dissenting). He also objected to the
admission of Sylvia's statement regarding
whether Lee reached for or possessed a
weapon when Michael assaulted him
because it allegedly rebutted his own
testimony and damaged his self- defense
claim.
While potentially damaging to Michael,
these statements are all inculpatory of Sylvia
as well. It was Sylvia who showed Michael
where to find Lee and she was present
through the duration of the violent
encounter. She walked away from the
stabbing with Michael and did not turn to
the police when she had the opportunity. As
a potential accomplice, therefore, Sylvia
would benefit from limiting Michael's
involvement; the lesser his charge, the lesser
her accomplice liability. Sylvia's statements
that Michael was "infuriated," "past tipsy,"
and that he said Lee "deserves a ass
whoopin" would not shift blame from her to
Michael, but rather it could increase
Michael's culpability, and potentially hers as
well. Furthermore, if Sylvia knew that
Michael wanted to give Lee an "ass
whoopin" and took Michael to find Lee, this
fact could support a charge against Sylvia
for accomplice liability because she could be
viewed as encouraging or aiding the
facilitation of a crime. See RCW
9A.08.020(3)(a). Likewise, Sylvia's
assertion that Lee may have reached into his
pocket, possibly for a weapon, but had
empty hands when Michael stabbed him,
would be against her interest. Rather, she
would benefit her own case if she had said
that Lee wielded a weapon throughout the
confrontation and that Michael was merely
protecting himself. Therefore, we conclude
that these statements were self-inculpatory
and admissible hearsay, provided they meet
a sufficient indicia of reliability.
Because a codefendant's confession is
presumed unreliable,4 the statement must
either meet a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule5 or provide some indicia of
reliability, such as interlocking with the
defendant's own confession. St. Pierre, 111
Wash.2d at 112-13, 759 P.2d 383. The State
asserts that Sylvia's second statement is
admissible as an interlocking confession
with Michael's second statement. See
generally Rice, 120 Wash.2d 549, 844 P.2d
416 (adopting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,
106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986)). As
this court recognized in Rice, "[w]hen a
codefendant's confession is virtually
identical [i.e., interlocks] to that of a
defendant, it may be deemed reliable." Id. at
570, 844 P.2d 416 (citing Lee, 476 U.S. 530,
106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514). Hence an
interlocking confession will serve the same
purpose as the nine-factor test in assessing
reliability. Id.
The Court of Appeals here held that,
although the Crawfords' statements were
''very similar," they differed regarding
4 Although Sylvia is not a codefendant, as she has not
been formally charged with a crime, her role is
similar to that of a codefendant. She was present
during the assault, was arrested and gave a statement
to the police concerning the events, and had an
arguable motive to shift the blame away from herself.
Her role in this case thus suggests applying the Rice
interlocking confession analysis by analogy.
As previously noted, a statement against penal
interest is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception for
purposes of the confrontation clause.
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whether Lee was armed when Michael
stabbed him. Crawford, 2001 WL 850119,
at *6. Following are the two statements for
comparison.
Sylvia's statement:
Q: did Kenny do anything to fight back
from this assault
A: (pausing) I know he reached into his
pocket ... or somethin' ... I don't know
what
Q: after he was stabbed
A: he saw Michael coming up. He lifted
his hand ... his chest open, he might of
went to go strike his hand out or
something and then (inaudible)
Q: okay, you, you gotta speak up
A: okay, he lifted his hand over his head
maybe to strike Michael's hand down or
something and then he put his hands in his
... put his right hand in his right pocket ...
took a step back ... Michael proceeded to
stab him ... then his hands were like ...
how do you explain this ... open arms ...
with his hands open and he fell down ...
and we ran (describing subject holding
hands open, palms toward assailant)
Q: okay, when he's standing there with his
open hands you're talking about Kenny,
correct
A: yeah, after, after the fact, yes
Q: did you see anything in his hands at
that point
A: (pausing) um um (no)
Ex. 42, at 6-7.
Michael's statement:
Q: okay. Did you ever see anything in
[Lee's] hands
A: I think so, but I'm not positive
Q: okay, when you think so, what do you
mean by that
A: I coulda swore I seen him goin' for
somethin' before, right before everything
happened. He was like reachin', fiddlin'
around down here and stuff ... and I just ...
I don't know, I think, this is just a
possibility, but I think, I think that he
pulled somethin' out and I grabbed for it
and that's how I got cut ... but I'm not
positive. 1, I my mind goes blank when
things like this happen. I mean, I just, I
remember things wrong, I remember
things that just doesn't, don't make sense to
me later.
Ex. 44, at 7.
Although the Court of Appeals concluded
that the statements were contradictory, upon
closer inspection they appear to overlap. The
Court of Appeals stated that Sylvia's version
of the story had Lee grabbing for something
only after he had been stabbed, while
Michael stated that Lee may have had
something in his hand before the attack.
Crawford, 2001 WL 850119, at *6.
However, when asked whether Lee fought
back from the assault, Sylvia states that Lee
"lifted his hand over his head maybe to
strike Michael's hand down or something
and then he put his hands in his ... put his
right hand in his right pocket ... took a step
back ... Michael proceeded to stab him...."
Ex. 42, at 7. She also previously stated that
she was unsure how Michael received the
cut on his hand. Id. at 6. Thus, it is unclear
from Sylvia's statement when, if ever, Lee
possessed a weapon.
Michael's statement is equally ambiguous.
He states, "I coulda swore I seen him goin'
for somethin' before, right before everything
happened. He was like reachin', fiddlin'
around down here and stuff ... and I just ... I
don't know, I think, this is just a possibility,
but I think, I think that he pulled somethin'
out and I grabbed for it and that's how I got
cut ... but I'm not positive." Ex. 44, at 7.
Thus, both of the Crawfords' statements
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indicate that Lee was possibly grabbing for a We reverse the Court of Appeals and
weapon, but they are equally unsure when reinstate the conviction.
this event may have taken place. They are
also equally unsure how Michael received ALEXANDER, C.J., SMITH, JOHNSON,
the cut on his hand, leading the court to MADSEN, SANDERS, IRELAND,
question when, if ever, Lee possessed a CHAMBERS and OWENS, JJ., concur.
weapon. In this respect they overlap.
Self-defense is at issue in this case, so
admittedly the timing of Lee's possession of
a weapon is significant. However, both of
the Crawfords' statements are ambiguous as
to whether Lee ever actually possessed a
weapon. The interlocking confession rule is
designed to admit "virtually identical"
statements. Rice, 120 Wash.2d at 570, 844
P.2d 416. As the dissent from the Court of
Appeals noted, and we agree, "neither
Michael nor Sylvia clearly stated that Lee
had a weapon in hand from which Michael
was simply defending himself. And it is this
omission by both that interlocks the
statements and makes Sylvia's statement
reliable." Crawford, 2001 WL 850119, at *
7 (Armstrong, C.J., dissenting). Because
Sylvia's and Michael's statements are
virtually identical, admission of Sylvia's
statement satisfies the requirement of
reliability under the confrontation clause.
CONCLUSION
We hold that a defendant does not waive his
Sixth Amendment right to confront an
adverse witness when he invokes the marital
privilege to keep his wife from testifying at
trial. Thus, Michael Crawford did not waive
his confrontation clause rights when he
invoked RCW 5.60.060 and refused to call
his wife, Sylvia, to testify at his trial.
Sylvia's pretrial statements to the police, at
issue in this case, were admissible, however,
because they were self- inculpatory and they
interlocked with Michaels' own admissible
statements.
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Also This Term:
02-6683 Castro v. United States
Ruling Below: (1 Ith Cir., 290 F.3d 1270, 71 Crim. L. Rep. 249)
When district court sua sponte recharacterizes federal prisoner's post-conviction motion as
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
prisoner's subsequent filing of self-styled Section 2255 petition, raising claim that had been
available when prisoner filed initial motion, is "second or successive petition" within purview of
AEDPA amendments that, absent compliance with such amendments, is not entitled to
consideration; in future cases, district court should warn prisoner of consequences of
recharacterization and provide him with opportunity to amend or dismiss his initial filing.
Question Presented: When district court recharacterizes pro se federal prisoner's first post-
conviction motion as habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, does such recharacterization
render prisoner's subsequent attempt to file first titled Section 2255 petition "second or
successive petition" within purview of AEDPA? (2) Does U.S. Supreme Court have jurisdiction
to review I Ith Circuit's decision affirming dismissal of Section 2255 petition for writ of habeas
corpus as second or successive?
02-8286 Banks v. Cockrell
Ruling Below: (5th Cir., 8/20/02, unpublished)
In federal habeas corpus proceeding held prior to effective date of Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act, district court erroneously granted relief under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), with respect to sentencing phase for state's failure to disclose that penalty phase
witness was paid police informant, because petitioner, by limiting his request for investigative
assistance to different witness and by failing to even attempt to speak with alleged informant,
unjustifiably failed to develop this issue factually in state court and, therefore, was not entitled to
evidentiary hearing at which evidence on which his Brady claim relies was adduced; even though
alleged paid informant admitted his status as such in affidavits presented to federal district court
and deputy sheriffs testimony confirmed that status, such evidence was not exhausted in state
court, petitioner having merely alleged in his third state habeas proceeding that witness was paid
informant without having attempted to locate witness and ascertain his true status, and without
having attempted to interview investigating officers, and thus petitioner cannot establish Brady
claim; assuming that merits of Brady claim are before court, that state withheld evidence that
witness was paid police informant, and that evidence would have been favorable to petitioner in
attacking witness's testimony, witness's status as paid informant was not material to jury's
penalty phase finding because, given that much of witness's penalty phase testimony was
corroborated, even by petitioner, and that witness had already been impeached on three other
bases, there is no reasonable probability that jury, had it been informed of informant's paid
status, would not have imposed death penalty; petitioner's claim that during penalty phase he
received ineffective assistance of counsel is also meritless because, even assuming that counsel's
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performance was deficient, petitioner has not shown prejudice from any aspect of such
performance: federal evidentiary hearing is not trial for purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b), which
provides that "[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings," and
thus district court properly refused to consider petitioner's contention that his Brady claim
encompassed transcript that was not raised in his habeas petition and that petitioner never sought
to add to his petition by amendment but that had been introduced at federal hearing to establish
Brady claim.
Question Presented: (1) Did Fifth Circuit commit legal error in rejecting petitioner's claim
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)--that prosecution suppressed material witness
impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in penalty phase of trial--on grounds that (a) evidence
supporting claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding fact that, as in Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 67 U.S.L.W. 4477 (1999), there was no reasonable basis for concluding that
counsel for petitioner could have discovered suppressed evidence prior to or during trial or state
post-conviction proceedings, and (b) suppressed evidence was immaterial to petitioner's death
sentence, when panel neglected to consider that trial prosecutors viewed evidence to be of
"utmost importance" to showing that capital sentence was appropriate? (2) Did Fifth Circuit act
contrary to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 68 U.S.L.W. 4263 (2000), when it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and
concluded that no single category would have brought about different result at sentencing
without weighing impact of evidence collectively'? (3) Did Fifth Circuit act contrary to Hams v.
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969), and Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), in holding that
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings because "evidentiary hearings"
in those proceedings are not similar to civil "trials"?
02-964 Baldwin v. Reese
Ruling Below: (9th Cir., 282 F.3d 1184, 71 Crim. L. Rep. 12)
Even though habeas corpus petitioner's petition for discretionary review by state's highest court
did not specify federal nature of claim he now seeks to assert in federal court, claim was "fairly
presented" to state court, within meaning of U.S. Supreme Court precedents on exhaustion of
remedies, by way of decision of state intermediate court, which, when read by state supreme
court, would have alerted it that claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was decided
on basis of federal law.
Question Presented: Does state prisoner "alert" state's highest court that he is raising federal
claim, as required by doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, when--in that court--he neither cites
specific provision of federal constitution nor cites at least one authority that has decided claim on
federal basis?
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